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In a global risk society (Beck, 2009), two interlinked developments increase com-
plexity on environmental policy issues: On the one hand, unilateral problem solv-
ing is often ineffective in a globalized world. On the other hand, many environmen-
tal issues themselves are becoming increasingly complex. States have addressed
these challenges by forming international institutions and regimes to collectively
deal with environmental problems. But why do states form international environ-
mental regimes on some issues while they fail to do so on others? How do states
deal with scientific uncertainty on complex environmental issues and to what ex-
tent can scientific uncertainty account for success or failure of regime formation
process? This dissertation provides insights on regime formation on highly complex
policy issues by theorizing on how scientific uncertainty frames actors’ perception
of an issue. It is argued that actors are tolerant towards uncertainty on some as-
pects of an issue while they are not on others. This argumentation is empirically
tested against four cases of international regime formation, two successful ones and
two failed regime formation processes. The dissertation finds evidence that actors
are more tolerant towards scientific uncertainty if it only affects the assessment of
benefits while costs are at the same time estimated to be low.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“There are known knowns; there are things
we know we know. We also know that there
are known unknowns, this is to say we know
that there are things we do not know. But
there are also unknown unknowns: the ones
we don’t know we don’t know.”
– Donald Rumsfeld
———————————————————-
“Il n’est pas certain que tout soit incertain.”
– Blaise Pascal
In a global risk society (Beck, 2009), policy issues are becoming increasingly com-
plex and political decision-making has to be made in the shadow of an uncertain
future. In environmental policy, complexity is twofold: On the one hand, com-
plexity is often caused by nature itself. On many issues, biological, physical and
chemical mechanisms are highly interlinked, causing feedbacks, tipping points and
chain reactions on different scales. While policy-makers depend on precise infor-
mation to make sound decisions, natural science is often at the edge of knowledge
on these issues with conflicting models and rivaling research results. On the other
hand, many environmental issues involve a transboundary dimension where uni-
lateral action is ineffective. Many issues can only be resolved through multilateral
cooperation in the form of institutionalized international regimes. Reaching such a
1
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multilateral agreement among actors with divergent interests and different norma-
tive convictions is a complex process in itself. The combination of complex natural
processes and interaction of social actors make these cases of regime formation on
complex policy issues unique. However, social science has to a large extent focused
on the latter and neglected the effect of uncertain scientific findings on political
decision making. This study approaches the question why and how states form
international environmental regimes on complex policy issues. Furthermore, this
study sheds light on the question why states form international regimes on some
uncertain issues whilst refusing to cooperate on others?
The focus of this dissertation on scientific uncertainty blends in with two research
traditions: It stands in the tradition of institutionalism in international relations
(Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1984; Keohane and Nye, 1977)
and its sub-discipline, the study of international regimes (Hasenclever et al., 1997;
Krasner, 1983; Rittberger and Mayer, 1993). Scholars of international regimes can
benefit from this dissertation, because it offers a refined theoretical framework that
integrates different and previously separated theoretical traditions in regime the-
ory. It furthermore enhances the body of empirical work on international regimes
by adding case-studies on international regimes as well as empirical cases of failed
attempts of regime formation that have not been studied in such detail before.
Scholars that have an interest in the role of ideas in politics and international rela-
tions may find this dissertation worth reading, because this study picks up on the
literature about cognitive biases in international relations (Goldgeier, 2001; Levy,
1992; McDermott, 2004) and the role of models and ideas (Blyth, 1997; Chwieroth,
2007; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Lieberman, 2002; Parsons, 2002) to integrate
science as a provider of ideas that influence political decision making. Not only
does this have implications for environmental politics, but for policy issues where
scientific models and ideas shape the perspective of actors. To explain the behav-
ior of social actors, it may be useful to turn to the science-induced perception of
the world; a focus on scientific knowledge in international politics is informative
in this regard.
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The book investigates international political action on four environmental pol-
icy issue areas that are characterized by scientific uncertainty (Persistent Organic
Pollutants, Stratospheric Ozone, Arctic haze, and global deforestation). The com-
parative perspective between two cases where regime formation was successfully
completed (Persistent Organic Pollutants and Stratospheric Ozone) and two cases
where regime formation failed (Arctic haze and global deforestation) allows to
more rigorously identify factors that facilitate or hamper regime formation under
scientific uncertainty than previous single-case studies had been able to do.
1.1 Research Gaps and Goals of this Book
The dissertation aims at closing three standing gaps in the study of international
regimes. The first one is of theoretical nature. In this study, it is argued that
regime theory either neglects scientific uncertainty or draws implausible conclu-
sions from its existence. In order to overcome this shortcoming, this study offers an
integrated theoretical framework, which regards scientific uncertainty as a factor
that influences state interests towards institutionalized cooperation. It is argued
that scientific uncertainty does not simply facilitate or hamper the formation of
international regimes. Rather, this study pursues an argument that focuses on the
specific aspect which is affected by scientific uncertainty. The second gap concerns
research design and methodology. Regimes study has for the most part relied on
single-n (or small-n) case studies about successfully installed international regimes.
While this is ideographically informative, this methodological choice runs the dan-
ger to cause a bias towards positive findings. To a large extent, regime studies that
intend to identify factors that are causally linked to regime formation are lacking
a control group (Dimitrov et al., 2007). The third gap that this study intends to
close is of empirical nature. The study offers detailed case studies not only of the
political process that has led to success or failure of regime formation, but it also
provides a detailed account on how scientific knowledge has evolved in parallel to
the political process of regimes and non-regimes.
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1.2 Major Arguments in Brief
Starting from a rationalist paradigm, this study presumes rational actors that try
to maximize their utility according to their individual cost-benefit-calculations.
Actors can be expected to form a regime, if benefits exceed costs. They can
be expected to block an international regime formation process if costs exceed
benefits. It is therefore a specific configuration of costs and benefits that leads
to successful or unsuccessful regime formation. In order to assess individual costs
and benefits, actors depend on information. More specifically, actors depend on a
whole set of information to assess costs and on a whole set of information to assess
benefits.
As argued earlier, information can be highly uncertain in the context of environ-
mental politics. For actors, this implies that they may be able to determine their
costs, but have trouble to determine their benefits, or vice versa. The main ar-
gument of this study is that in the light of scientific uncertainty there are still
configurations that are conducive for successful regime formation. On the other
hand, there are configurations which are obstructive for regime formation. More
specifically, if costs are expected to be low and benefits are uncertain, regime for-
mation is more likely and if costs are uncertain and benefits are low, successful
regime formation is more unlikely.
1.3 Outline of the Book
Starting form a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on international
regimes, as well as a review of concepts of uncertainty in chapter 2, the study
develops a refined concept of uncertainty and identifies three major gaps in the
study of international regimes. These gaps are picked up in chapter 3, which elab-
orates on a theoretical framework in order to close gaps at a theoretical level. This
allows the formulation of a set of testable hypotheses. Chapter 4 is of technical na-
ture and explores how the hypotheses are operationalized and empirically tested.
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The chapter explains and justifies methodological choices. Chapter 5 contains the
empirical analysis. To test the argument, this study has retraced the historical
developments of the scientific and political process of four empirical cases. The re-
sults are presented and interpreted in chapter six, which also addresses alternative
explanations, implications for research and politics and an outlook on the future
research agenda.

Chapter 2
Cooperation and Uncertainty in
Social Science Literature
This study is concerned with regime formation and uncertainty. Both issues have
already been addressed by a vast body of literature. This chapter reviews the-
oretical accounts on international regimes in order to identify major theoretical
paradigms in the field. The chapter also reviews empirical regime study to profit
form idiographic insights as well as methodological approaches that have been
employed in empirical regime study. Thirdly, the chapter reviews the literature
on uncertainty with a special focus on international relations. The review reveals
three major gaps in regime study. It shows how common concepts of uncertainty
rest primarily on knowledge about probabilities and how this can be mislead-
ing. The review furthermore shows how uncertainty in international relations has
been treated either as a strategic feature, or as the ambiguity of information about
complex real-world issues. While the latter concept of scientific uncertainty better
reflects the challenges of environmental issues, the review also shows that theo-
retical approaches that use such a concept often have their shortcomings. More
precarious, the review of theories on international regimes shows how theoretically
separating scientific uncertainty and strategic interaction forfeits explanatory value
on many issues of international cooperation. Concerning methodology, the review
of empirical regime study shows that the field tends to be bias towards positive
7
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findings, since empirical regime study to a large extend omits the whole range
of variance of the dependent variable. In other words, regime study is mainly
concerned with the successful creation of international regimes.
2.1 Regime Study – A Review of Theory and
Empirical Applications
Starting from Krasner (1983)’s prominent, yet wholly and broad definition (Hag-
gard, 1987) of an international regime as “implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge
in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983, :1), regime definitions can
be categorized into formal, behavioral and cognitive definitions (Hasenclever et al.,
1996). This study follows Young (1989)’s formal definition, where international
regimes are regarded as “specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined
activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of
the members of international society” (Young, 1989, :13). His definition has been
narrowed down by Dimitrov (2006), who defines an international regime as “. . . a
formal intergovernmental agreement that involves specific commitments to policy
targets and timetables” (Dimitrov, 2006, :5). This definition admittedly omits a
variety of non-explicit or uncodified international regulations and patterns of be-
havior, such as for example international customary law. However, the pragmatic
definition allows more traceable observations of actors’ behavior and is therefore
more suitable for the empirical research of this study.
Scholars found increasing interest in rule-based international coordination in the
1970s (Haas, 1975; Ruggie, 1975) as a response to mainstream work on interna-
tional relations (Breitmeier et al., 2006). As realist assumptions about interna-
tional regimes as the epiphenomenal execution of hegemonial power proved more
and more inadequate to explain the existence of international regimes despite the
absence of a hegemon, scholars turned to the interests of rational states that
seek to realize gains from cooperation. While the realist assumptions of rational,
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self-interested states as the main actors in an anarchic international structure are
adopted from realism, states are not pictured as unitary actors that share the
same desire for power (Grieco, 1988; Strange, 1982; Waltz, 2001); rather, they are
pictured to posses individual preferences and interests of which some can only be
realized through mutual cooperation. Even though cooperation can be expected
to improve the outcome towards Pareto-efficency, anarchy in the international sys-
tem of sovereign states leads to dilemma-situations in which non-cooperation is the
dominant strategy for all players (Dawes, 1975; Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965). Inter-
national regimes can change the pay-off structure in such a way that cooperation
becomes the dominant strategy by providing information, reducing transaction
costs and punishing deviation (Keohane, 1982).
Therefore, international regimes enable states to realize common interests and to
overcome different collective-action problems. According to supporters of interest-
based explanations, regimes come into existence “. . . because they could have rea-
sonably been expected to increase the welfare of their creators.” (Keohane, 1984).
By employing game theoretic micro-foundations, interest-based regime-theory im-
pressively shows how self-interested states can maximize their gains through rule-
based cooperation in an international self-help system (Finus, 2002; Kydd and
Snidal, 1997). Rather than serving a dominant powers’ interests, regimes provide
specific functions that are demanded by states to realize gains from cooperation.
Thus, an interest-based hypothesis about regime-formation can be summarized
by the following: “An agreement is struck and a regime forms when the partici-
pants reach closure on the terms of a mutually acceptable constitutional contract.”
(Young, 1993, :11). The original approach was extended by Zu¨rn, who notes that
the classical prisoners’ dilemma is not the only game that resembles settings in
international relations. Within his situation-structure-framework, he claims that
different game structures imply different dilemma situations which has an impact
on the likelihood and types of regime formation (Zu¨rn, 1992).
Despite sharing common grounds with political science, scholars from economics
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think differently about international regimes. Literature from economics on inter-
national environmental agreements (IEAs)1 employs the same logic as an interest-
based approach, but models cooperation in a more rigorous economic fashion. This
strand of literature adds two major insights to our understanding of rule-based co-
operation. First of all, Barrett (1994) shows that IEAs have to be self-enforcing,
since no sovereign state can be forced into signing an agreement. He further ar-
gues that states have to be symmetrical in their structure of preferences to have an
incentive for cooperation. The concept of symmetry reflects the political-science
concept of mutual interests towards cooperation and will be reviewed later in
this chapter. Secondly, in a later version of his model, Barrett (1994) shows how
rule-based cooperation can be ‘bought’ through side-payments and issue-linkage
(Barrett, 2001). Buying cooperation eventually levels asymmetry between states.
Rationalistic game-theoretic approaches that emphasize the importance of national
interests have enormously enhanced our understanding of international coopera-
tion by pointing out why states do not cooperate despite mutual expected benefits
and how international regimes can resolve this situation.
The strong assumptions that are implied in game-theoretic models of interna-
tional environmental cooperation have been challenged by regime-scholars who
are dedicated to a so-called ‘knowledge-based approach’ (Haas, 1980) or ‘cogni-
tivism’ (Hasenclever et al., 1996). Especially the assumption of fully informed
rational actors has been a target of criticism. Cognitivist criticism is, however,
not articulated in the radical fashion of the theoretical tradition labeled as ‘social-
constructivism’ in which the rationalistic ‘logic of consequences’ is confronted with
a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Wendt, 1992). Rather than questioning the assump-
tion of rational self-interest driven actors, cognitivists argue that the assumption
of adequate and complete information becomes more and more questionable in a
world of increasingly complex policy issues. Cognitivists contend that ambigu-
ity of information has an impact on the information-processing ability of rational
actors.
1since IEA refers to the same empirical phenomena as regimes, the two terms will be used
synonymously
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With this in mind, decision-makers are pictured as being unable to adequately
formulate interests and struggle to set up pay-off matrices. Cognitivists draw on
the literature from psychology in international relations (Goldgeier, 2001; Jervis,
1976; McDermott, 2004; Young and Schafer, 1998) and integrate works on the role
of ideas and models in foreign policy (Chwieroth, 2007; Goldstein and Keohane,
1993; Jachtenfuchs, 1995; Lieberman, 2002). These considerations lead cognitivist
scholars to three assumptions: Firstly, the demand for international regimes de-
pends on actors perception of international problems, which is, in part, produced
by their causal and normative beliefs (Hasenclever et al., 1997, :137). This implies
that (a) information does not speak for itself but must be interpreted and (b)
interpretation depends on the body of knowledge that actors hold (Hasenclever
et al., 1997, :206). Secondly, before actors can agree on the terms of collectively
treating an international issue, they have to agree on a shared consensual definition
of the nature and the consequences of the issue at stake (Dimitrov, 2006; Haas,
1992a). Thirdly, states want to reduce uncertainty by acquiring more knowledge
where science and international epistemic communities are the main provider of
new knowledge. If - as Keohane (1982) states - the chance of realizing common
interests is a prerequisite for a regime-formation, cognitivist scholars find it rea-
sonable to turn to the question of how these interests form in the first place (Haas,
1980).
Empirically, the study of international regimes predominantly rests on single-n or
small-n comparative case studies. (Moravcsik, 2000; Nayar, 1995; Raustiala and
Victor, 2004; Underdal, 2002; Young, 1993). As Hasenclever et al. (1996) conclude,
the authors ask questions on “. . . what accounts for the emergence of rule-based
cooperation in the international system? How do international institutions affect
state behavior and collective outcomes in an issue-area they address? Which
factors determine the stability of international regimes?” (Hasenclever et al., 1996,
:177). Empirical contributions typically set up the theoretical argument that is
derived from one of the mentioned theoretical paradigms and continue with a series
of case-studies to either support or modify the derived argumentation (Kydd, 2001;
Mitchell and Bernauer, 2004; Morrow, 2001; Oatley, 2001; Pahre, 2001; Richards,
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2001; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Underdal, 2002; Young, 1993). The publication
by Breitmeier et al. (2006) is an exception and offers a medium-n database of 23
regimes that have been coded by experts.
2.2 Uncertainty, Ignorance and Risk
Social science has developed multiple concepts and ideas to describe the unknown.
Much work has been done in the field of economics and game theory to model
the consequences of ‘asymmetric information’ or ‘incomplete information’. Since
these valuable contributions use different concepts of ‘uncertainty’, this section
aims at a minimal definition as basis for this study. To avoid misunderstandings,
this section provides a conceptional distinction between ‘certainty’, ‘uncertainty’,
‘risk’ and ‘ignorance’.
Knight (1965) contributed one of the most employed concepts of uncertainty within
social sciences. He defines uncertainty - in contrast to risk - as a situation where no
objective, or publicly verifiable, probability distribution exists. According to this
definition, he purposely distinguishes between uncertainty and risk: uncertainty
involves only scarce or ambiguous information that does not reveal probability
distributions about an outcome. The ambiguous character of information leads
to a situation where actors are aware of possible future outcomes, but have no
knowledge about the likeliness of a specific future outcome.
Contrasting ‘risk’ from ’uncertainty’ on the grounds of knowledge about probabil-
ity distributions has proven very helpful in highlighting different implications of
risk and uncertainty for social behavior. Both knightian risk as well as knightian
uncertainty have in common that outcomes of a certain action is not known. They
differ only with regard to the availability of objective, additive probability distri-
butions. However, characterizing ‘uncertainty’ merely on the grounds of proba-
bility distributions is problematic, because it neglects knowledge about the set of
possible outcomes. This makes ‘uncertainty’ indistinguishable from ‘ignorance’.
Both ‘ignorance’ and ‘uncertainty’ are characterized by the absence of knowledge
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about a definite outcome and the absence of knowledge about probability distri-
butions. The distinguishing feature that analytically separates uncertainty from
ignorance is the knowledge about what outcome could possible be the result of a
certain action.
The following table shows how considering an additional dimension (knowledge
about the set of possible outcomes) sharpens the concept of uncertainty and makes
it distinguishable from closely related concepts:
certainty risk uncertainty ignorance
Definite outcome Known Unknown Unknown Unknown
Probability distribution ‘One’ Known Unknown Unknown
Set of possible outcomes Known Known Known Unknown
Table 2.1: Certainty, Risk and Uncertainty
A simple throw of a dice can serve as an example: In the case of certainty, a
perfect dice has six sides with the same number; a known outcome will occur with
a probability of one2. In the case of risk, a perfect dice will reveal one outcome
out of a known set of outcomes with a known probability, while in the case of
uncertainty the player does not know whether and to what degree the dice is
loaded or not. In a situation of Ignorance-situation, the player does not know the
specific attributes of the dice, e.g. how many sides the dice has or if it is loaded
or not.
The main features of ‘uncertainty’ have been defined as the absence of knowledge
about a definite outcome, the availability of knowledge about the set of possible
outcomes and the absence of knowledge about the likeliness of a single, definite
outcome. The distinction between ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ignorance’ is crucial. Ac-
tors faced with ‘uncertainty’ have (ambiguous) information about the potential
consequences of their action which is not the case if they act under ‘ignorance’.
Beginning from the minimal definition of ‘uncertainty’, the study of international
relations and specifically the study of international regimes has identified different
2This, of course, only holds under the assumption that the basic rules of physics (gravity,
fraction, etc.) are sufficiently at work and the dice is not hit by lightning
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kinds of ‘uncertainty’ that differ in their source and their implications for social
behavior. The next section will show how literature has treated these aspects and
what conclusions have been drawn from it.
2.3 Uncertainty in International Relations
“In particular, governmental policy makers
may not perfectly know how the world eco-
nomic system works. Disagreement could
arises not only from a conflict of interest
in underlying preferences but from different
predictions concerning the consequences of
agreement.”
Keisuke Iida Analytic Uncertainty and
International Cooperation
While uncertainty in the form of asymmetric or incomplete information has been
a major theme in economics, game theory and decision theory (Alt et al., 1988;
De Mesquita et al., 1997; Downs and Rocke, 1990; Fearon, 1997; Morrow, 1989),
surprisingly few studies within international relations literature explicitly addresses
the issue of uncertainty. Rathbun (2007) shows how uncertainty is an implicit –
yet unaddressed – feature of nearly every major theoretical paradigm in interna-
tional relations study. He exemplifies how four major theoretical paradigms in IR
– Realism, Rationalism, Cognitivism and Constructivism – comprise different con-
cepts of uncertainty (Rathbun, 2007, :533). According to him, rationalism treats
uncertainty as a pure lack of information while cognitivism treats uncertainty
as the ambiguity of information which leads to confusion (see table 2.2). While
for rationalists, the remedy is updating information, cognitivists regard cognitive
shortcuts or scientific models as tools to overcome the challenges of uncertainty
(Rathbun, 2007, :534). While Rathbun’s contribution valuably illuminates an im-
portant, yet somehow ‘hidden’ feature of IR-theory, his view is however slightly
misleading since it gives the impression that the same unitary phenomenon (in
this case ‘uncertainty’) is simply regarded through different theoretical lenses (in
this case realism, rationalism, cognitivism and social constructivism). Rathbun
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neglects that uncertainty and its consequences are not just a matter of theoretical
conceptionalisation. As argued in subsection 2.2, uncertainty is diverse and com-
prises different features. While the minimal definition in section 2.2 points out
the differences between risk, uncertainty and ignorance, research has shown that a
closer focus on the nature of uncertainty and its sources reveals new implications.
Political game theory proposes that the main source of uncertainty stems from the
unknown future behavior of the other actors(s) (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007).
But as studies from macro-economics demonstrate, the mode through which play-
ers assess their pay-off functions has significant effects for the cooperative setting.
Frankel and Rockett (1988) call this ‘model uncertainty’ where actors do not know
which model reflects reality the best (Ghosh, 1988). Their research shows that ex-
pected pay-offs highly depend on the model that is employed to predict future
gains from multilateral macroeconomic coordination. Their simulation shows that
the choice of a particular model has in some cases more impact on the structure
of expected pay-offs than the choice of wether to coordinate action or not.
This notion is picked up by Iida (1993), who argues in favor of a distinction of
uncertainty according to its source. His study on macroeconomic cooperation
shows how analytic uncertainty – as opposed to strategic uncertainty – changes
pay-off functions in a macro-economic coordination game:
“In particular, governmental policy makers may not perfectly know
how the world economic system works. Thus, the economic outcomes
of policies are not perfectly predictable. Disagreement could arises
not only from a conflict of interest in underlying preferences but from
different predictions concerning the consequences of agreement.” (Iida,
1993, :433)
Iida (1993) distinguishes strategic uncertainty from analytic uncertainty ; strategic
uncertainty evolves from unknown intentions and attributes of the other actors
which is the major theme in political game theory and has found its way into the
study of international relations. Analytic uncertainty, on the other hand, stems
from the complexity of real-world phenomena. Iida states that “. . . the crucial dif-
ference between strategic and analytic uncertainty [. . . ] lies in the fact that players
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are assumed to know their own payoffs perfectly under strategic uncertainty while
they may not know their own payoffs [. . . ] under analytic uncertainty” (Iida, 1993,
:433, emphasis in the original).
Few contributions from environmental economics have included scientific uncer-
tainty into their research by modeling it as a random variable into the welfare-
functions (Helm, 1998; Kolstad, 2005, 2007; Kolstad and Ulph, 2011; Na and Shin,
1998). These contribution either highlight the possibility of hiding distributional
interests behind “the veil of uncertainty” (Helm, 1998) or model countries as be-
ing affected symmetrically by scientific uncertainty (Na and Shin, 1998). Both
views do not capture scientific uncertainty comprehensively. A scenario in which
countries were able to hide their preferences by pointing to scientific uncertainty
indicates that a country can actually assess the distributional effects of a specific
outcome. This indicates that scientific uncertainty must have been already re-
duced at least for a state with the intensions to exploit scientific uncertainty for
its own interest. In this case, actors rather strategically hide information to direct
the outcome in their interest rather than a case where scientific uncertainty ham-
pers states to set up clear pay-offs. However, if the available information reveals a
spectrum of possible pay-offs that can have both a positive or negative sign with
unknown probabilities to which direction the pay-off might turn, the possibility of
hiding interests is ruled out.
In a recent contribution, Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) pick up the notion of sci-
entific uncertainty and show in an experimental design how scientific uncertainty
can change the setting from a prisoners’ dilemma into a coordination-game. They
subdivide ‘scientific uncertainty’ into ‘uncertainty about thresholds’ and ‘uncer-
tainty about the resulting effects’ from breaching a certain threshold. They show
how collective action depends not only on scientific uncertainty as such; rather,
their research suggests that different aspects of an issue can be affected by scientific
uncertainty to varying degrees. This notion will be addressed in section 3.3.
Cognitivist authors incorporate the notion of analytic or scientific uncertainty into
their framework by claiming explanatory power for regime formation on policy
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issues that are plagued by scientific uncertainty. (Haas, 1992a). Cognitivists core
assumptions as mentioned in section 2.1 (model dependency, consensuality and
epistemic communities) can only be meaningful if scientific knowledge is uncertain,
this means if actors anticipate more than one single future outcome. Otherwise,
information would speak for itself. The definition of ‘the state of nature’ would be
given and not an issue of discussion and, self-evidently, not an issue that actors
have to agree upon before engaging in meaningful discussion. Therefore, scientific
uncertainty is a prerequisite for a cognitivist approach to be applied.
Bearing this in mind, decision-makers are portrayed to be unable to adequately
formulate interests and struggle to set up pay-off matrices. Cognitivists draw on
the literature from psychology in international relations (Goldgeier, 2001; Jervis,
1976; McDermott, 2004; Young and Schafer, 1998) and integrate works on the
role of ideas and models in foreign policy (Chwieroth, 2007; Goldstein and Keo-
hane, 1993; Jachtenfuchs, 1995; Lieberman, 2002) which lead cognitivists to three
assumptions: First, the demand for international regimes depends on actors per-
ception of international problems, which is, in part, produced by their causal and
normative beliefs (Hasenclever et al., 1997, :137). This reveals an additional co-
operation dilemma: gains from cooperation are not only jeopardized by possible
free-riding or leakage, but actors cannot be sure if these gains exist at all in the
first place. Cognitivist contributions emphasize the importance of ‘epistemic com-
munities’ who inform policy makers. If different plausible models offer divergent
conclusions on how to maximize utility, the agreement on one single model is cru-
cial for coordinated action. According to cognitivists, decision makers have to
agree on one model before they can engage in a meaningful discussion about the
issue at stake and negotiate the terms of an agreement (Dimitrov, 2006).
Table 2.2 summarizes the core features of an interest-based and knowledge-based
approach in regime-study:
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Rationalism Cognitivism
Central Explanatory Variable Interests Knowledge
Meta-theoretical orientation Rationalistic Weakly rationalistic
Perception Objective Subjective
Nature of Reality Objectively real Subjectively perceived
Nature of Uncertainty Strategic Analytic
Quality of Uncertainty Weak Strong
Obstacles to Regime-formation Collective-Action-
Dilemmas
Diverging Models of Re-
ality
Problems of Uncertainty Lack of Information Ambiguity of Informa-
tion
Tools for reducing Uncertainty Updating Information Cognitive shortcuts and
models
Table 2.2: Summarizing Regime Theory
The systematic overview shows the merits and shortcomings of both theoretical
approaches on which I will elaborate in detail in 2.4. A general shortcoming is
the focus on a rather limited scope of both theoretical strands. Both approaches
treat the key features of their theory in an exclusive manner. In this way, they
neglect that in many empirical cases for which they claim explanatory value, some
key features cannot be separated from each other and exist simultanioulsly. For
example, no approach accounts for interaction-effects with a central variable from
the other approach. As the next sections will display, an investigation of the
interplay between knowledge and interests can be informative. The same accounts
for the nature of uncertainty. In more situations, actors do not face either strategic
or analytical uncertainty, but rather a mix of both. By limiting the scope on only
one phenomenon, each strand forfeits explanatory value.
It will be argued in subsection 3.2 that these weak spots can be circumvented
and explanatory leverage is gained by integrating both approaches. I argue that
despite the displayed differences, both theoretical strands are rather supplemental
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than contradictory. Calculated in its weakest form as Haas (1992b) and others
express it, cognitivism rests on similar (positivist) epistemological and ontological
assumptions (Hasenclever et al., 2000, :11) as rationalism. The employment of
different central explanatory variables is not an obstacle per se. On the contrary,
a shift of focus on the interplay of both central variables might reveal new insights
on long-standing puzzles.
2.4 Regime Study – Three Objections
The study of international regimes has matured over the past 20 years. It seems
as though some shortcomings have sunk in and have been reproduced time and
time again. This section elaborates on the theoretical weak spots and it will reveal
some shortcomings in commonly employed research designs.
2.4.1 Objection Number 1: Theoretical Segregation
Rationalist approaches have convincingly argued why forming an international
regime serves the individual interests of utility-maximizing states. However, these
approaches have trouble accounting for scientific uncertainty. The predictions for
crop yield changes due to climatic change displayed in figure 2.1 are taken from
the assessment report of the International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC). For
a country like Mongolia, the report predicts either an increase or a considerable
loss in wheat yield due to climate change (IPCC, 2007a). In light of the best
information available, Mongolia is still left with the uncertainty whether to favor
climate change or not and therefor whether to support international efforts to fight
climate change or not.
As previously mentioned, cognitivism considers scientific uncertainty to be a key
feature of increased policy issues in a complex world. The underlying core assump-
tion of cognitivist scholars is that in the light of scientific uncertainty, consensually
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Figure 2.1: Wheat Yields Projections
shared knowledge among epistemic communities enhances the chances of a suc-
cessful regime formation process (Haas, 1992b), meaning that the more scientific
elites agree on one model to be the ‘true’ model, the more probable it is that
political decision-makers come to form a regime. Knowledge-based approaches
however lack (a) a convincing coherent theoretical base for arguments, (b) neglect
strategic effects of scientific uncertainty and vice versa scientific knowledge and
(c) frequently fall short in providing empirical evidence for its theoretical predic-
tions. Knowledge-based regime analysis relies on a rather fragile theoretical basis.
The underlying idea of knowledge-based approaches is that knowledge shapes the
perception of issues and therefore influences states behavior (Hasenclever et al.,
1997, :149). On this ground, knowledge-based regime analysis hypothesizes that
a shared understanding of consensual knowledge facilitates the regime formation
process. However, the causal link between shared knowledge and international co-
operation remains rather vague and empirical studies leave us with a contradictory
picture.
While Frankel (1988)’s contribution introduces the model-dependency of expected
pay-offs to macro-economics, he also finds that gains from cooperation exist de-
spite the employment of divergent scientific macroeconomic models. Therefore,
from a modeling perspective, a consensually shared perspective among actors is
not a necessary condition for actors to expect common gains from cooperation.
Furthermore, the contribution of Wettestad (2000) and the contribution of Skod-
vin (2000) show empirically that international regimes were formed despite di-
vergent causal beliefs. Vice versa, several attempts at international cooperation
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failed despite consensual knowledge (Helleiner, 2008). It is also questionable if
new scientific knowledge necessarily reduces scientific uncertainty and facilitates
regime-formation. New scientific findings can easily reveal new and stronger un-
certainties or - as Haggard and Simmons argue - “easily might render a game less
cooperative by exposing new incentives to defect” (Haggard, 1987, :510). Theo-
retical considerations as well as empirical findings lead to a rejection of one major
claim of knowledge-based regime theory: consensually shared knowledge is nei-
ther a necessary nor a sufficient condition for regime-building. The relationship
between uncertainty, knowledge, interests and political action seems to be more
entangled than previous research suggests.
To assess the role of scientific uncertainty and scientific knowledge in the process
of regime formation, it seems more appropriate to focus on the impact of knowl-
edge on the formation of interests rather than establishing a direct link between
knowledge and regime formation. The impact of information on the formation of
interests is intuitively hard to deny, since interests necessarily rest on some form
of causal ideas (see for example Goldstein and Keohane (1993)). Within a ratio-
nalistic framework, it is hard to think of anything else but ideas and models about
mechanisms in the real world as a base for formulating preferences and interests.
Even though several authors articulate the need for an integration of knowledge-
based and interest-based assumptions, (Hasenclever et al., 2000) literature lacks
a coherent theoretical model. Section 3 aims at filling this gap and will for that
purpose examine more closely how scientific knowledge can influence actors’ inter-
ests. Furthermore, it will shed light on the relationship between uncertainty, new
scientific knowledge, interests and policy.
2.4.2 Objection Number 2: No Variance on the Dependent
Variable
Empirical studies in the field of regime study have primarily been conducted
through small-n comparative case studies in which the evolutionary process of ex-
isting regimes are retraced. With few exceptions (for example Dimitrov (2006)),
Chapter 2. Cooperation and Uncertainty in Social Science Literature 22
these studies examine exclusively successful cases of regime formation processes
with the intension to trace causal inference of factors that lead to regime formation.
However, by omitting stalled regime formation processes as cases (or ‘Non-regimes’
as Dimitrov (2006) calls it), regime study faces problems claiming causal inference
as it lacks a comparative dimension.
When regime study omits ‘stalled regimes’ or ‘non-regimes’ (Dimitrov et al., 2007),
it ignores control cases that are crucial for testing causal hypothesis. Such a
research design implicitly assume that the absence of the factor that lead to regime
formation in the examined case(s) would automatically lead to a failure of regime
formation. Case selection, then, is biased towards a selection on the dependent
variable (Geddes, 2003) and does not cover all possible values of the dependent
variable and - as articulated by Arild Underdal - “. . . the entire field of regime
analysis is biased in favor of positive findings” (Underdal, 2002, :447).
2.4.3 Objection Number 3: Flawed Conceptionalization of
Scientific Knowledge as Independent Variable
The third objection concerns the conceptionalization of ‘knowledge’ as indepen-
dent variable by cognitivist scholars. The explanatory value of scientific knowledge
is (a) not convincing as it has different implications for different actors and (b)
has so far not been operationalized sufficiently. As Dimitrov et al. (2007) states,
“[T]he [. . . ] problem with knowledge-based accounts of international environmen-
tal policy is that, strictly speaking, there are none. All cognitivist explanations
focus on factors other than the available information per se: actors, institutions or
processes.” (Dimitrov et al., 2007, :30). As mentioned in section 2.1, the indepen-
dent variable ‘knowledge’ can - broadly speaking - either occur as ‘consensually
shared’ or ‘not shared’. This conceptionalization, however, neglects the actual con-
tents of ‘knowledge’. If, for example, epistemic communities and policy-makers
consensually agree that something is not a threat to human health, cognitivist con-
siderations would still leave us to expect a successful regime-formation while, at the
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same time, the actual reason for forming a regime (escaping a collective-action-
dilemmas to realize gains from cooperation) would not be given. Consensually
shared knowledge is therefore not sufficient. Within a cognitivist framework, at
least two conditions have to be met: First of all, knowledge has to be consensually
shared by relevant actors and secondly, the knowledge has to provide a reason for
forming a regime. Dimitrov (2006) addresses this shortcoming by disaggregating
knowledge into three sectors: (a) knowledge about the extent, (b) knowledge about
the causes of a problem and (c) knowledge about consequences to human society
(Dimitrov, 2006, :34). By this nature, a research design that investigates the im-
pact of knowledge on regime-formation is considerably improved. As subsection
4.4.1 will show, it makes however sense to disaggregate knowledge further.
2.5 Summary: Defining Scientific Uncertainty
”Scientific uncertainty is a fact of life and
many toxic substances issues present the
choice between two risks: the risk of economic
and other costs without corresponding ben-
efits and the risk of irreversible damage to
health and the environment if the substance
turns out to be harmful.”
Thomas B. Stoel et al.Flourocarbon
Regulation
Starting with a review of the literature on international regimes and literature
on uncertainty, the preceding chapter shows how the concept of uncertainty is
either implicitly or explicitly woven into the literature on international relations
as well as on international regimes. This chapter, however, argues in favor of a
more clear-cut definition of uncertainty which leads to a better understanding of
scientific uncertainty: First of all, considering knowledge about the set of possible
outcomes allows to distinguish uncertainty from ignorance. Secondly, it has been
argued in line with Iida (1993) that uncertainty has to be differentiated according
to its source. Both concepts allow us to arrive at a more comprehensive concept:
scientific uncertainty can be defined as knowledge about a set of possible outcomes
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(in contrast to knowledge about a specific outcome (certainty) or no knowledge
about any future outcomes (ignorance)) with unknown probability distributions
due to ambiguous scientific knowledge. The absence of definite knowledge about
pay-offs distinguishes scientific uncertainty from strategic uncertainty.
Furthermore, this chapter takes a critical stance on regime study. It argues that
regime study suffers from three shortcomings. First of all, regime study systemat-
ically neglects control cases of regime formation processes that did or do not lead
to a formalized international regime. The focus on small-n studies of successful
regime formation processes limits conclusions on causal factors for regime forma-
tion. Secondly, knowledge-based regime study suffers from (a) an unconvincing
theoretical framework and (b) an inconclusive conceptualization of ‘knowledge’ as
an independent variable. The next chapter argues that an appreciation of the
content of knowledge promises insights on the puzzling effects of scientific knowl-
edge on regime formation. And (c), current regime theory either neglects scientific
uncertainty (as in rationalist approaches) or conceptionalizes it unconvincingly (as
in cognitivist approaches).
Even though some authors have called for an integrated theoretical framework
(Hasenclever et al., 2000), a more nuanced appreciation of knowledge in the context
of regime study (Dimitrov, 2006; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994) and an integration
of failed regimes as cases (Underdal, 2002), literature on the issues is scarce. The
next chapter (chapter 3 aims at closing the theoretical gap and intends to develop
a coherent theoretical framework. Chapter 4 will pick up the shortcomings in
empirical research design by both disaggregating knowledge and integrating failed
regime formation processes.
Chapter 3
The Argument: A Theoretical
Synthesis
“Although each theory satisfactorily explains
a part of the origin of multilateral environ-
mental cooperation, all need to be invoked to
explain the full range of outcomes”
Peter M. Haas Stratospheric Ozoze: Regime
Formation in Stages
The review of the literature in the previous chapter shows that the two theoretical
approaches (interest-based and knowledge-based) which are predominantly em-
ployed in the study of international environmental regimes both have their merits
and their shortcomings. The aim of this chapter is to integrate these approaches
to establish a coherent theoretical framework that appreciates both interests and
knowledge. The main argument of this work is that empirical results are too
puzzling to support the claim that scientific knowledge as such influences regime
formation. On the other hand, the informational basis on some environmental
issues is too fragile to apply a purely rationalistic framework. To gain insights on
the interplay between scientific uncertainty, new scientific knowledge and political
action towards regime formation, it is useful to focus on the micro-mechanism of
how scientific uncertainty frames the perception of the issue.
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This study focuses on multilateral environmental agreements that intend to solve
a transboundary environmental issue and potentially would have an effect on the
issue through providing a collective good that (Underdal, 2002). The theoreti-
cal argument presented here is based on fundamental rationalistic assumptions
about international cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1984; Keohane, 1984;
Koremenos, 2005; Moravcsik, 2000; Snidal, 1985): Self-interested states are con-
sidered to be the main actors in an anarchic international order in which actors
attempt to maximize their own utility. Multilateral environmental agreements are
considered to be installed with the intent to resolve collective action problems and
serve as means for states to maximize individual utility. However, as argued in
the previous chapter, individual gains from cooperation on environmental issues
are often more difficult to identify, since environmental issues are often plagued
by scientific uncertainty.
The argument in this chapter begins with a micro-level-explanation of individual
state interests with no scientific uncertainty (see section 3.1). In a second step
(section 3.2), the approach will be transferred to the macro-level of international
regime formation to hypothesize on how different configurations of individual state
interests increase or decrease the likeliness of international regime formations. In
a third step (section 3.3), scientific uncertainty is introduced at a micro-level to
theorize on how scientific uncertainty effects the formation of individual state
interests. These considerations are transferred as a last step (section 3.4) to the
macro level of international regime formation. The aim is to come from the micro
level of individual state interests without scientific uncertainty to the macro level of
international regime formation with scientific uncertainty. This procedure allows
one eventually to arrive at a set of clear-cut and sound hypotheses on the influence
of scientific uncertainty and new scientific knowledge.
This eventually allows one to reconsider the role of new scientific knowledge in
the process of regime formation (section 3.4). It is argued that new scientific
knowledge does not simply facilitate international regime formation. Rather, as
the argumentation in section 3.5 shows, the role of scientific knowledge has to be
considered more diversely.
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3.1 An Interest-based Approach
Whereas individual interests of rational, egoistic states have been at the center of
power-based explanations (such as the ‘Hegemonic Stability Theory’ (Kennedy,
2010; Kindleberger, 1986) or ‘(Neo-) Realism’ ), interest-based theories (such as
‘Contractualism’ (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1984) or ‘Institutionalism (Keohane,
1989, 1984)) have dominated the theoretical discussion on international cooper-
ation ever since pure hegemony gradually began to vanish from international re-
lations. However, even though interest-based theories offer coherent explanations
as to why states do not cooperate despite common interests and how institutions
and international regimes can help to overcome these collective-action problems
in the absence of hegemony, they fall short in providing clear observables with
regard to when and how regimes form and how interests have to be structured so
that states actually form an international regime. The contributions from Sprinz
and Vaahtoranta (1994) and Barrett (2001) can be employed to fill this gap. Bar-
rett (2001) makes a clear case by showing that sovereign states cannot be forced
into an international regime and argues that if states do not share similar inter-
ests, a regime will only form if dissimilarities are overcome through side-payments,
package deals or institutional bargaining (Young, 1989). Sprinz and Vaahtoranta
(1994) focus on ‘interests’ as the dependent variable and conceptionalize them as
a function of costs and benefits that lead states to either support or not support
regime formation. This section shows how both approaches can be employed to
link cost-benefit-configurations of individual states to the international level of
regime formation.
Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) consider ‘interests’ as an aggregate of ‘costs’ and
‘benefits’ and focus on the individual configuration of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ to
estimate a state’s attitude towards institutionalized cooperation. This follows a
straight-forward logic: A state will push for international regulation if benefits ex-
ceed costs and vice versa. If ‘cost’ and ‘benefits’ are either both ‘high’ or both ‘low’,
states are rather ambivalent towards regulation. Hence, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta
(1994) classify them as ‘intermediates’ or ‘bystanders’. According to Sprinz and
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Vaahtoranta (1994), the configuration of costs and benefits shapes state’s attitudes
towards institutionalized cooperation as displayed in table 3.1.
Benefits
C
o
st
s
low high
lo
w
bystanders pushers
h
ig
h
draggers intermediates
Table 3.1: Classification of a Country’s Support for International Environ-
mental Regulation (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994, :81)
This classification displays a country’s expected attitude towards regime formation
within a rationalist, interest-based framework. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994)
hypothesize that if a state expects high benefits and low costs, it will push for an
international regime and if a state expects low benefits and high costs, it will drag
efforts towards international regime formation.
3.2 State Interests and International Regime -
Formation
While the concept of Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) sheds light on the mostly
neglected ‘true nature’ of interests, it cannot (nor does it intend to) explain the
success or failure of regime formation among multiple states. This section intends
to aggregate from the level of individual states interests to the international level of
regime formation. For this purpose, the concept of Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994)
will be extended to include the assumption of similarity (or ‘symmetry’ as Barrett
(1994) calls it) of interests between multiple states. Additionally, the variables
‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ will be conceptualized as gradual rather than binary variables.
This corresponds more to the way Barrett (2001) theorizes about international
environmental agreements. He models the interests of multiple states as either
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similar and conducive (see figure 3.1(a)) or similar and obstructive (see figure
3.1(b)) in terms of regime formation. Additionally, states can also have dissimilar
interests (see figure 3.1(c)). His main argument is that only under the condition
of similar and conducive interests, sovereign states will commit to an international
regime.
(a) Similar Conducive Interests (b) Similar Obstructive Interests
(c) Dissimilar Interests
Figure 3.1: Symmetry and Asymmetry
Each point represents the perceived costs and benefits of single (fictitious) country.
While Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994)’s intend is to explain individual attitudes
of involved states towards international regime formation for individual states,
Barrett (2001)’s concept allows one to conclude from a macro-perspective in what
situations different states have an incentive to form a regime (figure 3.1(a)), when
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not (figure 3.1(b)) and when states’ interests towards regime-formation are not
similar (figure 3.1(c)). Both concepts are therefore complementary and can be
summarized in the following hypotheses: if all states are pushers, a successful
regime-formation process is more likely and vice versa if all states are draggers,
a regime-formation process is less likely. This is reflected in table 3.2, which
displays different configurations of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ for similar states and their
implications for regime formation at the international level.
Benefits
C
o
st
s
low high
lo
w
in-between obstructive
h
ig
h
conducive in-between
Table 3.2: Conducive and Obstructive Configurations of Interests when States
are Similar
Barrett (2001)’s approach covers multiple states. He argues that in the case of dis-
similarity (or ‘asymmetry’ as Barrett (2001) calls it), institutionalized cooperation
can only be ‘bought’ through side-payments or package-deals. Therefore, if some
states are pushers and some are draggers or in between, a successful regime forma-
tion process is only likely if pushers can turn draggers, intermediates or bystanders
into pushers.
However, side-payments and package-deals among states might not be the only
means through which conducive similarity (or ‘symmetry’) can be installed. Re-
alists would argue that hegemonic power could have the same effect. An actor (or
a group of actors) that hold the preponderance of power resources relevant to a
particular issue area can coerce other actors into participation if it serves its (or
their) interests (Keohane, 1982; Kindleberger, 1986; Olson, 1965; Strange, 1982).
This does not contradict Barrett (2001)’s argument that sovereign states cannot
be forced into a regime. The exertion of power does not force states into a regime.
It simply changes their cost-benefit-configuration through the pending threat of
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additional costs for not joining a regime that a powerful actor (or group of actors)
wants to install. This additional mechanism through which similarity in interests
can be installed has not been considered by Barrett (2001), but perfectly fits into
his line of argumentation. This mechanism can of course only work if at least one
state is willing and able to bear the costs to turn other states into pushers.
While the contribution of Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) is a useful way to theorize
on how individual states form their specific interests, it cannot estimate conditions
under which multiple states form international regimes. Barrett (2001)’s model,
on the other hand, can explain when states with individual interests have an in-
centive to form an international regime, but neglects what determines the interests
of individual states. Both views are therefore complementary: Sprinz and Vaah-
toranta (1994)’s approach can be used as a micro-foundation for Barrett (2001)’s
macro-model.
3.3 State Interests and Scientific Uncertainty
The previous section links ‘cost’ and ‘benefits’ of individual states to the inter-
national level of regime formation by integrating the contribution of Sprinz and
Vaahtoranta (1994) and Barrett (2001). This section introduces the concept of
scientific uncertainty at the individual state level and theorizes on how scientific
uncertainty effects individual states’ interests.
Chapter 2 argues that scientific uncertainty and scientific knowledge should not
be treated as a unitary phenomenon. Rather, the specific implications of the
content of scientific knowledge provide insights on its effect on regime formation.
With reference to Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994)’s concept of interests as being an
aggregate of ‘cost’ and ‘benefits’, it can be argued that the individual perception
of both parameters is shaped by scientific knowledge (Goldgeier, 2001; Levy, 1992;
McDermott, 2004). Hence, an argument about the impact of scientific knowledge
and scientific uncertainty on regime formation has to acknowledge the impact
of scientific knowledge and scientific uncertainty on both the parameters ‘costs’
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and ‘benefits’. This eventually provides a micro foundation for the link between
scientific uncertainty and regime formation.
The central argument in this contribution is based on the assumption that sci-
entific uncertainty ought to be considered not as a unitary phenomenon, but as
a factor that changes the calculation of the parameters ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ for
individual states. While in the framework of Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) ‘cost’
and ‘benefits’ can take the values ‘high’ and ‘low’ respectively, both parameters
can also take the value ‘uncertain’ on issues that are characterized by scientific
uncertainty. Therefore, the parameters ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ can theoretically take
three values: high, low or uncertain. If a parameter takes the value uncertain,
states do not know whether it is ‘truely’ high or low. Both parameters should be
taken in conjunction.
To draw conclusions on the effect of scientific uncertainty on regime formation, it
is helpful to consider the effects for a single state first. This allows one to theorize
on different configurations of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ when one parameter is uncertain
and the other is high or low, respectively. Secondly, it allows one to theorize about
the case when both parameters are scientifically uncertain.
The configurations under ideal-typical conditions are graphically displayed in fig-
ure 3.2. It shows five possible configurations:
1. low cost / uncertain benefits (figure 3.2(a))
2. uncertain costs / low benefits (figure 3.2(b))
3. high costs / uncertain benefits (figure 3.2(c))
4. uncertain costs / high benefits (figure 3.2(d))
5. uncertain costs / uncertain benefits (figure 3.2(e))
Ideal type 1 in figure 3.2(a) represents a case in which a single state expects low
costs from forming a regime while benefits are uncertain. Since costs are expected
to be low, a state facing a configuration of ‘low costs’ and ‘uncertain benefits’
will rather push for a regime to form. The known set of possible future outcomes
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(a) Ideal Type 1 (b) Ideal Type 2
(c) Ideal Type 3 (d) Ideal Type 4
(e) Ideal Type 5
Figure 3.2: Ideal Types
indicates that benefits – in the best case – exceed costs or – in the worst case –
merely balance each other out. Regardless of the ‘true’ outcome, it can be plausibly
reasoned that a state will rather ‘push’ for multilateral regulation. This allows one
in a first step to hypothesize about its support for international institutionalized
cooperation. If a state expects low costs and uncertain benefits, it will push for an
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international regime.
However, a state might find itself in a position where costs are uncertain while
benefits are low (see ideal type 2 in figure 3.2(b)). In this case, a state expects to
benefit only little while it potentially faces high costs. Facing this configuration, a
state can be assumed to ‘drag’ regime formation since the configuration of scientific
knowledge leads it to expect potentially high costs and certainly low benefits. In
the best case, a state achieves low benefits at low costs. In the worst case, it
faces low benefits at high costs. Hence, if a state expects uncertain costs and low
benefits, it will drag a regime formation process.
Ideal type 3 and 4 (figures 3.2(c) and 3.2(d)) are in between and correspond to
what Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) would call ‘intermediate’ or ‘bystanders’.
Even though less clear-cut, it can be argued that states are more positive towards
international regulation if there is a possible future outcome within the set of
possible future outcomes where high benefits can be achieved at low cost. This
is the case in ideal type 3 (figure 3.2(c)). Vice versa, when the best possible
future outcome within the set of possible future outcomes predicts high benefits
to high costs while in the worst possible outcome only low benefits are achieved
at high costs (ideal type 4 in figure 3.2(d)), states can be assumed to be less
favorable towards institutionalized cooperation. Therefore, while both ideal types
are less clear-cut, it can be plausibly argued that ideal type 3 (figure 3.2(c)) is
more conducive in terms of institutionalized international cooperation than ideal
type 4 (figure 3.2(d)).
If both costs and benefits are affected by scientific uncertainty, hypothesizing about
support of international regime formation is the least clear-cut. Any conclusions on
how a state anticipates its costs and benefits remains speculative. If a state – as in
ideal type five – does not have any information about the outcome of their decision
on institutionalized cooperation, they can not anticipate whether they would gain
or loose from cooperation. However, there is a plausible argument that a state will
most likely invest (either politically or economically) in new scientific knowledge to
reduce the uncertainty and assess a clearer picture of costs and benefits. Therefore,
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one can expect that when being confronted with a configuration of uncertain costs
and uncertain benefits, a state will intensify its research efforts.
The considerations allow one to hypothesize about the expected level of support
towards international regime formation for individual states with and without
scientific uncertainty (see table 3.3). This classification is based on Sprinz and
Vaahtoranta (1994) with the additional dimension of uncertainty and a modifica-
tion of labels to account for additional classifications. It seems still plausible that
the clearest and strongest support or opposition can still be expected in the sce-
narios without scientific uncertainty. In these scenarios, states can clearly identify
if benefits exceed costs or vice versa and will either strongly push or strongly drag
a regime formation process. As examplified in the previous section, in some sce-
narios with scientific uncertainty, states can be expected to rather push or rather
drag. To introduce a more gradated classification that accounts for scenarios with
scientific uncertainty, ‘pushers’ in the original are relabeled ‘strong pushers’ and
‘draggers’ are relabeled ‘strong draggers’. This serves the sole purpose of intro-
ducing a more fine-grained relational classification.
Benefits
C
o
st
s
low uncertain high
lo
w in-between pusher strong pusher
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
dragger
call for more
research
pusher
h
ig
h
strong dragger dragger in-between
Table 3.3: Country’s support for international environmental regulation with
scientific uncertainty
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The strongest support can still be expected from countries that expect high bene-
fits at low costs and the strongest resentments can still be expected to be expressed
by countries expecting low benefits to high costs. However, countries that face sci-
entific uncertainty might be more easily turned in a certain direction, a fact that
will be picked up in the next section.
3.4 State Interests, Scientific Uncertainty and
International Regime Formation
Exemplifying how individual state interests emerge (section 3.1), what configura-
tion of state interests are more or less conducive in terms of international regime
formation (section 3.2) and how scientific uncertainty impacts on individual state’s
interests (section 3.4) paved the way to argue in this section how scientific un-
certainty influences international regime formation. This section starts with the
assumption of multiple states with similar interests towards regime formation and
scientific uncertainty to draw hypotheses about successful or unsuccessful regime
formation. In a second step, the assumption of similarity is relaxed to draw hy-
potheses on the empirically more plausible case of dissimilar states.
On an individual state level, scientific uncertainty adds additional configurations
of costs and benefits, some of them lead a state to (weakly) push for international
regime formation, some of them lead a state to (weakly) drag a regime formation
process. In one configuration, a state can simply be expected to conduct more
research before choosing a course of action. In a next step, the insights on expected
level of support of single states can be aggregated to the international level of
international regime formation by assuming similarity and theorizing on what
configurations would be conducive or obstructive in terms of regime formation.
Table 3.4 corresponds to table 3.3 in the previous section, but it displays the view
of multiple states rather than a single state.
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Benefits
C
o
st
s
low uncertain high
lo
w intermediate conducive strongly conducive
IV
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
obstructive
conducive for the
coordination of
research efforts
non-obstructive
I V III
h
ig
h strongly
obstructive
non-conducive intermediate
II
Table 3.4: Classification of configurations of multiple states with similar in-
terests under the condition of scientific uncertainty
As the parcels without scientific uncertainty (the grey-shaded parcels) have been
discussed at length by Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) and in the previous sections
of this chapter, the following exemplifications focus on the configurations with
scientific uncertainty.
In terms of regime formation, a configuration where costs are uncertain and ben-
efits are low (parcel I) can be considered as being ‘obstructive’, since anticipate
that the best outcome would be to realize low benefits at low costs, while at worst,
they realize low benefits and face high costs. A scenario where costs are high and
benefits are uncertain (parcel II) can be considered to be ‘not conducive’, since
states anticipate that the best possible outcome would entail high benefits at high
costs, while the worst outcome would entail low benefits at high costs.
In contrast, the configuration where costs are uncertain and benefits are high (par-
cel III) can be considered to be at least ‘not obstructive’, because state anticipate
that their benefits are high and costs can turn out to be either low (which would
turn them into pushers) or high (which would turn them into intermediates). The
most conducive configuration in an scenario with scientific uncertainty is a config-
uration where costs are considered to be low while benefits are uncertain (parcel
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IV). In this case, the worst outcome for states would be a situation where they
would face low benefits at low costs. On the other hand, there is a chance for
states to realize high benefits at low costs.
A scenario where both costs and benefits are scientifically uncertain (parcel V)
can be considered to facilitate the exchange of research and the coordination of
research efforts. It is plausible to assume that states which face scientific uncer-
tainty on both dimensions have a rational interest in updating their information
and in internationally coordinating the exchange of information and scientific re-
search.
The considerations of the previous sections have so far (a) shown how scientific
uncertainty affects individual state interests and (b) how individual interests affect
success or failure of a regime formation process. This allows to draw the following
set of hypotheses:
Under the condition of all other factors being equal (ceteris paribus),
H 1a: if the profile of scientific uncertainty is conducive, states are more likely
to behave as pushers and a regime formation process is more likely to be com-
pleted
and, vice versa,
H 1b: if the profile of scientific uncertainty is obstructive, states are more likely
to behave as draggers and a regime formation process is more likely to stall.
This argumentation only holds for the condition of similarity between states, mean-
ing that all states share a similar configuration of interests. If this assumption is
relaxed, Barrett (2001) shows how cooperation can be ‘bought’ by states with
a conducive configuration. The existence of at least one state with a conducive1
configuration that has the willingness and means to buy cooperation through side-
payments, compensations or package deals is a prerequisite for a regime to form.
1I exclude configurations without scientific uncertainty for the same reasons I stated above.
There is an argument, though, that in some cases, scientific uncertainty might blur asymmetry
and that therefore, scenarios with scientific uncertainty might in some cases be superior to
scenarios without scientific uncertainty.
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Side-payments, compensations and package-deals can eventually resolve asymme-
try by altering the configuration of states with a ‘weakly conducive’, ‘weakly ob-
structive’ or even ‘obstructive’ configuration to a ‘conducive’ one. It is plausible to
argue that states with a weakly conducive configuration can be more easily bought
into cooperation than states with a weakly obstructive configuration. States with
an obstructive configurations require the most to be turned.
On the international level, scientific uncertainty can also blur dissimilarities be-
tween states. While section 3.2 identified with reference to Barrett (2001) two
mechanisms that can change dissimilarities between states (side-payments by other
states or coercion by a powerful hegemon), scientific uncertainty can have similar
effect.
3.5 The Role of Scientific Uncertainty and New
Scientific Knowledge
Conceptionalizing scientific uncertainty as a factor that shapes the perception of
costs and benefits also allows one to rethink the role of new scientific knowledge as
well. As noted in subsection 2.4, the cognitivist claim that new scientific knowledge
per se facilitates regime formation as such does not seem plausible. As in the case
of scientific uncertainty, it is more informative to consider the content of new
scientific knowledge and its consequences rather than its mere presence (Sprinz
and Vaahtoranta, 1994).
Ideally, scientific knowledge reduces scientific uncertainty to zero. Nevertheless,
new scientific knowledge can easily increase scientific uncertainty. Plausibly, new
scientific findings can reveal flaws and imprecision in previous research and thus
reveal what areas are still unknown. Hence, new scientific knowledge can either
(a) reduce uncertainty, (b) reveal new gaps in existing knowledge and thereby in-
crease scientific uncertainty or (c) change the body of scientific knowledge without
enhancing or reducing it.
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Scientific knowledge does not enhance the chances for regime formation per se,
nor does it facilitate agreement among scientific elites. As in the case of scientific
uncertainty, it is instead the specific content of new knowledge and its effect on
the assessments of the situation by different actors that have an impact on regime
formation. It can be assumed that the effect of new scientific knowledge can
go both ways, it can either convert a configuration of costs and benefits from
obstructive to conducive (or vice versa). Therefore it can be hypothesized:
H 2: A successful regime formation process is more likely if new scientific knowl-
edge modifies the profile of scientic knowledge towards a pushing profile.
New scientific knowledge only enhances the chances of a successful regime forma-
tion process in the following scenarios: (a) A disfavorable setting as articulated
in figure 3.2(b) is turned through new scientific advances into a more favorable
one as displayed in figure 3.2(a). (b) Scientific uncertainty is completely ruled out
through new scientific advances and the new cost-benefit-structure converges into
a symmetrical setting as displayed in figure 3.1(a).
3.6 Summary
The theoretical framework advanced in this chapter aggregates the interest-based
approach by Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) from the individual level of states’ in-
terests to the international macro level through the integration of Barrett (2001)’s
approach of symmetry. This allows one to advance from hypotheses on individ-
ual behavior to hypotheses about whether a regime is more or less likely to form.
Both steps are necessary to coherently integrate scientific uncertainty and account
for asymmetry: First, scientific uncertainty is integrated into the interest-based
approach to theorize about how states’ interests are altered under the condition of
scientific uncertainty. It turns out that scientific uncertainty adds five additional
patterns of expected attitudes: two with a tendency to create additional pushers,
two with a tendency to create additional draggers. In one configuration, states
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can be expected to have a neither supporting nor dragging attitude, but simply
invest in more research.
The state-level framework with scientific uncertainty can be aggregated to the in-
ternational level to arrive at hypotheses on regime-formation under the condition
of scientific uncertainty. The logic is similar to the approach of aggregating from
an individual level (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994) to an international level with-
out scientific uncertainty: assuming symmetry allows one to hypothesize about
which configurations of costs and benefits are rather conducive or obstructive in
terms of regime formation. As shown in the individual-state-approach, scientific
uncertainty adds additional configurations of costs and benefits: two being rather
conducive, two being rather obstructive and one configuration under which states
can be expected to coordinate their research efforts in order to be able to better
define their configuration of costs and benefits.
The theoretical considerations also allow one to hypothesize about how states
deal with dissimilarities (or asymmetry) under the condition of scientific uncer-
tainty. Since scientific uncertainty simply adds additional configurations of cost
and benefits, it can be expected that similar mechanisms will be observable as in
the case without scientific uncertainty: In the case of dissimilarity and scientific
uncertainty, states with a conducive configuration can be expected to attempt to
turn other states into pushers, either through side-payments or coercion. How-
ever, as exemplified in section 3.3, scientific uncertainty might blur dissimilarities
between states. In that case, cooperation can be bought more easily from pushers
as compared to a scenario without scientific uncertainty.
The theoretical considerations on scientific uncertainty furthermore allowed to
plausibly reason under which condition new scientific knowledge becomes con-
ducive or obstructive for regime formation. New scientific knowledge simply re-
shapes the configurations of costs and benefits by providing new information along
either dimension.

Chapter 4
Research Strategy and Research
Design
“There is growing consensus that the
strongest means of drawing inference from
case studies is the use of a combination of
within-cases analysis and cross-case analy-
sis.”
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett
Case Studies and Theory Developement
In chapter 2 and 3, a clear case is made for the need of structured research on
international regime formation under the condition of scientific uncertainty. Why
do some international regimes form while others stall in the process? This chapter
will present the research strategy and the research design for the empirical analy-
sis. More specifically, the chapter will illustrate ‘hows and whys’ of the empirical
analysis. It will explain the choices for cases, strategies and methods.
The complexity of the theoretical argument leads to the choice of a comparative
qualitative design, the rationales for this choice are discussed in section 4.1. The
theoretical argument also curtails of the universe of cases and the selection strat-
egy (section 4.3). On this basis, section 4.3.1 provides a brief overview on the
selected empirical cases that are the best fit for testing the argument. The se-
lected cases cover different international environmental issues: the protection of
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the stratospheric ozone layer, the international regulation of Persistent Organic
Pollutants, the missing international regime on Arctic haze and the missing inter-
national regime on global deforestation.
Since the theoretical argument defines the configuration of scientific knowledge
as the independent variable and the regime formation process as the dependent
variable, both are operationalized in section 4.4.1. The Database and the methods
for data selection are introduced in section 4.5.
4.1 Testing the Hypotheses: A Qualitative De-
sign
The main interest of this study is a better understanding of the interplay between
scientific knowledge and regime formation on issues that involve scientific uncer-
tainty. The argument as stated in chapter 3 is based on the assumption that the
content of knowledge (independent variable) affects a regime formation process
(dependent variable) through framing actors’ cost-benefit-calculations. Scientific
uncertainty leaves actors with science-based knowledge about a set of possible fu-
ture outcomes rather than only one single expected future outcome (see section
2.2 and chapter 3). It has been argued in the previous sections that this set can
be conceptualized as a specific configuration of scientific knowledge which is ei-
ther conducive or obstructive in terms of regime-formation. A conducive profile
in this context refers to a profile where costs are determinably low while benefits
are uncertain. From an actor’s perspective, benefits in a conducive profile can
turn out to be either high or low, while costs are expected to be certainly low.
The profile is conducive because actors expect the gains from forming a regime to
be ≥ zero1. The opposite holds for an obstructive profile of scientific knowledge:
An obstructive profile refers to a profile where expected benefits are determinably
low while costs are uncertain. Costs can be either high or low, while benefits are
1For simplification, costs are assumed to be zero in this example.
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certainly low. It is obstructive since actors can expect gains from forming a regime
to be ≤ zero.
Costs & Benefits
Costs and benefits result from a particular action (Hanley et al., 2009), in this
case contracting an international regime. This rests on the assumption that
costs and benefits are only realized through institutionalized cooperative action
as argued in chapter 3. Both are considered as ‘social costs and benefits’, that is
the costs and benefits to all members of a society in a nation state (Hanley et al.,
2009). In this study, costs are conceptualized as direct costs from abatement
(Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994) such as installing filters, investing in research of
subsidies or higher production costs of subsidies. Benefits are conceptionaized as
reduced vulnerability, such as diminishing negative human health effects. Since
both are case-specific, they are to be operationalized individually from case to
case.
Under the condition of scientific uncertainty, hypotheses 1 and 2 state that
H 1a: If the profile of scientific knowledge is conducive, states are more likely to be-
come ‘pushers’ and a regime formation process is more likely to be completed.
H 1b: If the profile of scientific knowledge is obstructive, states are more likely to
become ‘draggers’ and a regime formation process is more likely to stall.
Hypothesis 1a is supported if the configuration of scientific knowledge is observably
conducive and an international regime is formed. Hypothesis 1b is supported if an
obstructive configuration is observable and a regime formation process stalls. Vice
versa, the argument remains unsupported if the profile of scientific uncertainty is
conducive while a regime formation process stalls, or an international regime is
formed despite an obstructive profile.
In the context of hypothesis 1a and 1b, scientific knowledge is considered merely
as a fixed parameter. It is empirically not plausible to assume that over the
course of a regime formation process, the body of scientific knowledge does not
change. Rather, it can reasonably be assumed that further research changes the
body of scientific knowledge and hence, the basis for cost-benefit calculations. An
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observable change in the scientific configuration (from obstructive to conducive)
that correlates with an observable change in the outcome (from stalled regime to
complete regime formation) strengthens the link between both variables.
This is directly addressed through Hypothesis 2:
H 2: A successful regime formation process is more likely if new scientific knowl-
edge modifies the profile of scientific knowledge towards a conducive profile.
The argument is supported for hypothesis 2 if the configuration of scientific nowl-
edge changes through scientific advancement from ‘obstructive’ to ‘conducive’ and
consequently a regime is formed. The argument is supported as well if scientific
advances change the profile of scientific knowledge from ‘conducive’ into ‘obstruc-
tive’ and a regime formation process stalls. The argument remains unsupported
if scientific advances change the configuration of scientific knowledge from ‘ob-
structive’ to ‘conducive’ and a regime formation process still stalls or if a regime
forms even though new scientific advances turn a ‘conducive’ configuration into a
‘obstructive’ configuration and a regime still forms.
Testing the hypotheses requires a sound knowledge about the configuration of
scientific knowledge. Profiling scientific knowledge requires a fine-grained under-
standing of the scientific facts that were present throughout the regime-formation
process. An in-depth understanding is necessary to determine what dimension of
a cost-benefit analysis was affected by scientific uncertainty, i.e. how the set of
possible future outcomes was structured. Since the argument states that actors
are more tolerant towards scientific uncertainty if it affects only benefits while, at
the same time, costs are expected to be low, it is necessary to analyze what dimen-
sion of a cost benefit calculation is uncertain. Testing hypothesis 2 additionally
requires tracing changes in scientific knowledge over time and the co-evolution of
political action. It is further argued in section 4.2 that hypotheses 1a and 1b are
best tested through a cross case comparison whereas hypothesis 2 requires a lon-
gitudinal perspective where the impacts of scientific advances on political action
are carefully retraced.
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Turning to the dependent variable, testing the argument requires a clear-cut an-
alytical separation of a successful regime formation process from a stalled regime
formation process. This consequentially requires retracing this process carefully
since, as subsection 4.4.2 will show, identifying a stalled regime formation process
poses a challenge. Additionally, preferably all alternative explanations as they
are proposed by the vast literature on international regimes have to be considered.
Though most of the literature does not explicitly consider scientific uncertainty nor
stalled international regimes, it cannot be assumed that alternative mechanisms
do not play a role.
4.2 Cross-Case Comparison and Within-Case Anal-
ysis
Designing this study as a qualitative small-n study follows the conceptualization
of both the independent variable as well as the dependent variable. According
to George and Bennett (2005), the strength of case study methods are high con-
ceptual validity, their potential to closely examine causal mechanisms and their
capacity for adressing causal complexity. All these advantages speak in favor for
employing a small-n case-study design in this study. The concept of scientific un-
certainty and is difficult to measure in a large sample without over-stretching the
concept (George and Bennett, 2005) or without forfeiting too much informational
content (Opp, 1970). The limited number of cases2 point in the same direction.
Rare, dynamic, and highly contingent events do not lend themselves readily to
quantification and statistical analysis (Kittel and Kuehn, 2012, :3). In the light of
the theorized causal relation (and the admittedly long causal chain), case study
methods are more promising to identify and retrace the causal mechanism of in-
terest and to address the complexity of the argument.
2Even though Mitchell (2003)’s comprehensive International Environmental Agreement
Database samples over 1,000 environmental regimes, few of them show the necessary variance on
the independent variable and show ultimately no variance on the depend variable since it lists
only the results of successful regime formation processes in the form of an international regime.
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All these factors make this study to appear as being predetermined for a small-n
case study design. On the other hand, a single-case study sacrifices the opportu-
nity to draw more generalized conclusions on factors that influence regime forma-
tion. Previous research on the role of scientific knowledge and regime formation
has mainly been conducted as single-n case studies of successful regime formation
processes (Kydd, 2001; Mitchell and Bernauer, 2004; Morrow, 2001; Oatley, 2001;
Pahre, 2001; Richards, 2001; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Underdal, 2002; Young,
1993). Though ideographically informative, the explanatory leverage of these stud-
ies is limited to tentative conclusions on causal relationships between knowledge
and regime formation that leave only small ground for generalization.
The theoretical argument is complex and subtle. Testing it against a single case
increases the danger of artifactual conclusion and measurement errors. This study
aims at enhancing external validity by comparing a small set of cases that vary
on the independent as well as the dependent variable. To draw inference from
comparing cases requires controlling for other potentially causal factors. However,
the strategy of comparing few cases that vary in cause as well as in outcome while
other possible causes are controlled for through the selection of similar cases (most
similar systems designs) has been controversial over the last few years (George and
Bennett, 2005; King et al., 1994; Landman, 2008; Lieberson, 1991). The strongest
critics of MSSDs even suggest abandoning it from the qualitative methodolog-
ical portfolio (Lieberson, 1994, :1236). Nevertheless, if employed with caution
and if inferential conclusions are not overstretched, the design can be usefully
employed.
Needles to say that the high requirements for case-selection in perfect MSSDs -
variance on the independent variable(s), variance on the dependent variable while
all other factors beeing similar - are hardly if ever met in reality and most MSSDs
are imperfectly designed. Nevertheless, imperfect MSSDs can be informative in
three ways: First of all, they allow to pretest for the hypothesized causal effect.
Finding an expected covariation in an imperfect design does arguably not yet
allow to draw resilient inference, since not all possible alternative explanations
can be controlled for. Nevertheless, it is a first hint whether the hypothesis might
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be supported or dismissed. Secondly, it facilitates the selection of cases for a
subsequent within-case analysis where conclusions about causal effects are to be
underpinned or dismissed by an investigation of the underlying causal mechanisms
through process tracing.
Kittel and Kuehn (2012) have stated in their recent contribution that “[. . . ] de-
spite the outstanding career of the terminology of process tracing, there has been
little success in formalizing its methodology and defining standards”. The per-
haps most commonly agreed definition of process tracing is offered by George and
Bennett (2005), who define it as “[. . . ] the attempts to identify the intervening
causal process - the causal chain and mechanism - between an independent variable
and dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005, :206). A more application-
centered definition of process tracing is offered by Collier (2011) who defines pro-
cess tracing as “[. . . ] the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected
and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investi-
gator.” (Collier, 2011, :1) Diagnostic evidence is often understood as part of a
temporal sequence of events or phenomena (Collier, 2011, :3). This study follows
Collier (2011)’s understanding of process tracing.
Combining cross-case comparison with in-depth within-case comparison as sug-
gested by contemporary literature on qualitative methodology (Brady, 2010; George
and Bennett, 2005; Rohlfing, 2012) promises insights on both the causal effects as
well as the underlying causal mechanism. While cross case comparison aims at re-
vealing causal effects among a certain population of cases, underlying causal mech-
anisms3 are best examined through within-case analysis (Rohlfing, 2012) .
The considerations of the previous sections lead to a research strategy that aims
at selecting four cases that fit the criteria elaborated in section 4.3 and embed the
cases into a small-n comparative design4. The selection strategy follows the logic
of MSSD, though the criteria of perfect similarity are relaxed. This means that the
selected cases are still to share a maximum of similar features, but dissimilarities
3Causal mechanisms are defined according to Checkle as “[. . . ] a set of hypotheses that could
be the explanation for some social phenomenon, the explanation being in terms of interactions
between individuals and other individuals and some social aggregate.” (Checkel, 2008, :115)
4The selected cases are presented in section 4.3.1
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do not automatically exclude them from the study. Rather, the selection criteria
in section 4.3 ensure comparability.
In a second step, the cases furthermore analyzed through process tracing tech-
niques. This approach promises to diminish some disadvantages of ‘pure’ MSSDs
as well as ‘pure’ single-n case studies. It circumvents the precarious control of
alternative variables in MSSDs since a close investigation of the causal mechanism
reveals a possible impact of other factors. Furthermore, the strategy allows insights
on the causal ‘black box’ left by covariational designs (Beach, 2012) and accounts
for causal complexity which is omitted by pure MSSDs (Levy, 2008).
The strategy improves causal claims of single-n studies, since it systematically
includes variance on the dependent variable. It is therefore more resilient towards
selection effects where the causal relationship between an independent variable x
is and a dependent variable y is case specific and not systematic. Secondly, it
enhances external validity by observing that not only x leads to y in a specific
case, but also that non-x led to non-y in a comparable case.
4.3 Universe of Cases, Selection and Cases
The previous considerations on qualitative comparative case studies of the pre-
ceding section directly tie in with considerations on the universe of cases, that is
the set of cases to which the hypothesis should apply (Geddes, 2003). ‘Cases’ in
regime study are typically issue-specific legally binding multilateral agreements.
This research, however, purposely includes failed regime formation processes to
reflect the whole spectrum of the dependent variable. Therefore, the universe of
cases has to include all failed attempts of regime formation. From the point of
initiation, regime formation processes can go both ways: they can either end suc-
cessfully or not successfully. Hence, the universe of cases comprises all initiations
of regime formation processes – or, more specifically, all demands for an interna-
tional regime. Furthermore, research question focuses on regime formation under
Chapter 4. Research Strategy and Research Design 51
the condition of scientific uncertainty. This further limits the universe of cases to
issues that – at least potentially – involve scientific uncertainty.
Common pitfalls in selecting cases for comparative case studies have been widely
discussed (Geddes, 2003). To avoid these pitfalls, King et al. (1994) suggest a
variable-guided case selection. The strategy for selecting has to incorporate the
justifiable assumption of causal homogeneity (Brady, 2010, :111). Causal homo-
geneity is defined by King et al. (1994)5 in its strong form as “[. . . ] the assumption
that all units with the same value of the explanatory variables have the same ex-
pected value of the dependent variable”. The weaker form it is defined as “constant
effect assumption” (italics omitted), which means that both variables vary in the
same way (King et al., 1994, :91-93). As causal homogeneity in its strong form is
rather rare, this study regards the weak as sufficient. The theoretical argument
hypothesizes that the configuration of scientific knowledge effects the regime for-
mation process. Hence, the configuration of scientific knowledge is conceptualized
as the independent variable which can either occur as ‘conducive’ or ‘obstructive’,
while the regime formation process is conceptualized as the dependent variable
which can either occur as ‘successful’ or ‘stalled’.
King et al. (1994)’s variable-guided case-selection however contains a dilemma:
On the one hand, cases have to be selected on the basis of variance of both the in-
dependent variable and the dependent variable, as well as non-variance of control
variables. On the other hand, finding covariance is usually the result of inten-
sive, resource-consuming collection of data and in-depth analysis. This especially
holds when the conceptualization of the variables is complex and data-collection
is rather difficult. In a sense, cases have to be selected on the basis of information
that is usually the outcome of an empirical analysis and are not known prior to a
thorough analysis of the cases. This dilemma accompanies comparative case study
designs and cannot be resolved completely. However, it can be limited or circum-
vented by setting proxies as selection criteria that allow to presume the required
variance.
5King et al. (1994) refer to “unit homogeneity”, which can be understood synonymously
(Brady, 2010, :111)
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These considerations lead to the following list of selection criteria:
Scope Conditions
Among the policy areas where most international regimes can be found (economy,
environment, security and human rights), environmental issues are most suitable
for testing the hypotheses since scientific uncertainty can be expected most com-
mon in this particular policy issue. Therefore, as a first approximation for selecting
cases, all cases have to involve a multilateral environmental issue that affects at
least three countries and can only be effectively contained collectively since - as
elaborated in chapter 2 and chapter 3 - this is the main motive for actors to form
a regime. Additionally, in all selected cases an observable political action (such as
an official regime demand) that potentially could end in an international regime
has to be identifiable.
Variance on the Independent Variable
To determine if the configuration of scientific knowledge is either ‘conducive’ or
‘obstructive’ at a certain point in time or changed in either direction over time is
a the result of a complex operationalization and interpretation of data and hence
cannot be employed at an early stage of the research process. However, a superficial
scan of secondary literature is presumed to be sufficient to presume variance on
the independent variable. As this study supplements a cross-case comparison with
a thorough within-case process-tracing, the latter strategy is expected to reveal
if cases show necessary variance on the independent variable. Cases that do not
show the necessary variance will be withdrawn from the analysis.
Variance on the Dependent Variable
The challenge of distinguishing a ‘regime’ from a ‘stalled regime’ is to be explored
in the next section (see 4.4.2). For the purpose of selecting cases, a government
document or a document by an international organization that is (a) addressed
to at least three governments and (b) explicitly calls for legal regulation of a
multilateral issue qualifies as a demand for a regime; the expressed demand for
a regimes qualifies for possible inclusion of a case. On the opposite side of the
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spectrum stands the a legally binding agreement that is signed by all relevant
states.
4.3.1 The Cases – A Brief Outline
Among the university of cases, four regime formation processes (cases) match the
outlined criteria and have been selected for this study: (a) the regulation on per-
sistent organic pollutants (POPs), (b) the protection of the stratospheric ozone
layer, (c) the issue of Arctic haze and (d) the protection of global forests. While
the first two cases are regulated by international regimes, the latter two cases have
experienced substantial political activity without any transnational commitments.
Furthermore, all cases deal with transboundary environmental issues that affect at
least three countries and were (or still are) prone to scientific uncertainty6. They
share a comparable number of involved parties and a rather homogenous compo-
sition of involved players since the regime formation processes under investigation
were all dominated by western industrial nations, but also included countries with
developing economies. Variation in the composition of parties should hence not
account for the observable variance of the dependent variable. All regime forma-
tion processes were initiated during or before the time span between 1980 - 1987
and ended after 1995. Therefore, all four formation processes started during ‘Cold
War’ times and experienced the ‘shift of tides’ in world politics. A change of major
power constellations should therefore not account for the success or failure of a
regime formation process.
The case of stratospheric ozone depletion has been selected as it has repeatedly
been studied to investigate the relationship between scientific knowledge and polit-
ical action by several authors (Dimitrov, 2006; Haas, 1992a; Parson, 2003; Skodvin,
2000). On the other hand, the ozone regime has been used as a case to investigate
the impact of rational state interests (Barrett, 2001; Lange and Vogt, 2003). Since
the argument of this study integrates both aspects, the case seems to be a perfect
6This section provides only a brief overview to underpin the outlined case selection. A thor-
ough investigation on all sketched issues follows in chapter 6
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fit for testing the argument. Secondly, the case of stratospheric ozone involves a
twisted scientific process that is marked by big turns and shifts in scientific knowl-
edge. Furthermore, it serves as a good example on the non-linearity of a scientific
process. This ensures high within-case variance of the independent variable. And
last, the case has been under extensive investigation from IR-scholars. Therefore,
most pragmatically, data availability is assumed to be very high.
POPs have been regulated internationally since 1998. Their hazardous character
is subtle and not easy to trace, which has plagued researchers for decades. The
scientific process has therefore been rather difficult and results have been rather
tentative. However, states negotiated an agreement emission cuts. The cases is
therefore insightful for a regime that was negotiated under rather strong scientific
uncertainty.
While the case of stratospheric ozone involves a timely scientific process, the absent
regulation of global deforestation is probably the most prominent non-regime in
international politics. States have negotiated for decades and did not yet reach an
international regime. Additionally, the scientific process is marked by shifts and
turns in the understanding of the issue.
The political activity on POPs and on Arctic Haze particularly lend themselves for
an in-depth process tracing, since both cases share additional similarities. Both
cases fall under the categorization of Sprinz and Helm (1999) as ‘global environ-
mental problems’, which result from “ . . . emissions around the globe [which] are
aggregated and chemically transformed by an environmental medium (the atmo-
sphere), but the effects of this global mixing vary by region.” (Sprinz and Helm,
1999, :362) (italics omitted). Additionally, both issues deal with the as the same
geographical region, the Arctic7. On the other hand, the political activity on POPs
lead to a binding international regime while the activities on Arctic Haze did not
lead to such a result. A close investigation promises to trace the causal mechanism
that lead to the successful completion in one case and the causal process that lead
to the non-completion of the other case.
7defined as the region north of 60◦ latitude
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4.3.2 Alternative Explanations
While the selected cases fit the selection criteria and share a high degree of simi-
larity, further alternative explanations need to be considered. Regime theory has
identified power, interests and knowledge as possible factors to explain regime for-
mation from a macro perspective (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Rittberger and Mayer,
1993). However, it has been however argued extensively in chapter 3 why interests
or knowledge in their pure form cannot explain regime formation under the condi-
tion of scientific uncertainty and the central argument of this study addresses both
issues in a combination. Nevertheless, it can be argued on theoretical grounds that
power explains regime formation under the condition of scientific uncertainty, es-
pecially if the profile of scientific knowledge is asymmetrical8 (Barrett, 2001). By
using means of power, an actor with an explicit conducive (or obstructive) pro-
file can transform the expected costs for other states and can therefore push (or
hamper) a regime formation (Hasenclever et al., 1996; Kindleberger, 1988). This
argument, however, rests on the assumption of a powerful state that has the ability
and willingness to coerce other states into forming an international regime. It is
mplausible that a single state has had the necessary means of excessive power to
do so during the period covered. However, the exercise of softer forms of coercion
(often described as a mixture of bribery and arm-twisting (Kindleberger, 1981))
could push states that face an ‘intermediate’ or ‘bystander’ profile (see chapter 3)
into a distinct direction. This rivaling mechanism deserves special attention at the
within-case analysis.
On a micro level, drawing on literature from negotiation studies, scholars have
identified leadership as a potential factor to explain regime formation (Breitmeier
et al., 2006) that cannot be controlled for through case-selection in this study.
Leadership as defined by Young (1991) as “[. . . ]actions of individuals or entities
who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the
efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargain-
ing” has been identified as a possible necessary condition for regime formation by
8I refer to Scott Barrett’s concept of asymmetry of interests which is explained in detail in
chapter 2.1
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several empirical studies. Especially in the case of stratospheric ozone protection,
U.S. leadership has been proposed as a causal factor for the success of regime for-
mation (Benedick, 1998). This, however, contradicts with other empirical findings
where regime formation processes failed despite large U.S. support and leadership
(Dimitrov, 2006, :168). Nevertheless, the presence or absence of leadership could
account for the variance of regime formation for two reasons: Young (1991) points
out that leadership becomes more relevant in situations that are not well specified
and where actors are not sure about their payoffs. In these situations, leadership
functions as a channel of communication. According to Young (1991), leadership
in international negotiations facilitates the process by coordinating positions and
identifying and communicating a contract zone. These functions can become even
more prominent when actors face scientific uncertainty since a potential contract
zone is harder to identify and a regime formation process might therefore stall.
Framing issues into negotiable packages through leadership can be considered as a
necessary condition for successful regime-formation. Therefore, the role of political
leadership deserves special attention within the process tracing.
Variance of administrative and organizational support for a negotiation process
can strongly affect the outcome. Depending on funding and capabilities, struc-
tural support like preparatory (scientific) reports can either be strong or weak. A
routined global IGO as for example UNEP can be expected to host international
negotiations and coordinate pre-negotiation information flow. Previous research
argues that the auspices under which a regime formation process was initiated
influences its course and can therefore influence its success. A variation of the
organizational degree of the auspices has to be considered in the within-case anal-
ysis.
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4.4 Variables, Conceptionalization and Opera-
tionalization
The conceptualization employes the approach of Goertz (2006). The variables
are derived from the theoretical argument, which argues that the configuration
of scientific knowledge (the independent variable) effects the regime formation
process (the dependent variable). For an empirical analysis, both variables have
to operationalized. However, since the differ in there issue, the operationalization
has to be adapted case by case. Therefore, this chapter provides framework for
operationalizing the variables case by case.
4.4.1 The Independent Variable: Profiling Scientific Knowl-
edge
Scientific uncertainty has been characterized in section 2.2 by the absence of knowl-
edge about a definite outcome, the availability of knowledge about the set of possi-
ble outcomes and the absence of knowledge about the likeliness of a single, definite
outcome. Table 4.1 is displayed here once again as a refresher. Knowledge about
a set of possible future outcomes distinguishes uncertainty from ignorance on the
one extreme of the spectrum and certainty on the other end of the spectrum (see
chapter 2). The central argument of this study can be summarized as follows:
within the subset of cases where actors face scientific uncertainty about the issue
at stake, the configuration of scientific knowledge affects the outcome of a regime
formation process by turning actors into ‘pushers’ (conducive profile) or ’draggers’
(obstructive profile). The configuration of scientific knowledge frames the set of
possible future outcomes as described in 2.2. This profile comprises two dimen-
sions: (a) the level of uncertainty (section 4.4.1.2) and (b) the affected dimension
(section 4.4.1.1).
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certainty risk uncertainty ignorance
Definite outcome Known Unknown Unknown Unknown
Probability distribution ‘One’ Known Unknown Unknown
Set of possible outcomes Known Known Known Unknown
Table 4.1: A Refresher on Uncertainty
4.4.1.1 The Dimensions of Scientific Uncertainty
As this study aims at showing how scientific uncertainty affects the behavior of
rational, cost-benefits-evaluating decision makers, it has to be theorized about
what decision makers include in their cost-benefit-analysis (CBA) and how it is
affected by scientific uncertainty. The basic understanding of costs and benefits
has been outlined in section 4.1. Costs are conceptualized as direct costs from
abatement for a domestic economy.
Previous research has conceptualized benefits from international environmental
regulation either as (expected) ‘avoided damage costs’ (Helm, 2000) or as (ex-
pected) ‘reduced vulnerability (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994). These can occur
through lower rates of negative health effects (as, for example, reduced cancer
rates as a result of banning the production and consumption of asbestos (LaDou,
2004)) or avoided infrastructural damages (such as damages from climate change
through CO2). To facilitate comparison, one principle of CBA is the conversion of
these costs into monetary values (Kolstad, 2000, :69). In this study, the issues of
the different cases share some characteristics as to their political relevance. The
actual causes of the issues (e.g. substances and compounds) however vary strongly
across cases. Therefore, the actual parameters that actors include in a CBA and
especially the associated scientific uncertainty have to be operationalized case-by-
case. For example, while Enkvist et al. (2007) include over 30 cost-parameters
in their estimation of costs for CO2 abatement (Stern, 2007, :203), very different
parameters have to be included in a CFC cost curve. Nevertheless, the required
knowledge for setting up a cost curve can be categorized into different types of
knowledge. Thrift et al. (2009)’s concept of different knowledge types can be
usefully employed as a guideline:
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Knowledge Type Specification
Substance Types, Character and behavior in the biotic and abiotic
environment
Sources Types, mechanisms, locations of emissions
Extent-intensity Geographical extends, trends and distribution, ecosys-
tem contamination levels
Consequences Wildlife effects, human health effects
Political Alternatives Abatement, substitutes, adaptation
Table 4.2: Knowledge Types (Thrift et al., 2009)
Thrift et al. (2009) disaggregates knowledge into different types to theorize about
which type of knowledge influences a political process (Thrift et al., 2009, :355).
The categorization helps to identify which type of knowledge is relevant for a
county’s assessment of costs and benefits in general. For example, a country can
only determine its costs from international regulation if it has knowledge about the
sources of a harmful substance, e.g. which processes are responsible for emission
and how much emission occurs within its own legislation. Furthermore, the devel-
opment of substitutes or costs from adapting to new environmental conditions has
to factored in and hence, knowledge about these factors is crucial. Equally, in order
to determine how much a country would benefit from international regulation, one
has to acknowledge the concentrations of the substance at stake (‘extent-intensity’)
and possible harmful consequences to human health, wildlife or infrastructure. All
types of knowledge are theoretically prone to scientific uncertainty. However, the
degree to which a knowledge type is uncertain varies for reasons that will be ex-
plained in the next section.
4.4.1.2 The Level of Scientific Uncertainty
The level of scientific uncertainty is measured through three indicators: the num-
ber of possible and plausible theoretical explanations, the congruence of theoretical
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predictions with observables and the deviations between results of empirical test-
ing. These indicators follow the description of Groot and Spiekerman (1969) on
the process of empirical research. Empirical research is broadly speaking a process
of observation, theory building and theory testing9.
Observation, according to Groot and Spiekerman (1969), is the process of collect-
ing and organization of empirical facts. Theory building describes the process that
induces an explanation for the observation on the basis of prior knowledge, plausi-
ble assumptions and logical reasoning with the aim of providing an explanation for
the observation. From a theory (or explanatory model), different hypotheses and
testable predictions can be deducted. Theory testing involves testing the hypothe-
ses against new empirical material. This involves laboratory experiments or field
measures. A match between theoretical predictions and empirical results supports
a theory.
Empirical research is, however, biased towards prior knowledge. Theory build-
ing rests on prior theories and assumptions, theory testing rests on prior existing
methods or data (Chalmers, 1990). The process of theory building is highly in-
fluenced by the body of prior knowledge and research. Depending on the body
of prior knowledge and prior research, an observation can lead to divergent the-
ories and alternative explanations. A scarce body of prior knowledge that rests
on tentative assumptions leaves room for multiple causal explanations. Regarding
newly emerging scientific issues, theories may be derived from contradicting and
untested assumptions. The existence of different theories to explain an observation
therefore indicates a high degree of scientific uncertainty.
Similar arguments can be made about the process of theory testing. If prior knowl-
edge is scarce, there is only little experience on how to test a theory, measurement
instruments are underdeveloped or access to data might be limited. Therefore, the-
ory testing ‘at the research frontier’ can produce a blurry range of results rather
9A theory in this context is “[. . . ] a reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a
research question, including a statement about why the proposed answer is correct.”(King et al.,
1994, :19)
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than a single, unambiguous outcome. Additionally, there are several ways to de-
sign empirical testing. Choosing a particular research design, choosing research
methods and choosing particular measurement instruments can have implications
on the result of empirical testing. If scientific uncertainty is high, it is likely that
the results from different research designs produce deviant results10.
The level of scientific uncertainty in the context of this work is regarded as a func-
tion of constraints in theory building and constraints in theory testing. Constraints
in theory building are assumed to be reflected by the number of competing expla-
nations within a defined period of time. The existence of competing explanatory
theories indicates that science cannot (yet) provide an unambiguous explanation
for the phenomenon of interest.
Constraints in theory testing are assumed to be reflected by (a) the congruence of
theoretical predictions with observables and (b) the difference between measure-
ment results (remaining residuals) that can be found in the scientific literature
within a defined period of time.
If theoretical predictions are not congruent with the observables – either through
the mere lack of empirical testing or through deviations between observables –
a theory remains speculative in nature. If empirical testing produces rather a
range of observables than precise observables – either through measurement errors
or other factors – a theory remains speculative or vague. Proposed statements on
causal linkages might be supported qualitatively, but a quantification of a proposed
causal link remains absent.
The level of scientific uncertainty is therefore considered to be very low if a single
theory is tested against new empirical data and the theoretical predictions match
the results from empirical testing. Vice versa, the level of scientific uncertainty
is considered to be very high if multiple explanatory theories intend to explain
an observation and there is either no empirical testing or empirical testing is not
convergent with theoretical predictions. This is also the case if there is a high
10For example, even running the same computer models on different computers changes model
predictions.
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Number of
Explanations
Congruence
of Predic-
tions with
Observables
Deviations
between re-
sults of theory
testing
Level of un-
certainty
Symbol
Single yes low very low - -
Single yes high low -
Single no - medium %
Multiple yes high high +
Multiple no - very high ++
Table 4.3: Operationalization of the Level of Scientific Uncertainty
deviation between empirical test results, either as a product of a single empirical
test or as a product of different empirical tests. The combinations of constraints in
model building and constraints in model testing and their implications for scientific
uncertainty are listed in table 4.3. The scheme presented in table 4.3 will be applied
during the empirical analysis to categorize the level of scientific uncertainty in
different time-spans and across different sub-issues of the cases (see chapter 5).
For that reason, the level of scientific uncertainty is shown in table 4.3.
The concept of scientific uncertainty as a function of constraints on theory building
and theory testing serves to develop a coding scheme that is displayed in table 4.4.
The development of the coding scheme follows Mayring (2010)’s instructions for
qualitative coding.
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4.4.2 The Political Process of Regime Formation as the
Dependent Variable
Empirical studies indicate that an international regime is the result of an inter-
active process between actors that can be – and frequently has been (see: Young
(1994)) – categorized in different stages (see figure 4.1). This process can either
end successfully or it can stall indefinitely. In this study, a regime formation
process is labelled as ‘successful’ if a group of at least three states sign a legally
binding treaty that is thematically bound to the negotiated issue and – if ratified
and executed – can be expected to have significant regime consequences11 on the
issue at stake.
Figure 4.1: Regime Formation Process (Young, 1994)
While defining an international regime is rather straightforward, defining a stalled
regime is more subtle. For this study, a stalled regime formation process remains at
one of the stages displayed in figure 4.1 or even falls back to a previous stage, even
though the issue has not been resolved yet. This can happen through three modes:
(a) cancelation (b) indefinite suspension or (c) ‘drying out’ (Janusch, 2012). In
the obvious case of cancelation, a country involved expresses its deliberate inten-
tion to discontinue the regime-formation process. Similarly, a regime-formation
process classifies as suspended indefinitely if countries officially express such a
plan. A regime-formation process can be labelled as ‘dried out’ if no actor takes
an initiative to continue the process from one stage to another for a longer pe-
riod of time. However, one has to be cautious at this point, since the duration
of a regime-formation processes can vary significantly. Some robust regimes took
decades to build, while others were negotiated within a few years. It is plausible to
assume that issues that involve high scientific uncertainty are harder to negotiate
11On the topic of regime consequences and regime effectiveness, see: (Hovi et al., 2003; Un-
derdal, 2004; Young, 2001)
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and normally consume more time. Moreover, it cannot be predicted whether a
negotiation process that stalled for years will eventually be picked up again once
the issue becomes prominent again. A regime formation process can therefore
only be labelled ‘stalled’ at a specific point of time or a specific period of time.
Young (1989), for example, implicitly attributes ‘stalled regimes’ to the issue-area
of biodiversity and climate change in a publication from 1989 (Young, 1989, :351).
While this is true for the time of Young’s publication, only five years later two
regimes were formed for both issue areas. This example calls for a careful use of
the concept ‘stalled regime’. A dried out regime-formation process, however, can
be defined in dissociation from cancelation: While a cancelled regime formation
process stalls with the explicit intend to discontinue negotiations, an indicator for
a dried out process is the absence of declared intention to continue with the pro-
cess. This definition is derived inductively from the observation that multilateral
negotiation rounds typically close with a declaration of intention by either all or
a fraction of the participating states. This declaration usually contains the intent
to continue the started process. If such an intent is not declared, the process is
likely to dry out.
In conclusion: Both a successful and a stalled regime formation process are ini-
tiated by an observable demand for an international regime. While a successful
process ends with an official (observable) multilateral treaty, a stalled process is
defined by the observable presence of (a) a cancelation, (b) an indefinite suspension
or (c) a dry-out.
A third occurrence of the dependent variable has to be considered in regime forma-
tion processes. The argument states that if both benefits and costs are uncertain,
states engage in coordinating and exchanging scientific information. This can ap-
pear in three forms: (a) states form a new international agency, mandated with
the collection, review and preparation of scientific knowledge, (b) an existing in-
ternational agency provides the information or gets mandated to collect, review
and process scientific knowledge, or (c) a national research agency collects, reviews
and processes scientific knowledge. This will be labeled as a research regime.
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4.5 Database and Data Mining
Database and the selection of data vary according to the variables. The scientific
process can hardly be retraced on the same database as the political process.
Hence, section 4.5.1 introduces the database for retracing the scientific process,
whereas section 4.5.2
4.5.1 Data for Retracing the Scientific Process
For retracing the scientific process, peer-reviewed scientific journals serve as pri-
mary database. This strategy rests on the assumption that in modern peer-
reviewed academia, authors either articulate the blank-spots and uncertainties
in their own work themselves or – if a contribution found any recognition – in-
consistencies and rivalling hypotheses are proposed by peers and other scholars.
Therefore, degree and dimensional impact of the profile of scientific knowledge can
be assessed through scientific publications. Within the field of natural science, Na-
ture and Science are the most recognized scientific journals. Both journals share
an over-the-top impact factor and cover the necessary time-span. Publications
from both journals on the issue of interest can be reasonably considered as (a) a
trustworthy source to evaluate the state of science and (b) can be considered to
be highly influential for academia. An analysis of publications from Nature and
Science also allows to discover two additional, more issue-specific journals: Both
Nature and Science are scanned for the most frequently cited journals. The two
most highly cited journals will be included in this analysis.
This strategy, however, entails two dangers: First of all, the strategy implicitly
assumes that the scientific debate is fully represented in the selected journals.
This is a strong assumption, since environmental issues in the selected cases are
very diverse and distributed across disciplines. It is possible, for example, that
highly influential articles for the assessment of negative health effects are not
published in a journal that is specialized on environmental issues, but in a scientific
journal that is specialized on specific types of cancer. Since Nature and Science
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usually provide overview-articles, an article that contributes a shift in the general
scientific understanding could be neglected. Additionally, the selection of journals
rests eventually on the ‘Journal Impact Factor’ (JIF) to evaluate the importance
of scientific contributions. The criticisms and limitations of this approach are
commonly known (for an overview, see Moed (2005)).
To remedy this danger, an additional computer-aided citation analysis is supple-
mented. A citation analysis is a tool usually employed in network analysis and
bibliometry to identify prominent authors, articles or journals within a scientific
field. It usually builds on citations and co-citations and includes forward- and
backward- citations, meaning that it includes citing and cited publications. A
backward-citation is also referred to as ‘reference’, a forward citation is called
‘citation’ (Moed, 2010). This technique enables to cluster publications and relate
them to each other. It allows to identify scientific bursts, shifts of paradigms within
science and a distinction of a scientific base from a scientific front (Chen, 2006).
After the introduction of the comprehensive Scientific Citation Index, scholars
used citation data to evaluate the quality of scientific contributions by focusing
on the frequency of citations (Garfield, 1979). With the improvement of computer
technology, the same dataset was used to develope more complex models of cross-
relations between authors. Different software tools are now available to perform
this task.
Tracing the history of scientific knowledge in peer-reviewed journals allows one to
account for what was recognizably known at different points in time. It allows not
only to state how much was known but also how it affected or changed the percep-
tion of costs and/or benefits. It has to be noted that the strict peer-review process
debars some scholars from publishing in scientific journals and grey literature may
contain ground-breaking scientific findings. However, it can be reasonably assumed
that political decision makers only consider scientific knowledge that meets high
standards of quality. Even if there were ground-breaking scientific findings hidden
in grey literature or journals of low impact, it can safly be assumed that these
findings would not shape the perception of costs and benefits of political decision
makers.
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4.5.2 Data for Retracing the Political Process
Official government documents as well as primary and secondary literature serve
as the data-source to account for the dependent variable. As mentioned in the
previous section, cases where a regime formation process dries out are most prob-
lematic. It is likely that these cases are not officially documented and secondary
literature merely reects the judgement of the author. Elite interviews offer a fall
back strategy for cases where a regime formation process is suspected to have dried
out. Actors who were or are closely involved in a regime formation process are
assumed to offer insights on whether the states involved intend to pick up on the
process or are willing to abandon it.
4.6 Summary
The preceding chapter has outlined the ‘hows and whys’ of the empirical study.
In a nutshell, this study employes a comparative cross-cases design of four cases,
which is followed by a within-cases process tracing. This allows in a first step to
identify covariation across cases and, in a second step, provides the opportunity
to search for the actual mechanism which is causing the covariance. The inde-
pendent variable is operationalized through the degree of scientific uncertainty
(which can be either high or low) and its directional impact (which can either
lead towards costs or towards benefits). The dependent variable has been oper-
ationalized through either a successful regime formation process (which becomes
observable through an actual signed multilateral agreement) or a stalled regime
formation process (which appears as either canceled, indefinitely suspended or
dried out).
The research design is the result of deliberate choices for particular strategies and
methodologies. Even after careful considerations of multiple alternatives, most
choices involve compromises and can be scrutinized on different levels. While the
choice for a qualitative design seems most justifiable in the light of the complexity
of the argument and the derived variables, it can be argued that the selected
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cases are not ideal and better cases might exist. First of all, it can be argued
that the cases are not similar enough to employ the logic of a comparative design
that aims at maximizing variance of the independent- as well as the dependent
variable while minimizing variance on all other potential factors. The cases differ
on many factors that could hold explanatory power. For example, neither size nor
composition of involved actors are perfectly similar. Even though there is a high
degree of congruence, deviations between size and composition might be crucial.
Secondly, the cases run on different time-scales. This means that political choices
were made under different international and domestic conditions. Foreign policy
and the willingness to engage in institutionalized international cooperation might
depend on domestic paradigms that shift over time and with legislators (Pierson,
2011). Though cases were selected in a way that they cover big historic tides on the
international level (such as the end of the Cold War), influence from convictions
and believes of domestic policy makers that shift as domestic policy makers are
replaced over time through elections (or similar political changes) cannot be ruled
out through the presented research design.
The research design can be criticized also from a more technical and method-
ological perspective. Not only case selection might bias inference, but also con-
ceptualization, operationalization, data selection and analytical methods could be
arguably misleading. One main contribution of this book is the inclusion of non-
regime cases into the analysis. However, the whole concept of non-regimes could
be considered as an artifact. First of all, there has been a conceptional choice to
define non-regimes as cases where political negotiations that aimed at forming a
regime did not lead to a regime formation. Alternatively, a non-regime could also
be considered as a case where states would benefit from institutionalized cooper-
ation but do not take any action towards this direction. This has implications for
the conceptualization of the dependent variable. It can be reasonably argued that
states only engage in a regime-formation process or express a demand for a regime
if they see a chance that their demand could lead to an international regime at
all. Therefore, considering only cases in which political action has already been
taken in some form biases research towards positive cases in which there is no
Chapter 4. Research Strategy and Research Design 70
non-regime, but merely a ‘not yet’-regime, especially when negotiations were not
deliberately aborted, but experienced a continuing halt. This ties in with a second
caveat. The previous chapters have justified the case selection and the choice for
the environmental sector with the scarcity of non-regime cases. However, if a non-
regime is defined as it has been in this study, the opposite might be true: there
are plenty (almost too many) non-regimes, depending on the time-frame under
consideration. Literally every international regime started with a regime demand
which was followed by negotiations and a regime formation process. Therefore,
literally every international regime started as a non-regime case. Even though this
caveat has to be acknowledged, it is not as problematic as it seems at first glance.
Whether a regime is a ‘true’ non-regime or simply a ‘not yet’-regime has only little
effects for testing the theoretical argument. On the contrary, observing when and
how a ‘not-yet’ regime turns into an international regime offers an opportunity
to furthermore test the argument. If scientific knowledge and political action are
interrelated, a change in political action should be observable only after a change
in scientific knowledge became clear.
The alternative definition of non-regimes – policy issues that theoretically could be
managed “better” through international regimes – has implications for the research
progress that seemed to be even more controversial. Defining a non-regime in such
a matter implies that what state actors regard as more beneficial is objectively
accessible. This, on the one hand, implies that it is possible to objectively asses
what actors consider as beneficial for themselves. On the other hand, such a
definition of a non-regime might reflect the concept better, but it is a lot more
difficult to trace empirically. If there has not been any political action towards
regime formation, what could be empirical data through which the argument could
be tested? How could ‘political inaction despite potential gains from cooperation’
be operationalized? Since these questions remain unanswered, this study took the
deliberate choice for the specific definition of a non-regime.
Concerning the operationalization of the the independent variable, transferring
aspects of knowledge into knowledge about costs or benefits might seem an ab-
straction that rests on strong assumptions on how actors perceive and progress
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information. This transfer is, however, induced by the theoretical argument. The
argument assumes that scientific knowledge effects actors’ perception of either
costs or benefits.

Chapter 5
Empirical Analysis
This chapter provides the empirical analysis of four cases – Persistent Organic
Pollution, Stratospheric Ozone protection, Arctic haze and Deforestation. Each
chapter begins with a process-tracing analysis of the progression of scientific knowl-
edge. This is followed by a process-tracing analysis of the political process. In a
third step, data on costs and benefits is analyzed.
5.1 International Regulation of Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants (POPs)
Despite the high degree of scientific uncertainty, countries implemented strong
multilateral regulation on POPs through two multilateral agreements. Given the
success of the regime formation process (the dependent variable), the theoretical
argument leads to the expectancy that the profile of scientific knowledge has been
conducive, meaning that by the time the agreement was struck costs appeared to be
low while benefits were uncertain. Additionally, section 5.1.3 will show how highly
uncertain scientific knowledge was after early concerns on POPs were raised. This
leads to the expectation that the first political activities on an international level
were science-oriented and calls for coordinating scientific efforts. The theoretical
argument would also lead to the expectation that states were rather similar in
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their cost-benefit-configuration, or that dissimilarities were compensated in some
form.
POPs are man-made chemical compounds of organic1 nature with toxic charac-
teristics. They are persistent, prone to long-range transport and were extensively
used as fungicides or pesticides in the agricultural sector (such as DDT), as flame
retardant or diluent (for example PCB) by the electronic industry or simply were
unintended by-products of industrial processes. The mix of chemical substances
which is grouped under the label ‘Persitent Organic Pollutants’ is heterogenous
and the substances vary significantly in their distribution, severity and harmful-
ness (see table 5.1). While some POPs are acutely toxic and cause immediate and
severe human health problems, others endanger only marine fish and mammals
after long-time chronic exposure (Ritter et al., 1995). With some exceptions, the
substances are suspected or proven to be carcinogen (IARC, 2013). Additionally,
some are suspected to disturb the hormonal balance (so called ‘endocrine disrup-
tion’) and the immune system (Bertazzi et al., 1998). They share similarities in
their chemical composition, their half-life in fatty tissue, their tendency for bio-
accumulation, and their long-range transboundary migration patterns. Especially
the latter sparked multilateral action as residues of POPs were detected in remote
areas such as the Arctic or Antarctica. For a comprehensive overview on the usage
of POPs and possible negative effects, see table 5.1. With regards to the negative
health effects, it has to be noted though that some findings rest on a rather fragile
evidential base (see annotations in table 5.1) (Longnecker et al., 1997).
Concerns about possible undesirable effects on wildlife and human health led to in-
ternational political action which resulted in two multilateral environmental agree-
ments: the 1998 Protocol on POPs under the Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) and the UN Convention on POPs (Stockholm
Convention) in 2001. The LRTAP Convention serves as an umbrella treaty system
with specific protocols and was established in 1979. It is signed and ratified by 51
countries, including Canada, USA, Russia and all European countries (Sprinz and
1POPs are “Organic” since their molecular structure is based on carbon.
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Vaahtoranta, 1994)2. The Protocol on POPs was signed by 33 LRTAP-parties in
1998 after ten years of assessing the scientific knowledge and negotiating an agree-
ment. The assessment process resulted in the first conclusive assessment reports
on POPs (Eckley-Selin, 2006, :178).
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, on the other hand,
was signed by 92 states in 2001 and became effective in 2004 after the ratification
of the fiftieth signatory state. It was negotiated over three years between 1998 and
2001 under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)
and regulates or restricts the production, use and trade of POPs. The negoti-
ation process was preceded by scientific assessment of the International Forum
for Chemical Safety (IFCS) which conducted an assessment report on toxicology
and transport of POPs (Ritter L., 1998). The Stockholm Convention has a broad
membership (by 2013, 172 countries had ratified the document)3.
Scholars and participants of POPs negotiations alike agree that the scientific as-
sessment for the Stockholm Convention heavily relied on the preceding scientific
work that had been conducted for the CLRTAP Protocol on POPs (Eckley-Selin,
2006). For example, the scientific assessment conducted for the Stockholm conven-
tion repeatedly refers to the CLRTAP Protocol’s scientific assessment (see Ritter L.
(1998)).
Since the scientific assessment as well as the political process of the CLRTAP pro-
tocol preceded the Stockholm Convention, the CLRTAP Protocol is more lucrative
for the study of both processes. Therefore, this study will exclusively focus on the
LRTAP protocol.
2For a complete list of members, see: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/status/
lrtap-st.html (21.10.2013)
3for a complete list of signatory states, see: http://chm.pops.int/Countries/
StatusofRatifications/tabid/252/Default.aspx (22.10.2013)
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5.1.1 Defining Costs, Benefits and Uncertainties of POPs
The study aims at retracing the development of scientific knowledge on POPs and
the linkages to political action. The argument in chapter 3 states that with re-
gards to political action on the international level, the configuration of scientific
kowledge can either be conducive or obstructive. Secondly, it states that new sci-
entific knowledge can reshape the configuration of scientific uncertainty (e.g. from
obstructive to conducive and vice versa). Since the issue of POPs was already
found to be characterized by scientific uncertainty at the previous step of case se-
lection (see section 4.3) and POPs are regulated internationally, we would expect a
conducive profile. Linking the case-study to the theoretical argument (see chapter
3) requires a clear-cut definition of costs and benefits in the case of POPs.
Costs resulting from the regulation POPs are conceptualized in line with Sprinz
and Vaahtoranta (1994) as pure economic costs from regulation. As an opera-
tionalization of economic costs has to capture the economic value or significance
of POPs, they are operationalized as the absolute production, use4 and waste dis-
posal of POPs, which are best captured by emission data (Pacyna et al., 2003).
The operationalization follows the logic that the higher a country’s emissions,
the higher the costs from international regulation (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994,
:88).
Benefits from regulating POPs are conceptualized (again in line with Sprinz and
Vaahtoranta (1994)) as reduced vulnerability. In the case of POPs, vulnerability
is determined by the possible hazards from POPs and the exposure to POPs. In-
tuitively, it can be assumed that states regard their vulnerability towards POPs as
high if they regard POPs to be hazardous, since this is the reason to expect harm-
ful consequences. On the other hand, vulnerability can only be high if a country
faces actual exposure to a hazardous substance. This follows the presumption that
a country is primarily concerned with its own well-fare and merely pays lip ser-
vice to concerns about “Mother Earth” in general. If a country’s territory is not
4‘use’ includes export of POPs
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affected by a harmful substance, it can be presumed that it expects no harmful
consequences.
Therefore, if exposure-rates are high and compounds lead to negative effects, ben-
efits from international regulation are high and vice versa. The conceptualization
of benefits is therefore a conjunction of hazardousness and exposure, which can
be expressed as vulnerability = hazardous nature of POPs * exposure. If both are
high, benefits from international regulation are high. If one or both indicators are
low, benefits from international regulation are low.
Concerning changing knowledge we would expect that initiatives for international
action followed a conjunction of findings on negative effects caused by POPs and
findings on their transboundary movement. If POPs were only hazardous and not
prone to transboundary movement, pure national legislation would be sufficient to
address the issue. If they were only prone to transboundary movement but rather
harmless, there would no reason to tackle the issue on an international level. Only
the conjunction of both would be a reason to regulate them internationally. The
subsequent case study intends to reveal whether this was the case or whether
other factors provide a more robust explanation for the emergence of the POPs
regimes.
5.1.2 The Outline of the Case Study
To determine how scientific knowledge was shaped and how it changed over time,
the scientific literature on the issue of POPs is analyzed. Two methods are em-
ployed to select the most relative contributions from the vast body of scientific
literature: First, contributions are picked from highly influential journals Nature,
Science and two additional journals that are prominent in the field of interest.
This step aims at identifying the dominant research themes during different time
spans. Secondly, the vast body of scientific literature is analyzed through a cita-
tion analysis using ‘CiteSpace’. This second step ensures that highly influential
publications which were not published in one of the selected journals, but were
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frequently cited by other contributions and can therefore count as highly influen-
tial are also included into the analysis. The results of the citation analysis serves
as a basis for the qualitative content analysis.
5.1.2.1 Scanning Highly Influential Scientific Journals
As a first step, Nature and Science are screened for publications on POPs. Further-
more, the journals Science of the Total Environment and Atmospheric Chemistry
have been identified as highly relevant to the issue through a review of the refer-
ences within the articles of Science and Nature. All four journals offer an accessable
historic database and were scanned for the period between the years 1948 (the be-
ginning of the commercial introduction of organochlorine pesticides) and 2001 (the
year of the Stockholm convention) for the keywords ‘DDT’, ‘Aldrin’, ‘Chlordane’,
‘Dieldrin’, ‘Endrin’, ‘Heptachlor’, ‘HCBs’, ‘Hexachlorbenzene’, ‘Mirex’, ‘PCBs’,
‘Polychlorinated Biphenyls’, ‘Furans’, ‘Dioxin’, ‘Toxaphene’, ‘Persistent Organic
Pollutants’, ‘Organochlorine Pesticides’. The search resulted in 438 articles that
cover the issue. A systematic overview of the results is made available in appendix
7. The results of the first step of data collection was used to identify dominant
research topics (see table 5.2). This is relevant to determine different dimensions
of scientific uncertainty.
As a result, the scientific themes ‘Resistance’, ‘Persistence’, ‘Uptake and Storage’,
‘Effectiveness’, ‘Negative Wildlife Effects’, ‘Negative Effects Human Health Ef-
fects’ and ‘Transport’ were identified. An overview with specifications is provided
in table 5.2.
Data collection and analysis of the articles in Science, Nature, Science of the To-
tal Environment and Atmospheric Chemistry show that different scienitfic issues
dominated research through different periods in time. In the early years (between
1948 and 1975), researchers were mainly occupied with (a) mechanisms that cause
resistance of targeted insects (such as locust, cockroaches or mosquitos), (b) the
persistence of pesticides in soils and water and (c) the effectiveness of the pes-
ticides. Within the scientific process, research on PCBs began later. During
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Theme Specification
Resistance The degree and underlying mechanism
on how different insects develop resis-
tance towards insecticides
Persistence The half-life of POPs in soils, water,
air and tissue. Mechanisms of biode-
gration.
Uptake and Storage POPs in different food-chains.
Metabolism and storage of POPs
in animals and humans.
Effectiveness The acute effects of POPs (toxicity and
micro mechanism).
Negative Wildlife Effects Adverse effects from sub-leathal, small
dosed, long-time exposure for animals.
Negative Human Health Effects Adverse effects from sub-leathal, small
dosed, long-time exposure for humans.
Transport Different mechanisms of how POPs mi-
grate over distances.
Table 5.2: Themes of POPs in Scientific Journals
the early 1950s, nearly all research effort on POPs was directed at improving the
effectiveness of pesticides by avoiding resistance, enhancing persistence and under-
standing the micro-mechanisms of lethality. Themes like negative wildlife effects,
negative health effects and uptake and storage were only addressed by a few pub-
lications which mainly dealt with negative effects from acute toxicity. The themes
‘negative wildlife effects’, ‘negative health effects’ and ’uptake and storage’ became
prominent in the mid 1960s and clearly dominated in the 1970s, also sparked by
events as the Seveso dioxin spillage. During this period, the first negative effects
from sub-leathal, small-dosed chronic exposure (like reproductive failure of birds
and fish) were investigated. The search for alternatives entered the scientific de-
bate between 1975 and 1985. The scientific debate on transport and migration
of POPs had been going on since the late 1960s, but major uncertainties had not
been resolved until the early 1990s.
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5.1.2.2 Citation Analysis
The underlying rationale and a detailed description of citation analysis are elab-
orated in chapter 4. This section will therefore focus on the case-specific im-
plementation of both methods. The method aims at filtering the most relevant
information that was present at different points in time within the scientific debate.
The results are crosschecked with the official assessment reports.
The citation analysis using ‘CiteSpace’ uses the dataset of the ‘Scientific Cita-
tion Index’ and identifies citation networks by connecting scientific papers accord-
ing to the backward citations and forward citations5. In a first step, a data-set
was generated by searching the keywords ‘DDT’, ‘Aldrin’, ‘Chlordane’, ‘Dieldrin’,
‘Endrin’, ‘Heptachlor’, ‘HCBs’, ‘Hexachlorbenzene’, ‘Mirex’, ‘PCBs’, ‘Polychlori-
nated Biphenyls’, ‘Furans’, ‘Dioxin’, ‘Toxaphene’, ‘Persistent Organic Pollutants’,
and ‘Organochlorine Pesticides’ within the Scientific Citation Index. In a second
step, the gathered citations were analyzed through ‘CiteSpace’ and allocated to
the above mentioned research themes. CiteSpace uses citation data to identify
citation networks and citation pathways through the historic development of sci-
ence. It allows to identify landmark articles and scientific bursts. This resulted
in the identification of 53 highly important publications for the issue of POPs. A
overview on the publications in emphNature and Science is made available in the
appendix.
The citation analysis leads to a manageable amount of scientific literature allows
to conduct a qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2010). The literature analysis
further includes the official assessment work which has been conducted by the LR-
TAP working group on technology with support of the International Programme
on Chemical Safety (IPCS). The efforts of both agencies resulted in two compre-
hensive assessment reports, the “State of Knowledge Report of the UN ECE Task
Force on Persistent Organic Pollutants” (UN.ECE, 1994a,b) and the IPCS report
5‘backward citation’ means a citation within the paper in focus, ‘forward citation’ describes
a citation of the paper in focus.
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“A Review of Selected Persistent Organic Pollutants” (Ritter et al., 1995). Ex-
pert interviews ensure that the following account on the development of scientific
knowledge on POPs is as conclusive as possible.
The historic steps of scientific advancement, as well as paralleling political action
are roughly divided into decades. Data on the political action was obtained from
the official documents, provided by the UN ECE and secondary literature (Eckley-
Selin, 2006; Selin, 2000; Selin and Eckley, 2003).
5.1.3 Scientific Knowledge and Political Action on POPs
from a Historical Perspective
Table 5.1 shows the diversity of POPs both in function and in negative effects. But
despite all dissimilarities, POPs share the features that they are (a) resistant to-
wards photolytic, chemical, and biological degradation; (b) they are lipophilic and
therefore bioaccumulate in fatty tissue of top predators mainly through the food
chain and (c) they migrate over long distances around the globe predominantly
through two mechanisms: ‘global distillation’, a process through which vaporized
chemicals travel through atmospheric winds into colder regions and condensate
and the ‘grasshopper’ or ‘cold trap effect’ where chemicals travel in tune with
seasonal temperature shifts6 (Wania and Mackay, 1993, 1996).
Research on POPs has always been, and still is, in parts fraud by analytical
limitations to the extend that experts refer to it as “hitting a moving target”
(Shifrin and Toole, 1998). To fully capture the scientific process on the issue of
POPs, each of the 12 compounds would need to be investigated individually. The
next sections will however explicitly focus on DDT and PCB for several reasons.
First of all, both substances appear most prominent in the scientific debate7.
They represent both the groups of organochlorine chemicals: Pesticides (DDT)
and industrial chemicals (PCBs). Second, DDT and PCB are the most significant
substances economically. Production, usage and trade exceed the all other POPs
6Other mechanisms have also been identified, see 5.3.3.2.
7Dioxin appears in a comparable number, this is however caused by the Seveso accident.
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by far (Lohmann et al., 2007). Thirdly, the two substances appeared to be the most
controversial politically (Selin, 2000). They drew the highest media-attention on
a national level and were discussed the most controversially during international
negotiations. Therefore, it can be assumed that these two substances best reflect
the relationship between scientific knowledge and political action on POPs.
5.1.3.1 Sources and Emissions
In search of an efficient pesticide that was harmless to humans and plants, the
Swiss company Geigy developed DDT in 1939. It was widely used during World
War II for vector control to curtail typhus, malaria and other deceases. After World
War II, the agricultural use of different organochlorine pesticides intensified. They
have proven to be an effective and cost-efficient pesticide for a wide range of pests
(Wharton and Reid, 1950) and between 1950 and 1980, over 40,000 tons of DDT
were used each year (Li and Macdonald, 2005). The extensive use led to pest
resistance and, as a consequence, large-scale outdoor application declined during
the 1990s. There is only minor use of DDT and other organochlorine pesticides
today (Longnecker et al., 1997).
In the early days of its application (1940s-1950s), estimating the sources, emis-
sions and residues in wildlife and humans of DDT remained a difficult task due to
methodological limitations. In the 1950s, some findings indicated large residues
of DDT and other organochlorine pesticides in soils, and small quantities were
found in plants and animal tissue (Edwards, 1966; Edwards and Adams, 1970;
Lichtenstein, 1957; MacPhee et al., 1960, :8). Further attention on residues was
sparked by Carson (1962)’s famous book ‘Silent Spring’ and numerous researchers
launched projects to trace the amount of residues of organochlorine pesticides in
soils, water and the air (Berry, 1967; Brady, 1967; Johnson, 1968; Moore, 1967;
Moore and Tatton, 1965; Rudd, 1964). These efforts improved the understanding
about persistent stocks of organochlorine pesticides in the physical and biological
environment. However, it was not until the early 1970s that organochlorine com-
pounds could be analytically separated and measured (Shifrin and Toole, 1998,
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:247). Research techniques sharply advanced as new gas spectrometric procedures
(Edwards and Adams, 1970, :8) became available, but many details were still un-
known. For example, it remained unclear if pesticides were picked up directly from
the air or washed out from circulating dust (Wheatley and Hardman, 1965), which
was highly relevant for research on migration patterns. These analytical gaps were
not filled until the late 1980s.
PCBs, on the other hand, were industrially produced from 1930 to 1989. They
substituted mineral oils that had previously been used for cooling and insolation
purpose (Kimbrough, 1989). Manufacturing peaked in the 1960s (Breivik et al.,
2004) and by 1972, they were produced in (West) Germany, France, Great Britain,
Italy, Japan, Spain, the USSR and the USA (Fiedler, 1997). Unlike DDT and other
chlorinated compounds, PCBs were detected rather late since they (a) analytically
overlap with other chlorinated pesticides and industrial compounds and (b) their
acute toxicity was not a reason for great concern (Shifrin and Toole, 1998, :247).
This changed with an accidental high-dosage exposure in Japan that occurred
in the late 1960s (see section 5.1.3.2). Systematic research on sources, emissions
and residues of PCBs was sparked by a study of Jensen (1966), who’s study sug-
gested that PCBs were probably distributed widely around the globe. However,
even though measurements and instruments on the quantification of PCBs con-
centrations improved significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Shifrin and
Toole, 1998, :249), the complex nature of PCBs still caused considerable difficul-
ties to researchers when it came to estimating PCBs concentrations during that
time period. 209 different commercially produced PCBs existed and unlike other
organochlorine compounds, they were not directly released or emitted into the en-
vironment. Rather, they were used in condensers and other electronic equipment,
making it impossible to track all possible sources. Secondly, considerable amounts
of PCBs were produced in unregistered and illegal production sites (Breivik et al.,
2004).
In conclusion, the mechanisms of emissions of DDT and PCBs were quite well
understood when negotiations on the CLRTAP Protocol started. While DDT
was deliberately dispersed in the environment through agricultural use, PCBs
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emissions appeared rather collateral through using and abandoning products con-
taining PCBs. However, very little accurate data existed on actual emissions and
inventories during the time when the CLRTAP Protocol was negotiated. This
is also expressed by the official assessment work of the IPCS and the UN.ECE
working group on technology (Ritter et al., 1995; UN.ECE, 1994a). States had
therefore only rough estimates on their own emissions that were not transparent
to other states.
5.1.3.2 Negative Effects on Wildlife and Human Health
In the early days of application, the abiotic and biotic character of DDT and other
organochlorine pesticides was at least partly understood (Thrift et al., 2009) and
acute toxicity resulting from organochlorine exposure – such as chloracne (Meigs
et al., 1954) – was already known from the beginning of it’s usage. The only
concerns about the large-scale use of organochlorine pesticides were raised in the
early 1950s when scholars discovered an increase of insect population despite the
application of pesticides. In 1945, a review of animal studies in the British Medical
Journal concluded that there is no reason to anticipate any danger in man from
widespread low-level exposure of pesticides (Beard, 2006; Cameron and Burgess,
1945). These findings were supported by small-scoped human trials where no
signs of adverse effects after a chronic mild exposure to pesticides were found on
test persons (Hayes et al., 1956). Hence, the first warnings did merely suggest
improvements in the application of pesticides to avoid ineffectiveness.
This changed with more and more findings about negative effects of DDT and
other organochlorine pesticides in wildlife. In the early 1960s, studies reported
findings of dead birds and fish close to sprayed fields and woodlands (Robbins
et al., 1951; Turtle et al., 1963), but these findings were accepted as unavoid-
able side-damage (Edwards and Adams, 1970, :8). Even though scholars in the
1950s discovered a rapid decline of certain bird populations in Great Briteain and
the U.S. through the thinning of eggshells (Ratcliffe, 1958), this phenomenon was
only tentatively linked to pesticides. A linkage between organochlorine pesticides,
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a change in the endocrine system of birds, egg-shell thinning and a decline in pop-
ulation of certain bird species was first articulated between 1967 and 1968, when
two influential publications in Science and Nature presented laboratory findings
(Hickey and Anderson, 1968; Ratcliffe, 1967). This was the first empirical evidence
of adverse effects of organochlorine pesticides from chronic, sub-lethal doses for
wildlife and was later confirmed by other lab experiments (Peakall, 1969). Two
properties of organochlorine pesticides allowed to draw this causal link: Since
these substances are highly persistent, they bioaccumulated (Doane, 1962; Ed-
wards, 1965; Keith, 1966) and, in the longer run, change hormonal processes that
are responsible for the egg-shell production (Egan et al., 1965; Turtle et al., 1963).
These were the first indications of adverse effects of organochlorine pesticides for
the environment.
Within that decade, evidence of organochlorine pesticides residues in food and
human tissue grew stronger (Egan et al., 1965; Hayes et al., 1963; Robinson and
McGill, 1966). However, the British Advisory Committee on Poisonous Substances
stated in an official report in 1964 that there was no evidence that the concentra-
tion of pesticides found in human tissue do any harm. Only the wide diffusion of
these compounds were reason for some concern, but serious adverse effects for hu-
mans were not articulated (Advisory Committee on Poisonous Substances used in
Agriculture and Food Storage, 1964). An assessment report by the World Health
Organization (WHO) in 1979 documented the well-established consequences of
acute, high-dosed exposure for humans, but at the same time stated that “in the
light of currently available information, there is no evidence that DDT is carcino-
genic in man” (WHO, 1979). However, some studies suggested a carcinogenic
effects and liver malfunction.
During the 1980s, research indicated more and more different adverse effects for
human health, especially different sorts of cancer and reproductive effects (Fry
et al., 1981). Studies showed correlations between residue levels and breast cancer
(Eriksson et al., 1981; Unge et al., 1984; Wassermann et al., 1976). However, the
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conclusions from theses studies were limited by methodological mistakes (Long-
necker et al., 1997, :219). The links between other forms of cancer such as lym-
phoma, pancreatic cancer, brain cancer, liver cancer and diabetis seemed even
stronger (Alavanja et al., 2003; Blair et al., 1992; Ditraglia et al., 1981; Littorin
et al., 1993; Longnecker et al., 1997; Woods et al., 1987). Nevertheless, as Beard
(2006) points out, the conclusions from these studies have to be read with caution
due to the mentioned limitations. In the light of theses findings and in the light
of stronger evidence of negative effects, nearly all signatory states of the POPs-
Protocol had installed restricting domestic laws on use, production and trade of
DDT by the late 1980s that exceeded the restrictions of previous legislation (see
table 7.1).
While knowledge on negative effects of organochlorine pesticides on human health
was merely tentative in the 1980s, much research effort had been spent on sup-
porting or dismissing the speculative findings in the decades that followed. The
potential carcinogenicity with respect to breast cancer remained unclear with
some studies confirming the link (Wolff et al., 1993) and some studies dismiss-
ing it (Krieger et al., 1994). Speculations on a relationship between exposure to
organochlorine pesticides and pancreatic cancer were supported by cohort stud-
ies (Garabrant et al., 1992). Additionally, the suspected relationship between
organochlorine pesticides and lymphoma was supported (Cantor et al., 1992). A
conclusive and highly cited review-study in a high impact journal from 1997 con-
cludes that besides the long known acute toxicity of high dosed organochlorine
pesticide exposure, human health effects were not yet well established. The same
study called for further investigation on breast cancer, lymphoma and pancre-
atic cancer, as well as androgen activity with regard to exposure and residues of
organochlorine pesticides.
Cancer did not remain the only reason for concern. Since the role of organochlo-
rine pesticides in reproductive processes in birds had been studied intensively,
scholars investigated these effects in humans and came to reasonable assumptions
that pesticide concentrations could be linked to miscarriage (Leoni et al., 1989;
Saxena et al., 1980), spontaneous abortion (O’Leary and Davies, 1970) as well as
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prematurity (Procinoy, 1981; Saxena et al., 1980) and other fetus related issues
(Rogan et al., 1986a,b). Organochlorine pesticides also were suspected to influence
male fertility (Bush et al., 1986), but studies only found scattered evidence. All in
all, studies on negative effects of DDT-exposure on reproduction processes remain
still puzzling. While some studies conclude strong effects (Longnecker et al., 2001),
other studies do not find evidence for a possible causal link (Siddiqui et al., 2003).
Early studies showed clear methodological limitations (Beard, 2006, :81), recent
reviews showed no statistically significant results (Dalvie et al., 2004).
Possible negative effects from PCBs-exposure entered the scientific debate rather
late, since - in contrast to organochlorine pesticides - there was initially no reason
to suspect any toxic effects from PCBs-exposure. An accidental PCBs-poisoning in
Japan, which caused several casualties in 1969, sparked research on PCBs-effects
with an exclusive focus on acute toxicity from highly dosed exposure. These ranged
from skin anomalies, deformed nails and teeth to delayed cognitive development
in children (Gladen et al., 1988; Ritter et al., 1995).
Negative effects from chronic, low level exposure entered the debate as a spill-
over from research on negative effects of organochlorine pesticides in the 1970s
(Hammond, 1972; Mosser et al., 1972). Jensen (1966) discovered how wide-spread
PCBs were to be found in the environment and, since their chemical composi-
tion showed similarities to organochlorine pesticides, researching possible effects
of PCBs seemed obvious. Since DDT was already suspected to be carcinogenic,
early research focused on this mechanism (Allen and Norback, 1973; Bahn et al.,
1976; Blum, 1977; Kimbrough et al., 1975). However, the same measurement dif-
ficulties that plagued research on sources and emissions also hampered research
on negative effects (Shifrin and Toole, 1998) and data was insufficiently robust to
draw a direct causal link (Nelson, 1972).
In the 1980s, research on PCBs and cancer expanded to cohort studies on occu-
pational exposure (Baker et al., 1980; Bertazzi et al., 1987; Brown, 1987; Cam-
marano et al., 1984; Gustavsson et al., 1986; Nicholson et al., 1987; Woods et al.,
1987). The studies were based, however, only on a limited numbers of participants.
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Therefore, even though many studies suggested a potential link between PCBs ex-
posure and various forms of cancer, the data remained insufficient. In 1987, the
International Agency for the Research on Cancer (IARC) reported that PCBs had
been found carcinogenic in animal trial, but not in humans and therefore classified
PCBs as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” (Group 2b) (IARC, 1987).
The focused research on negative effects of PCBs led researchers to suggest addi-
tional hazards form PCBs to wildlife and human health, such as prenatal neuro-
development, fetus malformations, miscarriage and immune system suppression
(Dar et al., 1992; Gladen et al., 1988; Leoni et al., 1989; Mendola et al., 1995;
Rogan et al., 1986a,b; Taylor et al., 1989). Research supported the hypothesis
of an influence of PCBs on several hormonal and endocrine processes, but could
not identify an unambiguous mechanism, significant correlation or effect (Brouwer
et al., 1999). Even though many details were still missing, evidence was alarming
enough for many countries to pass national legislation between the 1970s and late
1980s (see table 7.2 in the appendix). In contrast to DDT though, scientific find-
ings on negative effects of PCBs became more robust after many countries had
passed restricting regulation.
Though over the decades knowledge on negative effects of DDT and PCBs ex-
panded enormously in quantity and quality, the interactions in wildlife and hu-
mans of both compounds are highly complex and sensitive to only slight changes
in species, age, sex and exposure. There is little doubt about the effects of acute
high-dose exposure.
5.1.3.3 Transport and Migration Patterns
The issue of transport paths of POPs was raised in the 1960s after findings of
residues in remote areas such as the Antarctic and the Arctic. Finding DDT and
PCB in remote areas far from their production sites and deployment sites seemed
puzzling (Tatton and Ruzicka, 1967), and scholars began to speculate on transport
pathways of organochlorine pesticides. The standard model at this stage suggested
that organochlorine pesticides enter the food chain and travel through migrating
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species such as fish and birds. Alternatively, it was assumed that the substances
are diffused into the water cycle and are transported via sea-currents. Both of
the models were however contested by residue findings in air samples and water
samples at levels that exceeded the amount that could be transported through the
food chain or water currents (Abbott et al., 1965).
During that time period, results from a large-scale monitoring project in the Arc-
tic supported previous speculation about the long-range atmospheric compounds
(Tanabe et al., 1983). A highly cited article from 1989 investigated new data sam-
ples and concludes that “. . . organic compounds, which cannot be explained by
the presence of local sources, are occuring in Canadian Arctic snow at measurable
concentrations. The only reasonable source for these compounds is long-range
atmospheric transport.” (Gregor and Gummer, 1989). While long-range atmo-
spheric transport had been documented with certainty for decades for substances
such as dust, metal particles or carbon, the overall data on organochlorine pesti-
cides was still inconclusive (Barrie et al., 1992, :64). More insights on long-range
transport of organochlorine pesticide were gained by the studies of Wania and
Mackay (1993, 1996) who developed the first models of ‘cold condensation’, a pro-
cess where substances evaporate in warm seasons into the air and settle back to
soil in cold seasons or regions. The hypothesized model was confirmed by several
studies (Ockenden et al., 1998) and evidence for its reliability was accumulated
(Jones and De Voogt, 1999). These findings were picked up by Rodan et al. (1999)
who prepared an early screening report on the mechanisms in collaboration with
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). The report highlights the
remaining scientific uncertainties concerning half-life and transport paths. Only a
year later, Macdonald et al. (2000) published the results of the five year research
project under the Canadian Northern Contaminants Program (NCP), which not
only confirmed the existing transport models, but also identified additional mech-
anisms of atmospheric transport.
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5.1.3.4 Summary: Certain and Uncertain Knowledge on POPs
The main finding from the first step of literature analysis is that over time the
scientific community has been occupied with different aspects of POPs. These
research themes have been sparked by either (a) new puzzling findings (such as
residues in remote areas or the decline of bird populations) or (b) by transferring
previous scientific knowledge to new aspects that were suspected to be related
(such as hormonal effects of DDT in birds to hormonal effects of PCBs in hu-
mans).
The main finding of the qualitative content analysis of literature is that research
on POPs has been, and still is, a difficult task and that only a few definite state-
ments on many issues concerning POPs can be made. The acute toxicity of both
DDT and PCBs after a highly dosed exposure is one of the few hardly contestable
statements. The theoretical model on the mechanism through which highly dosed
DDT exposure and PCBs exposure leads to severe damage was plausibly formu-
lated and repeatedly tested in labs and in (accidental) field tests. It was never
really contested and can therefore count as ‘certain knowledge’. Additionally, very
detailed knowledge on the development of pest resistances and reduced effective-
ness as a result of long-term, large-scale use of DDT was available quite early
on.
Concerning transboundary migration, there were initially at least two theo-
retical models in the 1960s to explain transboundary transport. However, both
theories – migration through the food chain and through water currents – could
not be supported by empirical evidence. Theoretical predictions did not match
the empirical findings, and mechanisms of transboundary migration were highly
uncertain at that point. In search of alternative theoretical models, scholars began
to theorize on atmospheric migration in the 1980s. By the late 1980s and early
1990s, evidence of atmospheric transport accumulated. The theoretical model
on transboundary atmospheric migration was supported by numerous field tests
and laboratory studies; as a result, the scientific uncertainty about mechanisms of
transboundary transport declined. The emergence of the atmospheric transport
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model constitutes a turning point in the level of scientific uncertainty on migration.
While the level was very high in the 1960s with at least two untested explanatory
models, it declined in the 1980s and the 1990s, when a single model was confirmed
by different empirical studies.
Theoretical models on emission sources of DDT and PCBs had been supported
quite early on and proved to be a rather simple scientific task. DDT has been
produced in large quantities for the agricultural sector, PCBs have been used in
open and closed electronic systems. But even though emission sources of both
compounds can easily be identified, quantifying emissions and tracing quantities
back to emitters remained and still remains difficult (Li, 1999; Ritter et al., 1995;
Voldner and Li, 1995).
Scientific literature is highly at variance regarding negative effects. Even though
studies suggest negative effects, serious uncertainties remain. This is reflected by
both the IPCS assessment report and the assessment report of the LRTAP Work-
ing Group on Technology (Ritter et al., 1995; UN.ECE, 1994b,b). Both of the
reports emphasize the preliminary nature of the information and the need for
more research. The report of the LRTAP-Working Group on Technology states
that there are “[. . . ] difficulties in determining the role that POPs already in the
environment have in sustaining elevated ecosystem levels, and inherent difficulties
in obtaining biological effect and epidemiological data; all represent areas of uncer-
tainty which are unlikely to be resolved in the short or medium term.” (UN.ECE,
1994a, :20).
The analysis of the scientific literature as well as the official assessment reports
allows to conclude that knowledge about negative effects on wildlife and human
health from DDT and PCBs was still uncertain when negotiations started in 1997.
Either methodological problems allow to question evidence for negative effects,
scholars expressed the limitations of their own studies or were refuted by rivaling
studies.
Scientific uncertainty has been operationalyzed in chapter 4 according to the num-
ber of rivaling models and the reliability of empirical tests. This operationalization
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can now be applied to the development of scientific knowledge on POPs to show
how scientific uncertainty over time and across different scientific sub-issues. The
results are summarized in table 5.3.
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000
Sources and Emissions % % % % % -
Negative Effects ++ ++ + + + +
Transport and Migration Patterns ++ + + - - - - -
Table 5.3: Level of Scientific Uncertainty Concerning POPs over Time and
Scientific Theme
Uncertainty levels (see section 4.4.1.2: ++ = very high, + = high, % medium, - = low, - - very
low )
5.1.4 Stages of Regime Formation
5.1.4.1 Efforts on Domestic Regulation of POPs
Scientific findings on possible negative effects from DDT and the promotion of
these findings caused public concern in many countries, which put pressure on
policy makers to engage. Especially DDT sparked public and political concern
which led to legislative regulation on the agricultural use of DDT in many devel-
oped countries. However, the political action on POPs differed across countries
in timing and character. While for example the U.S. introduced rather strict do-
mestic legislation in 1972, DDT was still used in the agricultural sector of many
countries until 1984. Additionally, some countries set up quota for agricultural use
rather than banning DDT as such. Nevertheless, as table 5.5 shows, all negotiat-
ing countries had installed some form of regulation on DDT by 1996. The effects
of domestic regulation on POPs-emissions are reflected by decreasing emissions
during this period (see table 5.5).
Since the release patterns of PCBs are more complex, the issue of PCBs entered
the scientific and political debate later than DDT. PCBs were entangled in more
diverse production cycles and finding appropriate regulatory measures proved to
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be more difficult. States began to regulate PCBs domestically from the late 1970s
up to the late 1990s. However, as the use of PCBs was more diverse compared
to DDT, the regulation differed from state to state. While some states banned or
phased out all applications for PCBs, others would still allow the application of
PCBs, for example for non-consumer goods or in closed systems where the actual
emission of PCBs was unlikely.
5.1.4.2 Early Demands for International Regulation and Agenda For-
mation
In the early 1980s, discussions within the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) led to
the development of the 1985 International Code of Conduct for the Distribution
and Use of Pesticides and the 1987 London Guidelines for the Exchange of In-
formation on Chemicals in International Trade. Both the Code of Conduct and
the London Guidelines included procedures that aimed at improving the avail-
ability, thereby permitting countries to assess the risks associated with the use of
chemicals (Krueger and Selin, 2002).
Since high concentrations of POPs had been found in the tissue of indigenous peo-
ple in the Canadian Arctic, the issue was introduced by Canadian officials to the
UN ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). On
the basis of the Canadian initiative, the CLRTAP Executive Body initiated an as-
sessment process and installed a Task Force on POPs (Farrell, 2006) in December
1990 to develop a better understanding of POPs for potential future negotiations.
The task force reviewed existing findings on substances that had already been sus-
pected by applying a formalized screening procedure which focused on (a) potential
long-range transport, (b) toxicity (c) persistency and bioaccumulation. While in-
formation on long-range transport seem solid and information on acute toxicity
was more or less reliable, assessing persistency and bioaccumulation incorporated
severe uncertainty, due to not only data gaps but also by uncertainty about the
appropriate model used for assessment (Rodan et al., 1999, :3488).
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The Task Force recommended to the CLRTAP Executive Body to take multilateral
action on a list of POPs, even though it expressed large uncertainties in its final
state of knowledge report (UN.ECE, 1994a). Following this recommendation, the
CLRTAP Executive Body installed a Preparatory Group in 1995 to prepare polit-
ical negotiations within the CLRTAP framework. The group drafted negotiation
proposals that already included possible policy action (UN.ECE, 1995). On the
basis of the assessment work of the Task Force and the proposals of the Prepara-
tory Group, the negotiation process commenced in January 1997 (UN.ECE, 1997)
and continued in four sessions until February 1998 during the plenary sessions of
the CLRTAP Working Group of Strategy (Selin, 2000).
5.1.4.3 Regime Negotiations Under CLRTAP
During the initial meeting in January 1997, participants expected short and suc-
cessful negotiations (Selin, 2000, :160). But despite the general consensus among
participating states that an international agreement on POPs would be desirable,
the list of POPs to be included into an agreement, how POPs should be regulated
(banned, partially banned, phased out, etc.) and how to integrate new substances
into the protocol were still left to be discussed (Selin, 2000, :160). The cleavages
ran between three groups of participating states: the European Countries, the
U.S. and Canada, and the Russian Federation and Ukraine (Selin, 2000).
Both DDT and PCBs were considered crucial since they were of symbolic value for
the public and had been among the economically most important POPs. While
there was an agreement to include DDT into a protocol on POPs, countries dis-
agreed on the mode of regulation. While most European nations pushed for quick
bans on production, use and trade, Italy wanted exemptions to use DDT as a in-
termediate product for specialized industrial processes. With reference to WHO’s
recommendations, the U.S. refused trade-regulations for DDT, while the Russian
Federation and Ukraine called for exemptions for DDT use for malaria control
(Selin, 2000).
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PCBs were also on the initial list of POPs under consideration for a protocol.
However, the Russian Federation, supported by the Ukraine called, for exemptions
on both the production and use of PCBs during the third round of negotiations
(Selin, 2000, :165). This maneuver by the Russian Federation caused a set-back in
negotiations and made it clear that a quick resolution would not be accomplishable.
During two off-schedule Head of Delegations meetings in London in 1998, positions
were exchanged and final compromises were achieved on some remaining critical
issues. For example, an extra five-year period to phase out use and production was
granted to economies in transition. During these same meetings, a compromise
was reached on the trade of pesticides, stating that trade should not be regulated
by a protocol until a revision five years later. A similar compromise was found
for Italy’s demand on the production of DDT as a intermediate product (Selin,
2000, :176). These compromises were agreed upon in the closing session and the
agreement was signed in in June 1998.
5.1.5 Costs and Benefits of the Regulation of POPs
The previous sections provided a historic account of scientific research and politi-
cal negotiations of the POPs-issue. However, to test the argument, it is necessary
to operationalize costs and benefits of international regulation and to validate the
qualitatively obtained insights with data on emissions and exposure. The theo-
retical argument states that in the case of successful regime formation, costs are
expected to be low while scientific uncertainty is high. Furthermore, the argument
leads to the expectation that countries show a degree of similarity. Testing the ar-
gument against an additional set of data increases the robustness of findings.
5.1.5.1 Costs
In the case of POPs, costs from international regulation are associated with emis-
sion cuts. One way to assess costs would therefore be to assess emission data of
the signatory states at the time of the negotiations to determine who would face
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higher or lower costs from international regulation to conclude support or aversion
towards international regulation. This would, however, dismiss the main merit of
the historical perspective of this case study. Since the historical process tracing
revealed that almost all signatory states had already installed national legislation
on DDT and PCBs (see section 5.1.3.2 and table 7.2), including data of past emis-
sion cuts, because it represents the additional costs from international regulation.
This follows the logic that a country which already cut its emission to a fraction
of the former peak emissions bears lower costs from additional international reg-
ulation (and would therefore rather push for regulation) whereas a country with
small emission cuts or even an increase in emissions would bear higher costs and
rather oppose additional regulation. Additionally, including data from all signa-
tory states is misleading, since many signatory states were rather passive or not
even represented during negotiations and therefore, their interests did not shape
the agreement. Hence, the focus is on data from states that were active during the
negotiations. According to Selin (2000) these were Canada, Denmark, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia (Russian Federation), Spain, Switzerland,
Ukraine, UK, and USA. (Selin, 2000, :155)
As table 5.4 and table 5.5 indicate, the highest decrease of PCBs emissions and
DDT emissions (nearly -95%) appeared in the forehand to CLRTAP Protocol ne-
gotiations on POPs. However, especially states from the former Soviet Union
increased their emissions on PCBs during that time period. This implies that
most negotiating countries expected rather low costs from international regula-
tion on POPs, with slight dissimilarities concerning some former Soviet Union
countries.
5.1.5.2 Benefits
As stated in section 5.1.2, benefits are regarded as a function of hazardousness
and exposure. Measuring concentration levels in human breast milk has matured
as a standard procedure to determine exposure in a given spatial area and serves
as a indicator for exposure to PCBs and DDTs. Both the tables 5.6 and 5.7 reflect
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Country DDT-
Emissions
1970
DDT-
Emissions
1996
∆DDT(t)
1970 – 1996
Year of
Regulation
Canada n/a n/a n/a 1972
Denmark 18.00 0 - 18.00 1984
Germany 1652.00 0 - 1652.00 1974
Italy 2178.00 0 - 2178.00 1978
Netherlands 130.00 0 - 130.00 1968
Norway 1.73 0 - 1.73 1970
Russian Fed-
eration
6000.00 0 - 6000.00 1992
Spain 1200.00 0 - 1200.00 1972
Switzerland 10.00 0 - 10.00 1972
Ukraine 5150.97 0 - 5150.97 1994
UK 49.62 0 - 49.63 1984
USA n/a n/a n/a 1972
Table 5.4: Change in DDT-Emissions of POPs-Protocol Signatory States and
Russia Between 1970 and 1996
Emission Data predominantly rests on the following sources: Breivik et al. (2004); Pacyna et al.
(2003); Pacyna (1999). For sources on national legislation, see table 7.1 for details.
Country PCBs Emis-
sions in 1970
PCBs Emis-
sions in 1996
∆PCB (met-
ric tons) 1970
- 1996
Year of Regu-
lation
Canada n/a n/a n/a 1977
Denmark 24971 1026 - 23945 1986
Germany 402160 42462 - 359698 1972
Italy 270757 6054 - 264703 1970s
Netherlands 65823 250 - 565573 1970s
Norway 19598 408 - 19190 1981
Russian Federa-
tion
2094 8072 +5978 1992
Spain 170541 8721 - 161820 1976
Switzerland n/a n/a n/a 1986
Ukraine 1181 3043 +1862 –
UK 282443 3706 - 278737 1981
USA 114000 0 - 114000 8 1977
SUM 2308834 119121 - 2189713
Table 5.5: Change in PCBs Emissions Between 1970 and 1996 in Negotiating
States
Emission Data predominantly rests on the following sources: Breivik et al. (2004); Pacyna et al.
(2003); Pacyna (1999). For sources on national legislation, see table 7.2 for details. The table
includes only states that were highly active during negotiations (Selin, 2000, :155). For a more
conclusive overview, see table 7.3
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exposure to PCBs and DDT. To fully evaluate benefits, both exposure and harm-
fulness have to be considered. As subsection 5.1.3 shows, the aspect of whether and
to what degree PCBs and DDT posed harms to human health was highly contro-
versial. Both PCBs and DDT were associated with different forms of cancer. This
is reflected by the assessment work preceding the negotiations of the POPs Proto-
col. The International Agency for Cancer Research categorized PBCs as ‘probable
carcinogens (category 2A)’ and DDT as ‘possible carcinogens (category 2B)’. The
IACR-category 2A implies that there is only limited evidence for carcinogenicity
in humans, while experimental animal trials imply carcinogenicity. The IACR
category 2B implies that there is limited evidence of carcinogenicity in humans
and less than sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals.
Both of the substances have been associated with several other negative conse-
quences such as reproductive failure and immune suppression. However, as im-
plied by the literature analysis in section 5.1.3 and highlighted by the assessment
reports, the evidential basis for other negative consequences is at least as uncertain
as for cancer. Since there is only limited evidence for harmfulness for both PCBs
and DDT (which is also reflected by the literature analysis in chapter 5.1.3), the
harmful character of both PCBs and DDT is uncertain. Hence, the value for harm-
fulness varies between 0 (not harmful) and 1 (harmful). As benefits are a function
of both exposure and harmfulness, countries can be assumed to estimate their
benefits from international regulation as being either 0 (if the substances are not
harmful) or their individual level of exposure (if the substance is harmful).
5.1.5.3 Costs & Benefits
Data on exposure of both DDT and PCBs is unfortunately not available for all
countries and the whole time span. This prohibits strong conclusions about how
the configuration of costs and especially benefits changed over time. However,
data allows to conclude that emissions for substances decreased significantly, with
the exception of the Russian Federation. This allows to conclude that – with the
exception of the Russian Federation – all negotiating states expected similarly low
Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis – Persistent Organic Pollutants 100
Country PCBs Concen-
trations (µg
/kg milk fat)
Year Source
Canada n/a n/a n/a
Denmark 91 1999 (WHO, 2000)
Germany 220 1999 (WHO, 2000)
Italy 253 1999 (WHO, 2000)
Netherlands 192 1999 (WHO, 2000)
Norway 119 1999 (WHO, 2000)
Russian Federa-
tion
126 1999 (WHO, 2000)
Spain 241 1999 (WHO, 2000)
Switzerland n/a n/a n/a
Ukraine 136 1999 (WHO, 2000)
UK n/a n/a n/a
USA 54 1999 (WHO, 2000)
Table 5.6: PCBs Exposure
Data on Exposure predominantly rests on the following sources: (WHO, 2000). The table shows
only states that were active during the negotiations on the POPs-Protocol. (Selin, 2000, :155).
Country DDT Concen-
trations (µg
/kg milk fat)
Year Publication
Canada 385 1986 (Smith, 1999)
Denmark 238 1992 (Smith, 1999)
Germany 531 1991 (Smith, 1999)
Italy 2200 1985 (Smith, 1999)
Netherlands n/a n/a n/a
Norway 910 1982 (Smith, 1999)
Russian Federa-
tion
2000 1989 (Tsydenova et al.,
2007)
Spain 296 1991 (Smith, 1999)
Switzerland n/a n/a n/a
Ukraine 1072 1996 (Smith, 1999)
UK 490 1991 (Smith, 1999)
USA 770 1989 (Smith, 1999)
Table 5.7: DDT Exposure in 1986 and in 1991
costs from international regulation. Most emission cuts had been implemented
through domestic regulation in forehand. On the other hand, benefits from regu-
lation were still uncertain since the harmfulnes of PCBs and DDT had not been
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sufficiently proven. Since, however, the majority of scientific studies and asses-
ment reports suggested possible negative health effects, it can be assumed that
countries considered the possibility of potential negative health effects. And even
though exposure rates varied across actors, all negotiating states experienced some
form of exposure. The combination of possible harmfulness form POPs, certain
knowledge of transboundary transportation and certain knowledge of existing ex-
posure levels allow to conclude that negotiating states anticipated benefits from
international regulation. Additionally, as the qualitative analysis of the politi-
cal negotiation process shows, states negotiated exception rules for countries that
anticipated increasing costs (through increasing emissions of POPs), such as the
Russian Federation.
5.1.6 Conclusion – Costs, Benefits and Uncertainties
The analysis of the CLRTAP Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants shows that
states formed an international regime despite severe scientific uncertainty. Selin
(2000) states that “The participants did not have a clear image of all possible
pay-offs when they began negotiating [. . . ]”(Selin, 2000, :153). The CLRTAP
Task Force on POPs, assigned with the review of the scientific literature as an
assessment work for future negotiation states in its final report that “For the
large number of substances included in the ‘POP family’, inadequate emissions
inventories for POPs, incomplete understanding of POP transport processes and
mechanisms within the ecosystem, difficulties in determining the role that POPs
already present in the environment have in sustaining elevated ecosystem levels,
and inherent difficulties in obtaining biological effect and epidemiological data
remain; all of them represent areas of uncertainty which are unlikely to be resolved
in the short or medium term.” (UN.ECE, 1994a, : 92). This statement summarizes
the analysis of the scientific literature in subsection 5.1.3 which shows that some
sectors of scientific knowledge were still highly uncertain while others were covered
by well-established knowledge.
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In the light of these hypotheses, we would expect that the formation of the POPs-
regime was facilitated because (a) there was sufficient knowledge available that
costs of forming a regime would remain low and (b) scientific uncertainty would
mainly affect consequences for human health and/or wildlife. We would also ex-
pect that involved states who expected high costs from regulation with certainty
would oppose a regulation or call for a milder form of regulation. Concerning the
role of new scientific knowledge, we would expect that the issue itself would find
its way on the international agenda as a consequence of evidence for its trans-
boundary character has been found beyond the stage of speculation. We would
therefore expect that political action would follow scientific findings. Furthermore,
we would expect that a regime formation process only advances if new scientific
knowledge reveals that benefits exeed or might exeed the costs from international
regulation.
The process-tracing analysis reveals that countries began to domestically regulate
DDT between 1970 and 1985. This corresponds with the time span when scientific
evidence about potential negative health effects accumulated. Additionally, DDT
proved to be more and more ineffective for large-scale pest control as resistance
of pests increased during the same time span and its economic relevance declined.
Similarly, countries installed regulation on the production and use of PCBs be-
tween 1975 and 1986, even though PCBs were not regulated as strictly as DDT.
And as emission data on DDT and PCBs indicates, emissions dropped sharply
between the 1970s and 1990s as a result from domestic regulation. During that
time span, POPs were a purely national matter, since knowledge on transboundary
migration was scarce.
This changed in the early 1990s when findings of high POPs levels in remote areas
could be explained sufficiently by the scientific theory on atmospheric transport.
While high residues of POPs in the Arctic had been known since the 1970s, rival-
ing theories could not explain the residues. The conclusive theory on atmospheric
transport that emerged in the 1990s pushed the issue to the international level
and negotiations on POPs commenced in 1997. This indicates how new scientific
knowledge turned an issue from a purely domestic issue to one of international
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cooperation, which corresponds to the second argument in chapter 3. New sci-
entific knowledge reshaped the perception of the issue and knowledge about the
transboundary character of POPs motivated states to negotiate the international
regulation of the issue.
Secondly, as data on emissions and domestic regulation indicates, countries could
expect low additional costs from regulating DDT and PCBs since the emission lev-
els for both had already dropped significantly before negotiations started. Thirdly,
an argument about similarity (or symmetry, as Barrett (2001) calls it) can be
made. As data on emissions, as well as data on exposure reveals, states shared
a rather similar cost-benefit-configuration. And last, the process of negotiations
shows how dissimilarities were leveled (or how cooperation was ‘bought’) on the
issue of PCBs, on which a compromise was found to evoke the participation of
the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The following can be concluded: when nego-
tiations started in 1997, the cost-benefit-configuration for negotiating states was
conducive towards regime formation. While benefits were still uncertain, costs
from international regulation were low. Dissimilarities between states were lev-
eled through compromises. Table 5.10 summarizes the progress of the scientific
process, the deducted cost-benefit configuration and the political process.
However, the analysis excludes aspects that might be crucial for a conclusive expla-
nation of the role of scientific uncertainty and the emergence of the POPs regime.
As the analysis shows, most countries had already taken regulatory steps concern-
ing POPs which lowered the costs of an international agreement. Therefore, to
conclusively investigate policy-making under the condition of scientific uncertainty,
policy-making that led to national regulation has to be considered. In the light
of existing scientific uncertainty, why did states take domestic action to regulate
POPs? Even though this process was not thoroughly investigated, the analysis
reveals at some points how selective scientific findings were picked up by actors of
civil society, who exerted pressure on domestic political decision-makers in some
states. For example, Carson (1962)’s book served as a reason for NGOs to push
for domestic regulation, even though the publication appeared at a time when
POPs were not fully understood. The consequential question to be asked would
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then be: when and why does civil society push for legislation on an environmental
issue that is still scientifically uncertain? Future research should address these
questions.
Additionally, the study exclusively focuses on two specific POPs – DDT and PCBs.
It can be argued that the emergence of the POPs regime could be conclusively ex-
plained if all POPs were included, since states could have bargained package-deals
across POPs. However, DDT and PCBs have been selected for several reasons.
First of all, both POPs had been at the center of debates among POPs and both of
them were most present throughout the negotiating proces (Jones and De Voogt,
1999).
The official assessment work of the CLRTAP Task Force and Preparatory Group
initially identified 18 POPs as possible candidates for international regulation.
However, only 14 substances entered the negotiations. A full account of the regime
formation process could investigate why the initial list was narrowed down and why
some POPs were excluded from the list. According to the theoretical argument in
chapter 3, we would expect that for these substances, the cost benefit configuration
was not conducive.
Furthermore, the study focuses on the mere formation of the POPs agreement.
Analyzing the development of the regime, its consequences, state compliance and
the integration of additional substances provides a great area for future research.
Especially the future developments of scientific knowledge and the resulting in-
tegration of additional substances are of interest to further test the theoretical
argument on new scientific knowledge.
This ties in with the development of other regulatory initiatives on POPs as the
UNEP Stockholm Convention on POPs from 2001, which is broader in partici-
pation. First of all, there is an argument that the foresight of the soon-to-follow
negotiation process to the Stockholm Convention pushed CLRTAP states to reach
an agreement (Selin, 2000). Secondly, a comparison between the two multilateral
environmental agreements in the light of the argument could reveal additional
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insights on the role of scientific uncertainty and new emerging scientific knowl-
edge. While the first point could be an alternative explanation, the second aspect
constitutes an additional field for future research.
The narrow focus of the case-study is however justifiable in the broader context of
this work. The aim of this study is not to deliver a full explanation of each single
case. The aim is rather to test the theoretical argument and to investigate the role
of scientific uncertainty through comparing different occasions where countries did
or did not agree on institutionalized cooperation.
In conclusion: The case of the CLRTAP Protocol on POPs partially supports
the argument. Speculations on possible harmful effects from constant low-dose
exposure led to domestic awareness, and in some countries to national legislation
on the issue. Knowledge on the transboundary nature of POPs pushed the issue to
the international agenda. By the time the issue was negotiated, most countries had
already installed domestic regulation and the additional costs can be considered
to be low. Countries negotiated compromises on issues that were still critical since
countries still faced high costs from regulation.
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5.2 The Regime on the Protection of the Strato-
spheric Ozone Layer
“The Protocol was negotiated under intense
uncertainty regarding both the risks of ozone
depletion and the feasibility of the agreed
measures [. . . ].”
Edward A. Parson Protecting the Ozone
Layer
The case stratospheric ozone protection is one of the most intensely studied cases of
institutionalized international cooperation. While both the knowledge-based and
interest-based approaches claim for themselves high explanatory value (Barrett,
2001; Haas, 1992a), not any of the accounts offer a full and convincing explana-
tion. Therefore, the case is highly relevant for testing an integrated theoretical
framework that combines knowledge and interests. According to the theoretical
argument, we would expect that a conducive configuration of scientific knowl-
edge (the independent variable) led to the successful formation of an international
regime (the dependent variable). Furthermore, we would expect that a regime not
to form before new scientific knowledge had turned an obstructive configuration
into a conducive configuration.
The ozone layer absorbs and reflects nearly all harmful ultraviolet radiation (UV)
in sunlight and is therefore crucial for the life on earth as we know it. Approx-
imately 90% of atmospheric ozone accumulates in the stratospheric layer at an
altitude of approximately 15 - 30 km (Parson, 2003). Ozone is a chemical bond
of three oxygen atoms (O3). Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), in turn, serve as a
catalyzer that breaks up ozone into O2, rendering the UV-screening-function.
9
Enhanced UV-radiation damages human skin cells, eyes and has effects on plants
and animals. CFCs have been industrially used since the 1960s for many different
9CFCs are broken into chlorine through photochemical processes. Thus, CFCs lead to a loss
of stratospheric ozone and an increase of harmful UV-radiation on the earth’s surface.
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purposes, such as propellants in spray-cans (aerosol use), as cooling liquid in refrig-
erators and air-conditioners (non-aerosol use) or in industrial cleaning processes
(Parson, 2003, :32).
Several international documents cover the protection of the ozone layer: The Vi-
enna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer (1985), the Montreal Pro-
tocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer (1987), the London Amendments
(1990), the Copenhagen Amendments (1992) and the Beijing Amendments (1999).
The Vienna Convention was negotiated between 1982 and 1985 among the ma-
jor producer states and developing countries. Its non-binding character and its
ambiguous language10 made it a rather weak agreement. The agreement, how-
ever, did contain commitments on further research efforts regarding the issue.
Furthermore, the Convention served as a framework and institutionalized further
negotiation rounds which resulted in the Montreal Protocol of 1987. The Protocol
marked a significant change in ozone diplomacy. With a broader participation, in-
cluding non-governmental organizations, industry representatives and developing
countries, negotiations led to a protocol which was added to the Vienna Con-
vention that included a list of different CFCs to be regulated, as well as binding
commitments to production cuts and consumption cuts. The additional Amend-
ments (London (1990), Copenhagen (1992) and Beijing (1999)) broadened the
list of CFCs that were regarded as ozone depleting and tightened roadmaps and
schedules for cuts in production and consumption of CFCs. Since this research is
primarily concerned with regime formation, this subsection rather focuses on the
Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol and does not consider additional
amendments.
5.2.1 Defining Costs, Benefits and Uncertainties of CFCs
CFCs are problematic due to their ability to catalyze and destroy stratospheric
ozone. In the light of current knowledge, the evidential chain is straightforward:
CFCs- emissions lead to ozone loss which leads to increased UV-radiation, which,
10Countries committed to take “appropriate measures” to address the ozone issue
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in turn, causes adverse effects on human health (Diffey, 2004; Ichihashi et al., 2003)
and ecosystems (Paul and Gwynn-Jones, 2003). As described in chapter 4, costs
are to be conceptualized as direct economic costs, while benefits from regulation
ought to be conceptualized as reduced vulnerability towards the environmental
threat as such. In the case of stratospheric ozone, this work can build on the anal-
ysis of Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994). They use the negotiations of the Montreal
Protocol as case study and conceptualize costs in the case of ozone depletion as
CFCs production and its consumption in relation to a country’s gross national
product (GNP). They assume that the higher a country’s consumption of CFCs
per unit of gross national product is, the higher a countries abatement costs can
be expected (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994, :88). Vulnerability, in turn, is con-
ceptualized as incidences of skin cancer (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994, :87).
Though scientific uncertainty is recognized by many scholars of the ozone-case
(Haas, 1992a; Parson, 2003; Skodvin, 2000)11, its role in negotiations has not
been thoroughly studied yet. The theoretical argument in section 3 calls for an
integration of scientific uncertainty and for a consideration of the configuration of
scientific uncertainty.
The Vienna Convention in combination with the Montreal Protocol represents a
multilateral agreement with substantial cuts in production and consumption of
CFCs. Secondly, as emphasized by previous research, the issue has been plagued
by a high degree of scientific uncertainty (which is to be elaborated further in this
subsection). Since a multilateral binding agreement that was negotiated under
the impression of scientific uncertainty is observable, we would expect (follow-
ing the theoretical argument) a conducive cost benefit configuration for this case.
The theoretical argument argues that states are willing to form international en-
vironmental regimes if they collectively share a similar conducive configuration of
knowledge about costs and benefits. If the argument holds, we would expect that
states anticipated low direct economic costs, while benefits in the form of reduced
vulnerability were considered to be uncertain. This means that costs from cutting
11Even though Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) mention the aspect of scientific uncertainty,
they neglect its role in favor of their theoretical and methodological argument.
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consumption and production of CFCs have been low or were expected to drop
significantly by the time the agreement was negotiated and signed.
Concerning changing scientific knowledge, we would expect that new scientific
knowledge changed the profile from obstructive to conducive: new scientific find-
ings should indicate that economic costs from cutting production and consumption
can be expected to be lower than previously expected.
5.2.2 The Outline of the Case Study
The aim of this case study is to retrace developments and shifts in scientific knowl-
edge in order to determine how the perception of the issue at stake changed over
time. Secondly, the study aims at identifying what aspects of the issue were
known or unknown at the time political decisions were made. To identify in a
first step which research themes dominated during different time-spans, the scien-
tific journals Nature and Science are scanned for publications on the issue, using
the key-words ozone depletion, ozone destruction, CFCs, Chlorofluorocarbon and
a combination of these keywords. According to the argumentation in chapter 4,
different types of knowledge are relevant to determine either costs or benefits from
multilateral cooperation. Identifying what types of knowledge dominated during
a time span allows to conclude which topic was in the scientific spotlight at what
point in time. To reduce the vast amount of literature, an additional citation
analysis using ‘CiteSpace’ was conducted. The analysis resulted in 58 articles that
were included in this study. For an overview, see the appendix.
In addition to the primary sources of scientific literature, this study rests on the
vast body of secondary literature that covers both the scientific and political pro-
cess. The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol are probably the most
prominent multilateral environmental agreements in the literature on international
environmental cooperation. The regime has been hailed as a great success story
and many scholars use it to conduct case study research on regime formation. The
amount of social science literature on the process that led to the agreement is vast
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and hence, this case study can rely on existing works. Above all, the study of Ed-
ward Parson (2003), which produced a 300 pages book and filled some 12-feet of
bookshelf space in primary material12 has to be mentioned as a most thorough and
detailed work that investigates the political and scientific processes. His expertise
entered this case study also through an expert interview. Besides the mentioned
work, the works of Benedick (1998), Dimitrov (2006), Skodvin (2000) and Haas
(1992a) have been included as basis for a content analysis. The mentioned contri-
butions all focus on the role of scientific findings within the process of negotiations
and - at least partially - acknowledge scientific uncertainty.
Though this study uses to a great extend secondary literature to retrace the empir-
ical processes, some well-known contributions that address the Montreal Protocol
(as for example Barrett (2001)) have not been included. These contributions
mainly use the Montreal Protocol to test a theoretical argument or modeling ac-
counts and do not deliver new empirical accounts on how the different processes
developed over time.
Besides secondary literature, this case study is based on diverse assessment reports
that have been carried out by different scientific agencies and research circles.
These include the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
the US National Academy of Science (NAS), the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP).
To capture the political process, the case study rests on the one hand on the men-
tioned contributions from secondary literature. Additionally, some contributions
are added that focus explicitly on the political process (for example Benedick
(1998)). On the other hand, the political deveolpements are retraced from the
official documentation of the negotiation process, made available through UNEP.
The following analysis rests on the mentioned body of literature.
12Available at the Harvard library
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5.2.3 Stages of Scientific Knowledge
5.2.3.1 Sources of Ozone Depletion
Basic knowledge on stratospheric ozone and its ability to absorb UV-radiation
has evolved since the late 19th century (Bhattacharya et al., 2012) and intensified
during the 1920s and 1930s (Chapman, 1930). The combination of Gotz et al.
(1934)’s model on the vertical distribution of atmospheric ozone and Chapman
(1930)’s theory about UV-absorbation by ozone provided the basic understand-
ing that stratospheric ozone absorbs most of the harmful UV-radiation. Findings
in the 1950s, however, revealed deviations between model predictions and crude
empirical measurements of stratospheric UV-radiation. The deviations did not di-
rectly hint to ozone destruction, nor to an anthropogenic source for deviations, but
they spurred further research interest in atmospheric ozone and possible catalyzers
as well as possible sinks. Three substances were assumed to potentially catalyze
stratospheric ozone: nitrogen oxide (NOx), chlorine (Cl) and vaporized water.
In simplification, the three substances have the potential to bind oxygen atoms
and break up ozone (O3) into molecular oxygen (O2) which does not absorb UV-
radiation in the same way as ozone (Bhattacharya et al., 2012). Though the basic
chemical mechanisms were known, it was unclear if and how they were working un-
der stratospheric conditions. Furthermore, it was unclear through which pathways
the three substances would enter the stratosphere, where they could potentially
destroy ozone.
Plans of several governments to establish a fleet of civil supersonic transporters
(SST) - such as the British/French Concord - during the 1960s have raised the
question on the effects of stratospheric aviation for the ozone layer. On the ba-
sis of Hunt (1966)’s model on a catalyzing function of water vapor, it was feared
that vapor from SST exhaustions would considerably deplete stratospheric ozone
(Harrison, 1970). An even greater concern grew from NOx in SST-exhaust. Since
Crutzen (1970) showed a catalyzing (and therefore destructive) effect on ozone
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from NOx, scholars were alarmed by the planned 200 SSTs (Johnson, 1972; John-
ston, 1971). The concerns of NOx and water vapor were weakened since SST-
plans had been realized on a much smaller scale than originally planned and new
scientific findings revealed that water vapor from exhaust-fumes would have the
opposite effect of what was previously anticipated. Newer models and experiments
suggested that water vapor would actually increase stratospheric ozone (Fabian,
1978).
Concerns about NOx reappeared on the scientific agenda, since the substance be-
came widely used as soil fertilizer (Shapley, 1977; Turco et al., 1978; Whitten
et al., 1980). However, the source from soil was found to be very small. Addition-
ally, a large-scale upwards travel of NOx in significant amounts seemed unlikely.
Both water vapor and NOx vanished from the scientific debate in the late 1970s
and early 1980s and research started to exclusively focus on possible sources of
chlorine in the stratosphere.
Even though the concerns about ozone-destruction from SSTs turned out to be
negligible, the SST-debate raised scientific and public interest in stratospheric
ozone and ozone depletion (Parson, 2003, :30). Several research groups formed
and US government agencies established scientific research networks to assess and
evaluate the issue. The first report on the issue was released by the Climate
Impact Assessment Program (CIAP), a branch of the US National Academy of
Science (NAS). The report focused on the effects of SSTs for ozone destruction by
sponsoring extensive basic research.
While research on SSTs was deliberately directed on identifying sources for ozone
depletion, the discovery of surface-emissions of CFCs as a potential source for chlo-
rine in the stratosphere was rather coincidental. Lovelock et al. (1973) used CFCs
for their extreme stability as tracers for mass transfer processes in the atmosphere
and oceans. They measured considerable amounts of CFCs in the atmosphere
over the ocean’s surface, but stated that “[. . . ]the presence of these compounds
constitutes no conceivable hazard (Lovelock et al., 1973, :194). Additionally, they
assumed at first natural sources, such as sea salt spraying. Only a year later,
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Lovelock (1974) corrected this assumption on the basis of Molina and Rowland
(1974)’s findings of a chlorine-ozone reaction and urged for further research. Love-
lock (1974) found natural sources to be small and stable and therefore, he excluded
natural reasons for high concentrations. The source and fate of CFCs were still
unknown (Parson, 2003) during that time period.
Inspired by the publications of Lovelock (1974)’s article in Nature on the fate and
half-life of CFC-emissions in the environment, Rowland and Molina (1975) began
to study possible atmospheric sinks for ozone. They assumed that emitted CFCs
should either accumulate or be broken down through chemical processes. However,
the results remained puzzling, since no relevant atmospheric sink was identified.
CFCs-concentrations did not accumulate indefinitely and no relevant tropospheric
sink could be found. At the same time, CFCs were still emitted in large quantities.
Consequently, the fate of CFCs had to be located somewhere else. (Rowland
and Molina, 1975) claimed that CFCs traveled upward through the stratosphere
until they released chlorine under the influence of strong sunlight, which would
catalyze ozone. On the basis of laboratory work, Rowland and Molina (1975)
developed the first theory on significant stratospheric ozone depletion through
CFCs (Parson, 2003, :23ff). Their hypothesis was underpinned by three points:
their long half-live allowed CFCs to mix in the troposphere and move upwards
to the stratosphere. Second, high solar radiation in the stratosphere breaks up
CFCs to release chlorine atoms which, in turn, catalyze ozone. Third, continuous
worldwide CFCs emissions would sincerely deplete the ozone layer (Parson, 2003,
:31).
Another related scientific discussion on chlorine in the stratosphere developed
in parallel: While SSTs vanished from the ozone-debate, stratospheric chlorine
injection through space-shuttle exhausts entered the debate. Hydrochloric acid
(HCl) from space-shuttle exhausts was assumed to release chlorine into the strato-
sphere. Though researchers found only small effects, it drew further attention to
the chlorine-ozone reaction in the stratosphere and the models that emerged from
the research on space-shuttles, as well as SSTs, were used and refined by many
scholars that investigated the issue.
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The research efforts during the 1970s, as well as the collective assessment works,
led to an improved understanding of stratospheric chemistry. Furthermore, it
identified the ozone-depleting mechanism of anthropogenic CFCs, a mechanism
that remained unchallenged further on in the scientific debate. While Rowland
and Molina (1975)’s hypothesis was tested and refined repeatedly, it remained in
principle unchallenged. The mechanism through which CFCs would break down
under the influence of intense solar radiation in the stratosphere and release chlo-
rine which would catalyze and therefore deplete ozone was well understood and
reconfirmed multiple times by different scholars. The model was adopted into
literally all assessment work and by the early 1980s, no one within the scientific
community seriously questioned this model.
5.2.3.2 Extent-Intensity: Assessing and Projecting Ozone Loss
While most research confirmed the existence of the mechanisms of ozone-depletion
through CFCs as presented by Molina and Rowland (1974), scientists struggled
extremely to quantify actual ozone depletion and to directly observe the catalytic
process (Parson, 2003)13. Stratospheric ozone concentrations have a natural sea-
sonal and spatial variation. One of the main challenges was therefore to analyt-
ically separate natural causes for variations from anthropogenic causes and the
release of CFCs.
These difficulties led to a confusing number of estimates of ozone-loss by different
researchers and institution. In 1975, the NAS claimed optimistically that “the
magnitude of [ozone] decrease can now be reasonably well predicted” (Dimitrov,
2006, :52), a claim that was to be proven wrong over the next several years. In
1975, the NAS provided a first ‘most probable’ estimate of ozone-loss under steady-
state production of 6-7.5% (NRC, 1975), though the report stressed the lack of
knowledge about alternative mechanisms through which ozone could be catalyzed.
In contrast to the statement in 1975, the NAS report from 1976 states that “[. . . ]
while our knowledge of stratospheric ozone has become extensive over the last
13The first accurate quantity-estimation of ozone depletion was not feasable until 1989 (see:
Atkinson et al. (1989)).
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years, it should be apparent from the discussion [in this report] that significant
uncertainties remain”. The report repeats a 7% ozone loss, however quantifies a
combined uncertainty measure of “at least” 2-20% (Parson, 2003, :38).
A year later, in 1977, the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) published its first assessment report which proclaimed an ozone loss under
steady-state production between 10-17%. For the report, researchers calculated
ozone loss using nine existing 1D-models with the same data-set and compared
results. This method also offered an uncertainty range across the differences be-
tween models. In 1979, the NASA-figures were revised by a second interim report
of the NAS which stated a 16.5-20% loss in ozone by using different plausible
data-sets in one model (NRC, 1979a). The same year, NASA again published a
report in which ozone loss ranged from 15 to 18%. Both institutions revised their
figures on the basis of an improved understanding of chemical kinetics and state-
of-the-art models. In 1982, the NAS published new figures and claimed a 5% loss
and abstained in its report from 1984 to deliver new figures due to the persistent
uncertainties (NRC, 1982).
This confusion was even further enhanced by discrepancies between model predic-
tions and actual measurements. In 1986, the NASA-report states that the actual
quantity of ozone was 30-50% higher than models predicted (Dimitrov, 2003, :55).
The worldwide ozone loss which was previously claimed could not be verified,
and controversy arose whether it was real or simply an artifact of a deteriorat-
ing satellite instrument. These controversies remained unresolved through 1986
and 1987 and represented the most acute scientific uncertainties under which the
Montreal Protocol was negotiated and signed. The confusion continued during the
late 1980s and were not resolved until the early 1990s when the WMO/UNEP-
assessment published accurate numbers (Parson, 2003, :66).
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5.2.3.3 Consequences of Stratospheric Ozone Depletion
Sparked by speculations on ozone loss from SSTs, researches stated to consider
possible consequences. In the beginning, they drew catastrophic scenarios, reach-
ing from catastrophic climatic change and new sudden ice ages (Hampson, 1964)
to the extinction of species (Berkner and Marshall, 1965). The studies were how-
ever criticized since the were based on unrealistic assumptions, such as a complete
loss of stratospheric ozone.
Research during the 1970s provided more realistic scenarios about possible effects
from current-state CFCs-emission and identified three areas of possible effects:
marine life, plants and human health (Dimitrov, 2006, :59ff). With regard to ma-
rine life, the NAS report from 1976 claims negative impacts on aquatic organisms,
especially phytoplankton and zooplankton, both on the bottom of the maritime
food chain and therefore crucial for all maritime life. However, the report identifies
numerous sources of uncertainties. The report is even more speculative about the
effects on plants and agriculture. According to the report, future developments of
plant vegetation depends rather on future developments in the agricultural sector
than on future emissions of CFCs (NRC, 1976).
Even though reports on negative effects on plants and marine life found their way
into all NAS assessment work, the focus shifted more and more towards negative
human health effects. Increased UV-radiation was connected to eye damage (such
as increased risk of eye cataract), immune system disorder and, most prominently,
different forms of skin cancer. In principle, the link between solar radiation and
skin cancer had been established since the early 1920s (Hall, 1950) and research
advanced during the 1960s and 1970s as methods and instruments improved. The
first assessment report on the impact of stratospheric flights already reported a
possible increase of skin cancer due to ozone loss (Climatic Impact Committee,
1975). Even though other health effects were related to increased UV-radiation,
skin cancer remained the main issue of concern. The NAS-report from 1975 states
that 1% ozone loss would lead to 2% increase in skin cancer. The report however
points to the speculative and uncertain character of this figure (NRC, 1975, :11ff).
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The statement was weakened in the report of 1976 that states that “We find
that an increase of melanoma14 deaths is likely but not certain, to occure as a
consequence of a continuing increase in the rate at which DUV15 received at the
ground accumulates.” (NRC, 1976, :94). This notion of uncertainty only changed
slowly over the years. The NAS-assessment report from 1982 emphasizes that
melanomas are undoubtedly related to sunlight, but the relationship is complex
and only crude estimates can be made for the increased cancer risk as a result for
any given increase in UV radiation (NRC, 1982). In its 1983 update, the NAS
repeats its view that UV-radiation is likely to cause melanomas, however data
does not reveal the actual mechanism (NRC, 1984). Even though neither the
exact mechanism nor the actual quantity could be estimated, all evidence hinted
to a qualitative link between increased UV-radiaion and skin cancer rates.
5.2.3.4 Alternatives and Substitutes
CFCs were widely used during the 1960s and 1970s and all indicators pointed
to a rather increasing use. They were mainly used either for aerosol uses - as
propellants or blowing agent in packaging - or in non-aerosol uses - as refrigerants.
Alternatives for aerosol uses - such as hydrocarbons, ethers and nitrous oxide
were already known before CFCs became an issue of concern. Even though those
substances could be produced at lower costs, CFCs shared some features that made
them preferable: they were stable, had no odor and produced a uniform fine spray
(Parson, 2003, :32). As a reaction to an emerging U.S. ban of aerosol use in the
early 1970s, researchers (especially from the industry-sector) spent much effort in
improving the characteristics of alternative substances. By the mid-1970s, CFCs
could be replaced for nearly all aerosol applications, either through innovations on
comparable substitutes or through the adaptation of technical processes.
Considering non-aerosol use, the picture looked more puzzling. Before Molina and
Rowland (1974)’s publication, there seemed no reason to substitude CFCs. On
the contrary: CFCs were on the rise since they had replaced highly flammable or
14Which is an uncommon, but highly lethal form of skin cancer (Parson, 2003, :87).
15A sub-spectrum of UV-Radiation.
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hazardous substances in refrigerating units. After environmental concerns entered
the picture, it was long believed that substitutes for non-aerosol uses of CFCs were
technically infeasible and would stay technically infeasible for an unforeseeable
period of time. Research on alternatives for non-aerosol uses progressed slowly.
This notion was also expressed both by the assessment report of the Task Force on
Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere (IMOS) in 1975 and the NAS-report
from 1976 (NRC, 1976). Both reports make only vague and pessimistic statements
about future findings of adequate substitutes. Research on alternatives was mainly
industry-driven and assessment work had to rely on industry findings. During
that time, all known potential candidates for the replacement of non-aerosol uses
of CFCs faced serious problems and experts merely disagreed on the magnitude
of the problems and the time-span necessary to solve them.
However, in 1978, industry representatives announced that, in theory, HCFC 22,
HFCs and HCFCs could replace many CFCs even for non-aerosol uses. But at
the same time, industry representatives emphasized that, economically, potential
alternatives could not compete with CFCs as the were estimated to be twice to
five times as costly as CFCs. Additionally, commercializing alternatives required
extensive safety testing that was estimated to take 5-10 years. The pessimistic view
was rendered in 1986 when industry officials announced that HFCs and HCFCs
were suitable substitutes that could replace CFCs in nearly all uses, though to a
considerably higher price. This view was confirmed by a broad majority of involved
firms. Interestingly, the actual scientific knowledge had not changed between 1980
and 1986, but the conditions under which they were presented had changed, a fact
that will be further elaborated on in section 5.2.6.
The publications on CFCs alternatives in 1986 were followed by more and more
technical innovations and the former pessimism about the feasibility of CFCs al-
ternatives quickly changed within few years.
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5.2.3.5 Summary: SSTs, Chlorine and Scientific Spill-Overs
Retracing the process and progress in scientific knowledge on stratospheric ozone
and its depletion reveals some major shifts in the scientific understanding, as well
as areas of scientific uncertainties that were not resolved until the early 1990s.
From the very beginning, the issue of stratospheric ozone depletion had a specula-
tive dimension. The issue was rather theorized on before it was actually discovered
under real-world conditions. The issue popped up as a spill-over from an impact-
assessment on SSTs and developed from this origin. It was therefore discovered
backwards: Rather than finding an effect and speculating on its source, sources
of potential harms were discovered and speculations began what the consequences
might be. Since actual ozone depletion was not measurable until the 1990s, differ-
ent theories and hypotheses were articulated and dismissed. Possible substances
that might cause ozone depletion were narrowed down from NOx and water vapor
to chlorine.
The issue has been extensively studied and reviewed by numerous research groups
and institutions. While these efforts continuously contributed to a fair understand-
ing of the sources and mechanisms which cause stratospheric ozone depletion, as
well as of the consequences for wildlife and humans of increased UV-radiation, the
actual extent to which ozone would be depleted under different emission scenar-
ios remained unclear and was not resolved until after political controls had been
installed. Quantifying the actual extend to which ozone would be depleted under
different emission scenarios was however crucial to balance political steps to ef-
fectively protect the stratospheric ozone layer with economic interests. The issue
was pragmatically resolved in parallel to negotiations (see section 5.2.4.3).
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5.2.4 Stages of Regime Formation
5.2.4.1 Early Efforts Towards Domestic Regulation
The issue of stratospheric ozone depletion entered domestic political debates dur-
ing the mid-1970s as a result of early ozone research, especially after the pub-
lication of Molina and Rowland (1974)’s ozone depletion hypothesis. Countries
reacted however differently to the scientific warnings. The U.S. was the world’s
largest producer and consumer of CFCs, it experienced the strongest SSTs contro-
versy and it was a leading player the research efforts on the stratosphere (Parson,
2003, :42). Therefore, the first political restrictions of CFCs usage were imple-
mented on a state-level. The U.S. passed the first national ban on aerosol usage
of CFCs in 1976 (Stoel et al., 1980). In a first step, nonessential use of a specific
class of CFCs (CFCs 11 and CFCs 12) was restricted. In a second step, additional
CFCs for aerosol use were restricted (Parson, 2003, :40).
Canada regulated the aerosol use in 1976, Germany negotiated voluntary cuts with
industries and Sweden banned the manufacture and importation of fluorocarbons
in 1977. Australia, France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan the
Soviet Union and Switzerland had no effective domestic legislation by 1980 (Stoel
et al., 1980, :51-71).
5.2.4.2 Early Demands for International Regualtion
Canadian officials and scientists were the first strong proponents of regulations
on an international level and lobbied for international action at UNEP and the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO). As a result, both organizations initi-
ated calls for internationally coordinated research and policy (Parson, 2003, :44).
But despite these efforts, demands for international regulation on CFCs failed
throughout the 1970s. Individual opponents brought forward different arguments
against international regulation. Japan, for example, simply argued that skin can-
cer resulting from increased UV-radiation would not effect Asians due to their
darker skin (Parson, 2003; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994). Some governments did
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not support initiatives for international regulation for domestic political reasons
(such as France, Italy and Germany), others (for example the UK and the Soviet
Union) strongly opposed the necessity for regulation since scientific evidence did
not justify regulatory efforts.
The first action taken by the transnational organizations UNEP and WMO aimed
at coordinating research and enhancing knowledge on the issue. Two meetings
were hosted by UNEP in 1977 which ended with the conclusion that “participants
recognize that the ozone layer is a global resource, and that current knowledge is
adequate to give cause for concern about effects of chloroflurocarbon use on the
ozone shield. At the same time, there is much to be learned - especially in the
effects areas.” (Stoel et al., 1980). The WMO restricted its activities to expanding
its ozone monitoring group and to issuing regular statements of concern (Parson,
2003, :44). Besides the already mentioned two international bodies, the OECD
would have been the probably most fitting platform for international regulation
of CFCs. The organization comprised the largest producers and consumers of
CFCs (except for the Soviet Union) and had the mandate to initiate multilateral
negotiations among member states. Additionally, it had specialized subbodies for
environmental issues and chemicals (Parson, 2003, :45). Similar to UNEP and
WMO, the first OECD-action aimed at assessing the state of knowledge. After an
initiative of Canada and the U.S., the OECD collected scientific findings from its
member states and produced a report on ozone depletion and CFC-regulation in
1976. The report confirmed the ozone-depletion hypothesis, but also emphasized
the remaining uncertainties and carved out the need for further scientific inves-
tigation. Despite further pressure from Canadian and U.S. officials, the OECD
remained largely inactive. By that time, “[. . . ]there was no international orga-
nization willing and able to coordinate international policy on the ozone issue”
(Parson, 2003, :45). Organizations either did not have the mandate or capacity
or were blocked by a forceful opposition. Therefore the early international efforts
accomplished little. (Parson, 2003, :50)
In the early 1980s, different international organizations initiated action on CFCs
with diverse success. The EC-commission’s move to cap CFCs-production within
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the EU failed to accumulate the necessary support. The OECD continued its
scientific assessment by conducting model comparisons but was limited by po-
litical maneuvers and continuos scientific uncertainties about the actual effect of
increased UV-radiation. After these experiences and because of the UNEPs as-
sessment efforts that gained more and more prominence, the OECD discontinued
its efforts and shifted to supporting the UNEP’s work.
In the light of continuous failure of international bodies to install multilateral
policies or initiate at least policy relevant negotiations, proponents of interna-
tional legislation continued to push for the issue at UNEP. While a Norwegian
initiative in 1977 gained little support, it slowly built up and the UNEP Govern-
ing Council decided to organize negotiations for an international convention to
protect the ozone layer in 1981 (Benedick, 1998). This decision did not imply any
intergovernmental negotiations yet, but it allowed UNEP to form a group of tech-
nical and legal experts. The group developed the basic structure of the convention
as a “treaty and protocols” process. Early drafts and political initiatives that
promised a quick negotiating process were rebuffed and opponents pointed to new
or uncertain scientific findings that had to be considered before any negotiations
(Parson, 2003, :112). Official negotiations started in 1982 without any specific
proposals for controls.
5.2.4.3 The Vienna Convention Negotiations and the Montreal Proto-
col Between 1982-1987
The first negotiation meetings for the Vienna Convention in early 1982 had a
rather educational character since many participants were not familiar with the
global dimension of the ozone issue. The meeting was set up as an expert meet-
ing, not a negotiating meeting and participants did not arrive at negotiations with
clear-cut objectives from their national governments (Morrisette, 1989). However,
different drafts and proposals for international regulation were circulated and this
meeting already revealed divergent views on what to regulate in what manner and
to which quantity. The most prominent proposal was submitted by an alliance of
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Nordic countries (the so-called Toronto Group16) that called for a ban on nonessen-
tial aerosols and technological controls for other CFCs-uses. The discussions that
followed circled around this proposal. One obstacle was a lack of knowledge on
alternatives to CFCs and the related costs for controls. Some scientific programs
refused to address these questions for the sake of scientific credibility, and re-
search groups that addressed the issue did not make much progress (Parson, 2003,
:114).
Despite the lack of knowledge and divergent positions, the first session ended with
a mandate to UNEP for preparing a draft framework for a convention. The follow-
ing meetings were marked by the discussion over the initial proposal by the alliance
of Nordic countries. Western European countries, Japan and the Soviet Union op-
posed international controls whereas Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the
U.S. supported international regulations (Dimitrov, 2006, :46). While some actors
pledged for a refinement of the proposal, other nations objected it as “scientifi-
cally indefensible” (Parson, 2003, :115). As negotiations continued between 1984
and 1985, actors more and more underpinned their arguments with new, though
ambiguous, scientific findings. While opponents of international regulations em-
phasized the succeeding decline of predicted ozone loss, advocates pointed to the
model of nonlinear ozone depletion. (Parson, 2003, :120). As a result of unresolved
conflicts, specific control measures were removed from the convention draft version
preceding the meeting in early 1984.
The Vienna Convention was the result of extensive negotiations and was, at most,
a compromise between advocates and opponents. In the beginning of the nego-
tiations, the level of general knowledge on the issue was low17, but during the
negotiation process, arguments were repeatedly justified with scientific “facts”,
regardless of their preliminary character or reliability (Parson, 2003). On the
other hand, arguments were repeatedly refused on the basis of alternative scien-
tific models. By signing the Vienna Convention, participating nations committed
16Members of the Toronto Group were United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and Finland
17Some nations even claimed that “their ozone layer” was intact since they were not using
CFCs.
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themselves to take “appropriate measures” to “protect human health and the envi-
ronment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities
which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer”. This language reflects the
weak character of the convention and the actual effects of the convention on the
ozone layer were probably close to none. Nevertheless, the convention produced
commitments to future research, exchange of information and - most importantly
- future political consideration of the issue. The basic framework of a general
umbrella-treaty that is followed by more issue-specific turned out to be helpful in
the subsequent negotiation process.
The first negotiation rounds towards the Montreal Protocol experienced similar
controversies about the validity of different scientific findings. Especially conflicts
over model projections of ozone loss marked the discussions since the projections
determined what CFCs-control measures (for example production freeze versus
production cut) were necessary to effectively protect the ozone layer and avert
harmful UV-radiation. These model uncertainties were however pragmatically re-
solved during an ad-hoc meeting in a hotel room at Wu¨rzburg in 1987 (Skodvin,
2000). At this short-term meeting, modelers standardized and merged different
projection models and eventually showed that the biggest source of uncertainty in
respect of projection were future CFCs-emission scenarios, thus passing responsi-
bility back to the political arena. Secondly, running a combined model also showed
that a simple emission-freeze was insufficient to hold global ozone loss under 2%
within the next 50 years. A 2% loss was perceived as an upper threshold to avert
serious negative effects (Parson, 2003, :132). The so-called “Wu¨rzburg conclusion”
posed a turning point in the debates on the scientific basis of a call for regulation.
The model results were confirmed at a later meeting of a NASA scientific working
group in 1988.
The negotiation rounds that followed were characterized by tactical bargaining
maneuvers where actors intended to strengthen their position in order to influence
the outcome of negotiations to their favor. As negotiations continued in 1987,
several remaining differences were narrowed or resolved (Parson, 2003, :136). Ex-
ceptions were negotiated for CFC-uses that could still not be substituted (such as
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some medical applications) and timelines for meeting the targets of the Protocol
were exceptionally extended for developing countries. As a result, nations merely
needed to clarify technical issues of the Protocol. (Parson, 2003, :133).
5.2.5 Costs, Benefits and Uncertainties of CFCs-Regulation
While the previous sections offer an across-time analysis of the process of both
the scientific as well as the political developments, this chapter aims at testing
the argument against operationalized indicators for costs and benefits. This offers
a deeper understanding on the profile of negotiating countries and allows to con-
clude about changes within the configurations through either changes in behavioral
patterns or changes in scientific knwoledge. Chapter 4 provided the rationale for
operationalizing costs as direct costs from international regulation and benefits as
reduced vulnerability. Costs from international regulation are (in line with (Sprinz
and Vaahtoranta, 1994)) operationalized as CFCs-consumption in relation to GDP
per capita. This follows the logic that international regulation would imply emis-
sion cuts which would cause economic costs, since more cost-intensive substitutes
have to be developed or certain products would not be available to the market
anymore.
Benefits – or reduced vulnerability – are conceptualized as the amount of estimated
ozone loss. While Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) suggest to operationalize bene-
fits as a function of skin-cancer, rates of ozone loss are more suitable to capture the
whole spectrum of negative effects and represent vulnerability at an earlier point in
the causal chain from CFCs-emissions to vulnerability. Therefore, vulnerability is
conceptualized as rate of predicted ozone-loss in per cent. As figure 5.1 shows, pre-
dictions on how much ozone would be lost in the future varied significantly across
time and between scientific institutions. For the purpose of this study, the years
1978 and 1984 have been selected for a cross-time comparison for several reasons.
First of all, the beginning and the end of the interval both preceded international
regulation. At the beginning of the interval in 1978, concerns on ozone-loss had al-
ready been raised and early political maneuvers was observable at the international
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Figure 5.1: Ozone Projections by the National Academy of Science (NAS)
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) between 1975
and 1982
level. The interval ends shortly before international negotiations on the Vienna
Convention were closed. Since at both points, states have already somehow en-
gaged in the ozone issue and participated in knowledge-exchange (for example at
early meetings for the Vienna Convention), the state of scientific knowledge that
was communicated through the official assessment work of the National Academy
of Science can be assumed to be commonly shared among participants. Secondly,
data prior to the international agreements on CFC-consumption is available only
for those two years.
The data shows two trends: the first implication is that – despite missing data of
some countries – CFC-consumption declined in some countries while other coun-
tries increased their consumption. Secondly, it seems as if ozone loss as well as the
uncertainty concerning ozone loss predictions declined. However, data on ozone
loss has to be interpreted with caution. First of all, data for both listed years
are model-based predictions. Between 1976 and 1987, various institutions had
published different mode-based predictions of ozone loss that showed strong vari-
ance between and within models (see figure 5.1). With the experience of these
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strong fluctuations in mind, there were strong reasons to question the reliability
of the predicted ozone loss. Both NASA and the WMO declared in 1986 that ac-
tual ozone levels would probably deviate between 20-30% from model predictions
(Dimitrov, 2006).
5.2.6 Conclusions
The scientific and political recognition of stratospheric ozone loss evolved in differ-
ent stages of activities, advancements and dead-locks. Research on stratospheric
ozone loss began in the 1960s, but the primary cause for anthropogenic ozone
depletion was not found until the mid 1970s. And even by then, the scientific
basis was rather slim, leaving room for speculations and contradicting hypotheses.
Knowledge consolidated over the years and the qualitative link between CFCs-
emissions and ozone loss gained consensual recognition. However, quantifying the
exact loss of stratospheric ozone to current and future CFCs-emissions as well
as deciding which levels of ozone loss could be tolerated as acceptable remained
extremely difficult.
In the 1960s, the substances Cl, NOx and water vapor were suspected to catalyze
stratospheric ozone. The only possible pathway through which these substances
could enter the stratosphere were assumed to be Supersonic Transporters which
were not even in place by that time and it was unclear if they ever would be man-
ufactured. After Molina and Rowland (1974)’s early speculation on stratospheric
ozone destruction, direct economic costs as well as actual levels of vulnerability re-
mained unclear. Their hypothesis merely suggested a link between CFCs-emissions
and stratospheric ozone destruction. Additionally, research on possible substitutes
was for most applications still at its infancy and countries could not project the
economic effects of broad and universal regulation on CFCs-emissions.
Molina and Rowland (1974)’s hypothesis gained however more and more recog-
nition and it became a consensus that a qualitative link between CFCs-emission
existed, though it remained unclear to what extent ozone would be lost and what
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thresholds would be acceptable. The formulation Vienna Convention can be re-
garded as a reaction to the scientific picture of that time and fits the predictions of
the theoretical argument in chapter 3. Through the Convention, states confirmed
the existence of anthropogenic ozone depletion and stated that the global ozone
layer should be preserved. The process of negotiations, the vague language and
the call for additional research on the issue indicates that the knowledge at hand
did not (yet) call for immediate political action.
The continuing political process towards international protection of the ozone layer
was marked by disputes over scientific findings and differences between models,
especially with regard to project future ozone depletion. Two major shifts in the
scientific perception evolved during that period of time: the Wu¨rzburg conclusion
and industry announcements on the technical feasibility of potential alternatives.
Both shifts did not feed new scientific findings into the political process. Knowl-
edge on the technical feasibility of potential substitutes had been developed in the
late 1970s (though knowledge was not advanced enough to develop products that
could compete with CFCs on every level), but it did not find political recognition.
When the same research results were republished in 1986, it drew the attention of
political actors. The Wu¨rzburg conclusion represents rather a pragmatical choice
of how to overcome model uncertainties than new findings on future ozone loss.
But even though both aspect were not entirely new, they gained political recogni-
tion for the first time. Table 5.12 provides an overview on scientific and political
events on stratospheric ozone protection, as well as the cost-benefit-configurations
as they were developed in chapter 3.
The two scientific shifts mentioned – the Wu¨rzburg conclusions and findings on
cost-efficient substitutes – changed the configuration of costs and benefits into a
more conducive profile which made a regime formation process more likely. How-
ever, while the two scientific shifts reduced scientific uncertainty from the perspec-
tive of states, it did not rule out dissimilarity. As Barrett (2001) and others con-
vincingly show, sovereign states cannot be forced into a multilateral environmental
agreement and have therefore to be similar (or ‘symmetrical) in their configura-
tion of costs and benefits. As a look at data on consumption and human health
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effects from increased ultraviolet radiation shows (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994),
this was certainly not the case. The agreement was actually achieved through a
political compromise between supporters of a 95% cut and supporters of a phase
out (Parson, 2003).
The case of stratospheric ozone protection allows to test the theoretical argument
and the hypotheses in different ways. The historical process tracing shows how
scientific knowledge shifted and how the political process reacted to these shifts.
At a first glance, the hypotheses are supported: by the time the ozone issue was
discovered, scientific uncertainty was high on both dimensions (costs and benefits)
and political action was directed at improving knowledge. As it became clear that
regulating aerosol uses could be easily achieved, many states installed domestic
regulation on aerosol use. At the same time, international efforts to regulate non-
aerosol uses failed. This changed when new scientific findings revealed a more
conducive cost-structure for substitutes and when scientific knowledge confirmed
high vulnerabilities.
Even though this simple explanation for the success of regime formation is appeal-
ingly convenient, some aspects do not fit and alternative explanations have to be
considered. For example, shifts in scientific knowledge cannot explain differences
in domestic regulation that preceded international regulative efforts. Especially
early regulation in the U.S. (by that time one of the biggest consumers of CFCs)
did not follow shifts in scientific knowledge. However, strong public attention,
pushed by NGOs, had already changed markets for aerosol uses of CFCs (Parson,
2003, :59), which softened industry opposition and facilitated domestic regulation
within the U.S. Many other industrial nations followed and introduced different
forms of domestic restrictions upon aerosol CFC-use (Stoel et al., 1977). It can be
argued that preceding domestic regulation – though weaker and exclusively focused
on aerosol uses of CFCs – paved the way for international restriction.
Secondly, shifts in scientific knowledge do no necessarily resolve dissimilarities
between countries. It has been argued that new scientific knowledge about the
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extent of ozone loss and substitutes for non-aerosol uses reduced the scientific un-
certainties to a degree where states could expect that their costs from international
regulation would be low while benefits were high, since ozone loss appeared to be
greater than expected. This, however, did not resolve distributional conflicts that
would arise from international regulation.
Most interestingly, the study shows how the scientific debate can be shaped by ac-
tors. The Wu¨rzburg conclusions were a conscious decision by actors to deliberately
emphasize some aspects of science and ignore some other aspects of knowledge to
deliver a clear-cut result as the basis for policy decisions. In this case, it can hardly
be argued that scholars manipulated scientific knowledge in a particular direction
to foster their individual interests. The occasion however shows that “scientific
results” are not necessarily the results of pure scientific research. Therefore, the
interaction between science and interests could go in both directions. Though no
research on the case of stratospheric ozone protection hints in this direction, it
certainly is an agenda for future research to further understand the relationship
between scientific knowledge and political interests.
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5.3 The Non-Regime on Arctic Haze
“For a while, it looked so simple: greenhouse
gases warm the Earth and sulphate aerosols
cool it down. [. . . ] But this simplistic view ig-
nores the fact that aerosol particles in the real
world are not white but grey, mostly because
they contain soot particles from the incom-
plete combustion of fuels.”
Meinrat O. Andreae The dark side of
aerosols
Despite its early scientific recognition, Arctic haze has produced a rather fragile
and contradictory body of research. Moreover, even though the issue has been
debated at high-level political institutions, it has not caused too much political
reaction. The case is especially interesting, because the scientific process is marked
by big shifts. As the study will show, scientific uncertainty leads to the paradox
effect that policy makers do not know whether political action would avert or,
on the contrary, even enhance the undesired consequences from Arctic haze. It is
therefore not clear whether Arctic haze should be avoided or not. The case is very
suitable to test the argument, as scientific knowledge is uncertain to a degree that
does not allow actors to formulate their own costs and benefits.
Arctic haze is a layer of brownish mist that covers the Arctic at an altitude of
10-20 km, covering roughly the region north of the 66th parallel on the northern
hemisphere. Oral tradition of the native Inuit suggests that the phenomenon set
in with the industrial revolution and even Fritjof Nansen – one of the earliest
explorers of the Arctic – was puzzled by residues of black dust on Arctic snow
(Soroos, 1992). The first scientific description was published in Science in 1883
(Nordenskio¨ld, 1883). However, the phenomenon did not raise too much atten-
tion until the 1950s when pilots crossing the Arctic reported a brownish fog of
unknown origin that occurred during winter and spring (Greenaway, 1950). Ac-
cording to Mitchell (1957), who coined the term ‘Arctic haze’ but did not think of
it as air pollution, pilots described the haze as hundreds to thousand kilometers
wide and 1-3 km thick. It occurs in diffuse layers in the lower troposphere (at
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approximately 15 km altitude) and consists of sulphate particulate organic matter
(POM) ammonium, nitrate, dust, and black carbon (Li et al., 1993) of mostly
anthropogenic origin (Rahn, 1981). Arctic haze is a highly seasonal phenomenon
with peak concentrations during early spring and very low concentrations during
the summer (Shaw, 1995). Moreover, Arctic haze has been traced back to sources
in Eurasia and North America and it is suspected to disturb the highly sensitive
regional Arctic climate system (Rinke et al., 2004). The significance of the Arctic
climate for the global climate system has been emphasized by many scholars of
climate change (IPCC, 2007b).
Despite the significance of the local Arctic climate for the global climate, Arctic
haze has received little political attention, neither on a national nor on a multi-
lateral level. So far, no international regime has been created to address the issue
of Arctic haze. Weak political, non-binding commitments to protect the Arctic
environment have been formulated in 1989 in the ‘Declaration On The Protec-
tion Of The Arctic Environment’ (‘Rovaniemi-Declaration’), which was signed by
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the USSR and the USA.
Through the declaration, states committed to initiate an assessment process on
environmental and economic conditions in the Arctic and established the ‘Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme’ (AMAP). The signatory states formed
the ‘Arctic Council’ in 1996 as a weakly institutionalized forum to discuss issues on
sustainable development which comprise environmental and socio-economic issues
of the Arctic region (Bloom, 1999). The forum aims at coordinating cooperation
on various aspects of the Arctic region, such as socio-ecomomic issues of indigenous
people, fishery or environmental issues. Even though AMAP repeatedly presented
the issue of Arctic haze to the Arctic Council, where it was discussed in numer-
ous official meetings, and despite calls for multilateral action by some participants
within the Arctic Council framework, no legal action was taken to address the
issue.
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5.3.1 Defining Costs, Benefits and Uncertainty of Arctic
Haze
Arctic Haze has been identified as a potential problem because of its high concen-
tration of sulfur and the high proportion of black carbon. High sulfur concentration
and other acidifying chemicals might threaten the fragile biological equilibrium of
the Arctic flora and fauna. The issue of acidification, however, is geographically
limited to the Arctic region and might be of little interest for states that do not
have stakes in a healthy Arctic eco-system. The high proportion of black car-
bon in Arctic haze, however, poses a more transregional, transboundary problem.
Black carbon is a short-lived climate forcer in the Arctic and some researchers
argue that it is the second most important driver for global climate change after
CO2 (Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008). However, despite substantial scientific
improvements, the role of particles in clouds and the Arctic is not very well under-
stood so far. This case-study will focus on black carbon for two reasons: First of
all, sulfur and and other acidifying chemicals have already been regulated by the
CLRTAP (see section 5.1) to which all Arctic nations are members. Measurements
show that their proportion in the composition of Arctic haze has progressively de-
clined (AMAP, 2006). Secondly, acidification affects predominantly the Arctic
region itself with fewer negative effects for other areas and lacks a transboundary
dimension. Thirdly, the effects of anthropogenic sulfur in the environment have
been studied in depth and few scientific blank spots are left here.
Black carbon in the Arctic, on the other hand, has the potential to accelerate
global climate change, and thus has a more transboundary character than sulfur-
acidification. The climatic effects of black carbon mitigation are more direct than
those of other climate change drivers such as CO2 or methane. It is not a green-
house gas, it rather soots out and darkens the large snow-fields of the Arctic and
Antarctic and, as consequence, diminishes surface albedo. A decreased surface
albedo through darkened surface results in more sunlight to be absorbed by the
surface. This, in turn, might lead to a warmer Arctic surface climate and an
enhanced melting of Arctic ice shield (IPCC, 2007c). This could eventually rapidly
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speed up the process of climate change through a variety of mechanisms and
complex feedbacks.
As already emphasized, there is no multilateral agreement on Arctic haze despite
political efforts in this direction. Since the issue was already found to be charac-
terized by scientific uncertainty (see 4.3.1) and there is no international regime,
we would expect, in line with the argument, an obstructive configuration of sci-
entific uncertainty in which costs of mitigation are uncertain while benefits from
international regulation are rather low (see section 3).
Since black carbon has been identified as the central transboundary issue of Arctic
haze, the economic costs of a multilateral Arctic haze agreement are represented
by domestic emissions of black carbon. The higher annual black carbon emissions
per capita, the higher potential costs from regulating or cutting these emissions.
According to the theoretical argument, we would expect that emissions are rather
uncertain since they are hard to measure.
Benefits from an international agreement on Arctic haze are conceptualized as
reduced vulnerability. In contrast to the previously described phenomenon of
Persistent Organic Pollutants, vulnerability to black carbon occurs as an indirect
effect and in relation to its role as climate forcer and its potential to significantly
enhance climate change. Therefore, vulnerability from Arctic haze is reflected
by vulnerability towards dramatic climate change. In line with the theoretical
argument, we would expect that the Arctic council states are experiencing a rather
low climate change vulnerability.
5.3.2 Outline of the Case Study
The case study will geographically focus on the members of the Arctic Council. At
the same time, research indicates that these are the main emitters of black carbon
that travels to the Arctic and on the other hand Arctic haze has been addressed
as a political issue within that organization (Soroos, 1992).
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To ensure comparability, this case study follows procedure similar to that of the
previous case study. Nature and Science are scanned for publications on Arctic
haze. Two additional relevant scientific journals are identified through the refer-
ences of the articles in Nautre and Science. The journals have been scanned for
the key-words Arctic Haze, black carbon, Arctic air pollution and short-lived cli-
mate forcers, as well as a combination of these terms. Additionally, the scientific
journals Journal of the Atmospheric Science and Journal of Geophysical Research
have been analyzed for publications on Arctic haze and black carbon in the Arctic.
The review led to a data-set of 46 articles, which were scanned for research themes
and existing scientific uncertainty. The themes that dominated the scientific de-
bate were sources, composition, long-range transport and effects related to Arctic
haze. For an overview on the reviewed articles, see the appendix.
Similar to the previous case studies, data collection has been supplemented by a
citation analysis using ‘CiteSpace’, with the search terms ‘Arctic haze’ and ‘black
carbon emission’. The following case study rests on insights from a qualitative
content analysis (Mayring, 2010) of the collected data.
5.3.3 Historical Stages of Scientific Knowledge on Arctic
Haze
5.3.3.1 Origins and Sources of Arctic Haze
For the Inuit population, the origin of the new phenomenon was to a large ex-
tent unknown and interpreted religiously. To early western explorers and the first
pilots who noticed Arctic haze in the 1950s, its origin seemed puzzling as well,
especially since the Arctic was thought to be a remote and pristine area. There
was, however, little scientific interest on where the haze came from and how it got
to the Arctic. This changed when Glenn E. Shaw started to investigate optical
depth at Barrow, Alaska (Shaw, 1975). Optical depth measurement (or optical
thickness measurement) is a simple method to determine the amount of particles
in the air by means of light scattering. He intended to collect clean template
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samples in the Arctic as baseline levels for polluted urban areas and was puz-
zled when he found optical depth to be much deeper than he expected, indicating
much higher particle concentration in the air than theory and previous research
suggested (Shaw, 1989). Nearby sources could quickly be excluded as causes and
rough trajectory analysis hinted to an anthropogenic origin from northern Amer-
ica. However, this assumption was refuted by Rahn et al. (1977), who identified
the origins in the Asian deserts. At the time, two models to explain a longer-
than-usual atmospheric life-time and a longer-than-usual travel route for aerosols
were available: either aerosols were induced through volcanic erruptions (Crutzen,
2006) or windblown from deserts (Shaw and Stamnes, 1980; Sinclair, 1974). Since
a volcanic origin could be excluded and the timing matched with seasonal sand-
storms in Asian deserts, Rahn et al. (1977) assumed that the particles originated
from Asian deserts and published these assumption in Nature. Since the compo-
sition of Arctic haze was similar to Sahara aerosol and long-range flow patterns
of aerosols supported the assumptions, scholars agreed that Arctic haze consisted
mainly of wind-blown dust from Asian deserts (Barrie, 1986).
Further research in the early 1980s, however, gave reason to doubt the suggested
explanation of wind-blown dust (Rahn and McCaffrey, 1980; Rosen et al., 1981).
By the late 1970s, data was still incomplete and scattered and the sources of
Arctic haze had not been clearly identified, but evidence suggested to rule out
some suspected sources: “Haze is not correlated with or chemically similar to
several sources of air pollution on the north slope of the globe”(Shaw, 1989, :73).
This excluded any local sources for the haze. Since local sources and asian deserts
seemed implausible sources for Arctic haze, researchers speculated that industrial
sources from central Eurasia and northern America could contribute to Arctic haze
(Shaw, 1989, :73). By that time, scientific knowledge left no doubt that Arctic
haze was an anthropogenic phenomenon of remote origin. This seemed surprising
since scientific theories indeed showed how particles traveled through air currents,
but by far not over such a long distance.
A new publication of Rahn and Heidam (1981) initiated a major shift in the under-
standing of Arctic air pollution and long-range atmospheric transport of particles.
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Their research demonstrated why previous assumptions on Artic haze sources in
Asian deserts must be mistaken and suggested that industrial sources in central
Eurasia, eastern Europe, and northern America were major contributors (Rahn
and Heidam, 1981, :1448ff). The analysis of particle composition allowed Rahn
and Heidam (1981) to infer Eurasia as the main contributor with North Amer-
ica to a lesser extent. Rahn and Heidam (1981), however, emphasize that the
assumptions rest on a patchwork of several publications on Arctic haze and signif-
icant knowledge gaps and lacks in data still prevailed. Further research by Barrie
et al. (1981) partly supported Rahn and Heidam (1981)’s assumption, but ruled
out European sources (Barrie et al., 1981, :1415) and identified additional pos-
sible sources, such as Japan and Siberia. Research continued and particles were
furthermore analyzed, using x-ray spectrometry to trace back their origin. The
results published in Nature support once more the idea of Eurasian and North-
American sources as contributors to Arctic haze (Shaw, 1982)18. A growing body
of research research, using new emerging methods, supported the hypothesis of
Eurasian and North-American sources (Rahn and Lowenthal, 1984). By the early
1990s, the hypothesis of sources from Eurasia and North-America had become sci-
entifically accepted and confirmed by additional research that combined chemical
analysis with meteorological findings on the transport of aerosols (Cheng et al.,
1993; Nriagu et al., 1991)(see also section 5.3.3.2) and the research focus shifted
towards more detailed questions of transport mechanisms, composition and envi-
ronmental effects (Djupstro¨m et al., 1993).
5.3.3.2 Transport and Long – Range Migration
Research on aerosol transport is closely linked to research on sources and many
publications address both aspects. The puzzling discovery of Arctic haze by Shaw
(1975) had already raised questions about transport patterns. The standard model
for aerosol migration in the 1970s suggested wind-blown dust over a few hundred
18Shaw (1982) corrected his own previous research which suggested Asian deserts as sources.
He called this early Nature-article his ‘Red Herring Paper’ (see: http://gi.alaska.edu/glenn/
research/Arctichaze)
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kilometers. However, when researchers found that the composition of Arctic haze
pointed to sources around 1,000-3,000 km away, the focus shifted towards unique
features of Arctic climatic conditions (Barry and Hare, 1974; Kerr, 1979). Rahn
and McCaffrey (1980) developed the first crude model of the meteorological inter-
action between the local Arctic climate system and mid latitude climate system.
Since many studies implicated strong variations of Arctic haze density between
winter (strong concentration of Arctic haze) and summer (low concentration of
Arctic haze) and a quite sudden change between seasons, Rahn and McCaffrey
(1980) assumed an influence of seasonal temperature difference and developed the
model of ‘coupling-decoupling’. Put simply, it describes how both systems couple
in winter, allowing large air massess to travel into the Arctic and decouple in sum-
mer, separated by the Arctic front, a weather front between cold Arctic air massess
and warmer polar air massess. The rough model was refined by Raatz and Shaw
(1984), who investigated in detail the interaction between low-pressure and high-
pressure systems in the northern hemisphere. Especially the interaction between
a seasonal low-pressure system over Iceland and a constant Arctic high-pressure
system allowed researchers to identify nine different pathways from North-America
and Eurasia to the Arctic, seasonal deviations of long-range pathways, as well as
vertical deviations (Raatz and Shaw, 1984, :1504). The model corresponded with
theories on ‘blocking’ (Austin, 1980; Iversen and Joranger, 1985) and was con-
firmed by airplane and ground measurements (Bridgman et al., 1989; Burkow and
Kallenborn, 2000; Carlson, 1981; Mackay and Wania, 1995; Ottar, 1981; Ottar
et al., 1986; Rosen and Hansen, 1985; Shaw, 1989). Since additional research on
pathways and long-range particle transportation confirmed model predictions, the
model had become the standard model by the early 1990s and was integrated into
the first AMAP Assessment Report to explain Arctic air pollution (Wilson et al.,
1998, :22).
5.3.3.3 Composition of Arctic Haze
Neither the members of early Arctic expeditions nor the pilots in the 1950s had
any knowledge about the composition of Arctic haze. The rather unscientific term
Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis – Stratospheric Ozone 144
‘Arctic haze’ itself reflects this lack of knowledge. However, after its rediscovery
in the 1970s, much research was devoted to decoding the composition of Arctic
haze (Winchester et al., 1985). After falsely assuming natural sources of Arctic
haze, namely extraordinary weather events during the time period of measurement
(Shaw, 1989, :88), early trajectory studies discovered that Arctic haze contained
natural, as well as anthropogenic elements. Tracing anthropogenic elements had
proven to be difficult at that time since (a) anthropogenic aerosols could not
easily be separated from natural aerosols and (b) the Arctic climate with low
temperatures and high seasonal variation in solar radiation causes complicated
chemical reactions (Shaw, 1989) that bias measurements. By the late 1970s, the
main pollution substances had not been understood (Rahn and Heidam, 1981,
:1345). Research focused on tracers to investigate sources and pathways. However,
tracers as Vanadium (V) play only a very minor role in the total composition
of Arctic haze (Rahn and Heidam, 1981; Rahn and McCaffrey, 1980). Sulfuric
acid (SO4
2-
) was identified as a constituent, but neither its fraction of the total
aerosol mass nor the particle-size distribution was known. Additionally, “graphitic
carbon” (Rahn and Heidam, 1981, :1346) was discovered as a fraction of Arctic
haze. At issue-specific scientific conferences, Arctic chemistry was still described
as being in its infancy (Rahn and Heidam, 1981).
The level of understanding improved with methodological advances in the late
1980s when researchers found a whole spectrum of different chemicals (Heintzen-
berg et al., 1981). Among the anthropogenic elements, those with the highest
occurrence were found to be vanadium (V), sulfuric acid (SO4
2-
), nitrate (NO3
-
),
black carbon and smaller amounts of other elements which are typical byproducts
of industrial combustion processes (such as iron (Fe), magnesium (Mg) and copper
(Cu) (Heidam, 1984; Parungo et al., 1990; Rosen et al., 1981; Shaw, 1989; Sheridan
and Musselman, 1985; Sheridan and Zoller, 1989). However, even with improved
methods, it remained difficult to separate natural from anthropological sources
and to exclude measurement artifacts. This led to false artifactual speculations on
anthropogenic concentrations of bromine (Br) (Shaw, 1989, :89), which were later
corrected (Barrie et al., 1988).
Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis – Stratospheric Ozone 145
By the early 1990s, airplane measurements, executed during the Arctic Gas and
Aerosol Sampling Program (AGASP), had provided detailed data on on the com-
position of Arctic haze in the stratosphere and troposphere (Davidson et al., 1993;
Parungo et al., 1990). The new data provided insights into the relative con-
centration of different elements within Arctic haze. It revealed that previous
ground-based measurements underestimate the fraction of black carbon that is
present in Arctic haze (Hansen and Novakov, 1989). The results of the extensive
AGASP-measurements were included into the first AMAP Assessment Report:
“Haze aerosols are mainly sulfate. The haze has been thoroughly analyzed. It
consists of sulfate (up to 90 percent), soot, and sometimes dust. The particles
are about the same size as the wavelength of visible light, which explains why the
haze is so apparent to the naked eye.” (Wilson et al., 1998, :135).
5.3.3.4 Local and Global Effects of Arctic Haze
Arctic haze has been associated with at least two possible effects on the Arctic. As
it became clear that Arctic haze consisted to a large extent of SO4
2-
and previous
experiences in the Scandinavian environment showed how SO4
2-
had a decreasing
effects on the ph-level of soils and lake water (which, in turn, threatened local
flora and fauna) (Likens et al., 1972; Schindler, 1988), researchers had started to
speculate on possible negative effects of SO4
2-
in the Arctic (Barrie et al., 1981;
Kerr, 1979). However, by the late 1970s, only very little was known about the
nature and quantity of any such effects and nothing at all was known on possible
sinks19 for Arctic haze.
Besides concerns about changes in the Arctic environment due to increased SO4
2-
levels, scholars had started to theorize on thermal effects from black carbon within
Arctic haze. Because of its special characteristics, the Arctic region was thought to
be very sensitive to thermal changes. The high reflectiveness (also called ‘albedo’)
of a white surface which is covered with ice and snow for the most of the year,
coupled with long periods of constant sunlight (Arctic summer) or vice versa long
19In ecological science, a ‘sink’ is broadly described as a physical place or area where material
collects and accumulates.
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periods of darkness (Arctic winter) leads to a fragile equilibrium of temperature,
precipitation patterns and wind currents. And since thermal impacts from air
pollution were known from other regions (Warren and Wiscombe, 1980), scholars
began to hypothesize on possible effects.
Shaw and Stamnes (1980) developed the first model on how Arctic haze might
influence the polar radiation budget20. The model has made it possible to identify
two mechanisms resulting in different effects in the atmosphere and on the surface.
Arctic haze (a) decreases the albedo of atmospheric clouds, thus absorbs solar
radiation in the atmosphere which also (b) shields the surface from solar radiation.
According to the model of Shaw and Stamnes (1980), the albedo effect of Arctic
haze leads to increasing temperatures in atmosphere21. Solar radiation absorption
leads to an oppositional effect: Solar radiation is prevent to hitting the surface,
thus Arctic haze works like a parasol or sunshade.22
Even though the model estimates a temperature increase of 1◦ C per day in the
lower troposphere, Shaw and Stamnes (1980) assert a net cooling effect from Arctic
haze, meaning that the shading-effect outbalances the atmospheric heating effect.
Other modeling-approaches on black carbon in the Arctic atmosphere confirmed
in principle Shaw and Stamnes (1980)’s conclusion (Cess, 1983; Porch and Mac-
Cracken, 1982; Rosen et al., 1981; Tsay et al., 1989), but corrected the magnitudes
of estimated atmospheric temperature increase to be much lower (Leighton, 1983).
However, as Cess (1983) points out, all of those models suffered from questionable
assumptions and a lack of data. “The parameters that would have to go into the
models are, however, known only poorly.” (Shaw and Stamnes, 1980, :537). Fur-
thermore, the models only pictured temperature effects within Arctic haze layers
and did not link this effect to dynamic feed-back processes (Barrie, 1986). A gen-
eral increase of local atmospheric temperatures has nevertheless been regarded as
established scientific knowledge in the early 1980s, but its magnitude and further
20A local or regional radiation budget refers to the balance between incoming solar radiation
and outgoing albedo-radiation (reflected radiation by the local or regional surface).
21The effect of light absorbing black carbon particles is comparable to wearing a black shirt
in the summer sun.
22This effect is even enhanced by SO4
2-
in Arctic haze.
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implications could only be guessed (Rahn and Heidam, 1981). Estimations on
radiative effects improved as data from ground measurements was supplemented
by airborne-sample data (Patterson et al., 1982; Wendling et al., 1985) and sup-
ported the initial assumption of increasing temperatures in the lower troposphere,
a cooling surface and a net cooling effect from Arctic haze.
While models on the effect of aerosols in the Arctic troposphere gradually im-
proved, the deposition on snow and its effects on Arctic climate particles remained
puzzling during the 1980s (Rahn, 1985). Research on long-range transport indi-
cated a movement from mid-latitudes to the Arctic, but only little was known on
the fate of the particles (Rahn and Heidam, 1981). The standard paradigm was
that deposition of particles must be very small in the Arctic (Shaw, 1989), since cli-
matic conditions were assumed to be rather stable. This view changed during the
mid-1980s when more research effort was dedicated to mechanisms and concentra-
tions of Arctic haze deposition. Between 1985 and 1990, studies reported residues
of SO4
2-
(Davidson et al., 1987) and black carbon in Arctic snow-packs (Blanchet,
1989; Clarke and Noone, 1985; Noone and Clarke, 1988). Basic mechanisms of
deposition were identified, but quantifying deposition to assess environmental im-
pacts was not feasible (Shaw, 1989). Measurements showed an acidifying effect of
SO4
2-
on snow surface, but it was black carbon raised most attention since it has
the potential to increase surface temperatures and might lead to increased snow-
melt (Hansen and Novakov, 1989). Previous models had focused on temperature
changes within the haze layers and close to the surface and neglected the effect
of light-absorbing particles on snow (Blanchet, 1989). Additionally, previous re-
search had indicated that the Arctic climate is highly sensitive to slight changes in
temperatures as well as to the timing of certain climatic events such as the spring
snow-melt.
Despite reasonable concerns that black carbon did not only decreases cloud albedo
but also decreases surface albedo by darkening the snow-white surface, research
in the 1990s mainly focused on the effects of atmospheric black carbon. Despite
possible regional and global climatic impacts (Menon et al., 2002; Ramanathan
et al., 2001), changes in surface albedo and resulting effects were largely neglected.
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This is reflected in the first AMAP assessment report in 1998, in which SO4
2-
was considered to be the main problematic issue of Arctic haze (Wilson et al.,
1998). While some publications had already pointed out possible climatic effects
of decreased surface albedo (Menon et al., 2002; Ramanathan et al., 2001), , the
scientific community on global climate change did not take it into consideration
(Houghton et al., 2001).
Albedo decreasing black carbon gained prominence after 2000. Jacobson (2001)’s
Article in Nature emphasizes (a) how the radiative forcing of black carbon strongly
depends on mixtures with other aerosols, (b) has been widely underestimated by
previous research and (c) is very hard to quantify with certainty. But based on
his model results, he suggests that black carbon might easily offset the cooling
effect of other anthropogenic aerosols and might thus be the second most impor-
tant driver of global warming after CO2 in terms of direct forcing (Jacobson, 2001,
:695). This view is however put into perspective by Andreae (2001), who points
out that, although Jacobson (2001)‘s work is based on “ . . . best current knowl-
edge or assumptions” (Andreae, 2001, :671), the actual role of black carbon is still
difficult to determine. In a publication in Nature, Andreae (2001) summarizes how
the effect and the direction of signs of the effect (a) strongly depends on various
parameters (e.g. location, latitude, altitude, timing and size of black carbon oc-
curences) and (b) how modelers and experimentalists struggle to determine both
magnitude and sign of a possible climatic effect from black carbon.
New modeling results of Hansen and Nazarenko (2004) were published in a highly
cited PNAS publication. They integrate climatic forcing of black carbon on snow
into climate models and their calculations suggest a substantial increase in radia-
tive forcing (up to 0.16 W/m2) in the Arctic. The authors inferred that black car-
bon in the Arctic can account for one quarter of observed global warning (Hansen
and Nazarenko, 2004, :428). This changing knowledge about the role of black car-
bon is also reflected by the fourth AMAP assessment report23 from 2006, which
devotes a section to possible climatic effects from Arctic haze. It summarizes sci-
entific knowledge on the effects of Arctic haze and concludes that (a) atmospheric
23The second and third assessment report does not address Arctic haze
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black carbon heats up the haze layers, (b) black carbon on the surface reduces
albedo and therefore might be a climate forcer and (c) magnitude and sign of
radiative forcing for the Arctic are not well understood (AMAP, 2006, :40). De-
position and fluctuation in concentrations remained a great source of uncertainty
(Quinn et al., 2007). Radiative impacts of aerosols in the Arctic are marked by
complex feedbacks between aerosols, clouds, radiation, sea ice and transport pro-
cesses and thus remained difficult to understand (Quinn et al., 2007, :109).
Within a few years, the understanding of black carbon improved as several scholars
published new modelling approaches. Radiative forcing from black carbon on snow
appeared to be positive, though lower than previously suggested (between 0.03 to
0.11 W/m2) (Flanner et al., 2009; Jacobson, 2010). The AMAP Technical Report
on the Impact of Black Carbon on Arctic Climate incorporated these new findings
and states that despite the uncertainties in determining the radiative effects of
black carbon, some of its features were clear: Both the decrease in atmospheric
albedo and the decrease of surface albedo from black carbon turn out to show a
positive sign. Thus, black carbon from Arctic haze is assumed to be causally linked
to a warming local Arctic climate and increased or premature ice melts (AMAP,
2011). This, in turn, was associated with accelerating effects on global warming
(Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008).
5.3.3.5 Summary: The Shifting Scientific Understanding of Arctic
Haze
Unique conditions aggravate research in the Arctic in several ways: remoteness,
extreme sub-zero temperatures, ice and snow are practical factors that challenge
researchers and especially research equipment to the edge. Infrastructure is un-
derdeveloped and standard equipment was never designed for use under such con-
ditions. Secondly, due to those conditions, previous scientific knowledge gained
from other regions cannot be easily transfered. Hence much research in the Arctic
had to start from scratch. Both sources of difficulties were formulated in numer-
ous publications. Thirdly, political reasons during the ‘cold war’ period limited
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scientific exchange and cross border research projects, such as airplane measure-
ments.
As the previous section shows, the history of scientific knowledge on different as-
pects of Arctic haze is marked by detours, deadlocks and uncertainties. After its
discovery, the sources of Arctic haze were considered to be a natural phenomenon.
but further investigations in the 1980s pointed to anthropogenic sources. As local
sources seemed an implausible explanation, scholars searched for sources in the
industrialized northern hemisphere. This was supported by findings on possible
atmospheric pathways. Findings on long-range transport through an inter-
action between meteorological high- and low-pressure systems changed standing
paradigms about aerosol transports and existing models of aerosol transport had
to be fundamentally revised. The new models were supported by new empirical
measures and it became clear that (a) Arctic haze is of anthropogenic origin and
(b) traveled from sources in Eurasia and North-America towards the Arctic.
Determining the composition of Arctic haze proved to be limited by extreme
research conditions in the early days of research. But as methods advanced, the
actual composition of Arctic haze could be traced more accurately and the chem-
ical fingerprint gave further confidence to hypotheses on sources and pathways.
Insights on the components of Arctic haze led to considerations on how it might
affect the Arctic region and research shifted towards the issue in the late 1979s
and early 1980s. Since the biggest fraction of Arctic haze was found to be SO4
2-
,
the acidifying properties of which were known from previous works on SO4
2-
in
other regions, research focused in the beginning on SO4
2-
. Even though SO4
2-
was
thouht to disturb the natural equilibrium of Arctic flora and fauna, its effects were
assumed to diminish with regulatory steps taken by CLRTAP. Research shifted
towards possible climatic effects from black carbon in Arctic haze24.
During the first phase on research on possible effects of Arctic haze, the under-
standing of aerosols was still in its infancy. It seemed reasonable to assume that
24This goes in parallels with a broader shift in scientific research ‘from acid’ to climate change.
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Arctic haze would somehow perturb the radiative budget of the Arctic. Addition-
ally, it seemed very likely that the Arctic radiation budget was extremely sensitive
to perturbation due to extreme seasonal changes in the budget and high surface
albedo of the snow-white surface. During the 1980s, Arctic haze was modeled as
a solar radiation absorbing layer which would lead to a raise temperatures within
the atmosphere and lower surface temperatures with a slight net cooling effect.
The models were confirmed by empirical measurements, though researchers in
most instances emphasized the many preliminary assumptions and uncertainties
in their models and measurements. Additionally, the publications differ regarding
the magnitude they attribute to the net cooling effect.
Even though some researches raised concerns about a possible additional effect
from depositional black carbon on Arctic snow as early as the 1980s, the issue
did not gain much attention before the year 2000. Researchers found evidence
that black carbon on the snow-covered Arctics could decrease surface albedo. This
could substantially contribute to snow-melt, making black carbon the second most
effective actual driver of global climate change. Yet again, it seemed as if this pro-
cess would only appear under particular conditions and much was uncertain about
the actual magnitude of this effect. Though for a long period, it remained unclear
whether the solar radiation absorbing cooling effect was offset by the albedo de-
creasing effect, the AMAP report declared that in the light of all evidence, it
is likely that Arctic haze has a heating effect than a cooling effect, making it a
climate forcer.
In conclusion, the actual role of Arctic haze remained unclear for decades. Arctic
haze research experienced two major shifts: From hypotheses on natural origins to
hypotheses on anthropogenic origins and from hypothesis on a net cooling effect to
hypothesis on a net heating effect. While contradictions between different models
and diverging empirical findings on the sources of Arctic haze have been resolved
at latest by the 1990s, aerosol research and research on black carbon still bears
complex uncertainty. Even though the actual effect of Arctic haze for the Arctic
(net cooling or net heating) has not been clarified beyond any doubt, the AMAP-
report of 2011 states that in the light of all reviewed scientific research, it seems
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plausible to assume that Arctic haze has a heating effect rather than a cooling
effect. This implies a paradigmatic change from the AMAP-report of 2006 to the
AMAP-report of 2011. While the 2006 report stresses that Arctic haze might cool
the Arctic climate, the 2011 report clearly warns that it is more likely that Arctic
haze warms the Arctic climate with large implications for the global climate.
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
Sources and Emissions ++ ++ - + - - - -
Negative Effects ++ ++ ++ + + -
Composition ++ ++ + - - - - -
Transport and Migration Patterns ++ + + - - - - -
Table 5.13: Level of Scientific Uncertainty concerning Arctic Haze over Time
and Scientific Theme
Uncertainty levels (see section 4.4.1.2): ++ = very high, + = high, % medium, - = low, - - very
low
5.3.4 Stages of Political Actions towards Regime Forma-
tion
Even though there is no international regime to regulate Arctic haze, there has
been a series of considerable international efforts concerning the Arctic environ-
ment in general, such as the Rovaniemi-Declaration from 1991 (Arctic Council,
1991) (see section 5.3). This diplomatic initiative led to the signing of the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy by the Arctic rim states (Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the USSR and the USA (Arctic Council, 1991,
:3)). By signing this document, states have agreed on scientific cooperation and
knowledge exchange on selected environmental issues in the Arctic. The initiative
was followed by the constitution of the Arctic council, a forum among the Arctic
rim states to exchange and coordinate various issues concerning the Arctic (Bloom,
1999). The Arctic council meets biennially at the ministerial level, each meeting
concludes with an official joint declaration and several national statements. The
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aims of the forum are to “[. . . ]provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordi-
nation and interaction among the Arctic states [. . . ] on common Arctic issues, in
particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the
Arctic.” (Arctic Council, 1991, :2). Similar to comparable international environ-
mental organizations, the political deliverables of the Arctic Council are mainly
policy recommendations and guidelines, agreed upon through consensual voting.
However, it also established a substantial scientific body to assess various aspects
of the Arctic environment. Each ministerial meeting is preceded by a collabora-
tive assessment report from AMAP, which was founded and funded by the Arctic
Council member states.
The analysis of this study will focus on the political processes within the Arctic
Council for several reasons: First of all, the Council was the first multilateral po-
litical forum to which the issue of Arctic haze was presented by a scientific body.
Secondly, the Arctic Council member states already committed to the aim of en-
vironmental protection by signing the founding documents of the Arctic Council
and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. It can therefore be reasonably
assumed that these states have some concern for the well-being of the Arctic re-
gion. Thirdly, emissions that contribute to Arctic haze are largely sourced within
the territory of Arctic council members. A change in behavior of Arctic Council
member states could therefore actually make an impact on the problem. Fourth,
though designed as a forum, the Arctic Council has already produced legally bind-
ing multilateral environmental agreements, such as the ‘Agreement on Cooperation
on Marine Oil Pollution’ (Arctic Council, 2012). This shows that the forum is,
in principle, an adequate organization with the ability to produce legally binding
international environmental agreements. A review on the official declarations, as
well as notes, minutes, press releases and national statements (where available),
show how the political considerations on Arctic haze and especially the issue of
black carbon have shifted over the years.
The issue of Arctic haze was presented to the Arctic Council in 2000 by the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP). It was, however, framed as a
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matter of acidification, which is reflected by the national statements and the final
declaration.
The member states commited to support the by that time still pending CLTARP-
Protocols on Acidification, POPs and Heavy Metals and encourage member states
to ratify the protocols. At the same ministerial meeting, the issue of climate
change in the Arctic was discussed. The major concerns according to individual
statements and the official declaration was the rapid climatic change in the Arctic.
However, the Arctic was regarded merely as a receptor rather than a possible driver
for global climate change. Therefore, national statements and final declarations
circle around balancing economic opportunities resulting from climate change25
with environmental care for the Arctic. National statements (for example the
statement by the USA) emphasize the necessity for further knowledge prior to
political action on the issue of climate change.
While this view on climate change continued with the subsequent ministerial meet-
ings in 2004 and 2006, member states acknowledged anthropogenic sources for
climate change and the need for mitigation of greenhouse gases in official declara-
tion of 2009. Additionally, the declaration “[. . . ]note[s] the role that shorter-lived
climate forcers such as black carbon, methane and tropospheric ozone precursors
may play in Arctic climate change, and recognize that reductions of emissions have
the potential to slow the rate of Arctic snow, sea ice and sheet ice melting in the
near-term” (emphasizes added). This was the first political recognition of possible
effects from black carbon in the Arctic and changed the previous perception of the
Arctic as a mere receptor of global climate change.
At the next ministerial meeting in 2011, member states signed a declaration that
“[. . . ]encourage[s] Arctic states to implement, as appropriate in their national
circumstances relevant recommendations for reducing emissions of black carbon”
(emphasize added). The need for further multilateral action on black carbon
emission reduction is also emphasized by national statements while other states
continue to emphasize the economic opportunities within the Arctic from climate
25As new trading routes and a possible exploitation of natural ressources.
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change. The declaration of 2013 points in the same direction. Black carbon is
recognized as a source for climate change and member states decided to set up a
task force to develope arrangements on actions to achieve enhanced black carbon
reductions in the Arctic until the next ministerial meeting in 2015 (Arctic Council,
2012).
5.3.5 A Cost-Benefit-Configuration of Arctic Haze Regu-
lation
It has been convincingly argued in section 5.3.1 that the main motive for joint mea-
sures on Arctic haze through a multilateral agreement could be to avert negative
effects from climate change. Since the negative climatic effects of black carbon
work on a much shorter time scale than for example CO2, reducing black car-
bon could be an efficient (though not sufficient) short-term instrument to combat
global climate change. In addition, as the review of the historic scientific devel-
opment shows, possible impacts from Arctic haze on climate change stem from
black carbon. Reducing negative climatic effects from Arctic haze hence requires
a reduction in black carbon emissions. This, in turn, could lead to a reduction
of climatic effects and climate change vulnerability. However, this would only be
the case if the negative climatic effects of black carbon really exist as proposed,
meaning that the hypotheses on a net heating effect from Arctic haze really is
valid. It has been emphasized in the previous section how controversially this link
has been discussed, as there are two groups of models that predict oppositional
effects from Arctic haze: one group predicting a net cooling effect, the other a
net heating effect. If the latter is the ‘true’ model, black carbon emission cuts are
an effective means to reduce climate change vulnerability, reducing black carbon
emissions would actually raise climate change vulnerability. A cost-benefit-profile
oscillates between these extreme points.
Data of black carbon emissions is acquired from the AMAP Technical Report on
the Impact of Black Carbon on Arctic Climate (AMAP, 2011) which compiles data
from different black carbon inventories. Black carbon emissions are made available
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for Arctic Council members for the year 2000. The report was published in 2011
and its results were presented to the Arctic Council in 2013. In the context of this
study, relying on compiled AMAP data rather than direct emission data (Bond
et al., 2007; Lamarque et al., 2010) ensures that the data considered in this study
was actually available to Arctic Council member states.
Data on climate change vulnerability is taken from the UNEP Environmental Vul-
nerability Index (Kaly et al., 1999). The Index is constructed from national data,
climate change vulnerability is a subindex. The Index ranges from 0 (Resilient)
to 7 (Extremely vulnerable).
Country Climate Change Vul-
nerability Score26
Black Carbon Emiss-
sions (Gg/y)27
Canada 3.08 52
Denmark 4.31 24,4
Finland 2.61 24,4
Iceland 3.85 24,4
Norway 3.15 24,4
The Russian Federation 2.73 516,5
Sweden 3.08 24,4
USA 3.23 765,5
Table 5.14: Climate Change Vulnerability
Source: Climate Vulnerability Index (Kaly et al., 1999); Technical Report on the Impact of Black
Carbon on Arctic Climate (AMAP, 2011)
Data on climate change vulnerability and black carbon emissions make it possible
to identify three groups of polluters: Russia and the USA show very high emissions
of black carbon, followed by Canada with a medium value and Denmark, Finland
and Iceland who emit only about half as much black carbon as the Nordic States
and only a small fraction of the US’ and the Russian Federation’s share. Con-
cerning vulnerability scores, only Denmark scores above the median. The Russian
Federation and Finland score lowest, but generally, most countries score around
the median. This implies that they all face a medium climate change vulnerability
and all countries are rather symmetrical in their climate change vulnerability.
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5.3.6 Conclusions
Both scientific progress and political action on Arctic haze have evolved in differ-
ent stages. In the early years between 1975 and 1981, it was believed that Arctic
haze had natural sources from Asian deserts. It was therefore regarded as a pure
scientific matter that could hardly be influenced by human action. Its anthro-
pogenic nature was discovered between the mid 1980s to 1990, but in absence of
local emission sites, its origin remained enigmatic. This changed after the discov-
ery of long-range transport in the 1990s and with more accurate measurements
of chemical fingerprints which made it possible to trace back emissions to actual
sources and regions.
However, during this time period (roughly from 1985-1995), Arctic haze was as-
sumed to consist of mainly SO2, which was already regulated by the CLTRAP
and additional political action seemed obsolete as measurements showed decreas-
ing SO2 concentrations in the Arctic. This situation changed when researchers
brought the issue of black carbon in Arctic haze into the political debate. Even
though scientific research provided robust arguments for climatic effects of black
carbon in the Arctic, it remained unclear in which direction and to what magni-
tude temperatures would change due to Arctic haze. Two oppositional effects were
known and during this period and model calculations did not allow conclusions
about which effect would dominate, i.e. whether Arctic haze had a cooling or a
warming effect. As a consequence, political action was directed at furthering the
understanding of the actual effects from Arctic haze.
The most recent scientific advances still point out complications and knowledge
gaps, but they imply that Arctic haze overall has a warming effect on the Arctic
climate and therefore has the potential to accelerate global climate change through
breaking tipping points. Not surprisingly, political actors most recently called for
an exploration of coordinated political action to reduce black carbon emissions.
For that reason, Arctic Council members states agreed to set up an inventory to
measure black carbon emissions in the first place.
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The case of Arctic haze is informative and most suitable for this comparative case
study for several reasons. First of all, both the scientific process and the politi-
cal process involve a manageable time-span and amount of actors. This, on the
one hand, facilitates an in-depth understanding of both processes, and challenges
existing theoretical approaches to explain regime formation. The Arctic haze phe-
nomenon was studied and researched by a small, unified group of international
researchers, who were collaborating, publishing and exchanging at scientific con-
ferences over the whole period of time. They shared a similar understanding on the
issue and had access to the political arena as their research results were frequently
presented to political decision makers. The network can therefore be perceived
as a prototypical ‘epistemic community’ as Haas (1992a) defines it. Hence, a
knowledge-base approach would argue that these factors would highly facilitate a
regime formation process.
According to an interest-based approach, the structural factors of a limited number
of political decision-makers that, in principle, were committed to protecting the
Arctic environment by signing the Arctic environmental protection strategy would
speak (however weakly) in favor of a successful regime formation process according
to an interest-based approach. Both theoretical approaches would lead us to expect
an existing regime and it thus seems even more surprising that no such regime
exists.
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5.4 The Non-Regime on International Forest Pro-
tection
“If you chop a tree, you know what happens
to carbon - but what this is causing is largely
unknown”
Evelyn Trines Secretariat of the Framework
Convention on Climate Change
Protecting forests on a global scale has been on the agenda of international nego-
tiators for over two decades. But despite these efforts, a multilateral agreement
on forest protection is yet to be seen. More than once, governments, international
agencies and NGOs have demanded global action to protect forests in order to
avert climate change. Nevertheless, the nexus between deforestation and climate
change involves a rather long and scientifically uncertain causal chain. Especially
the relationship between a long-term increase in and a short-term albedo effect is
a complex one.
The series of political attempt and failure motivates the inclusion of the case in this
comparative study. The issue sparked high-level negotiations with the engagement
of various international agencies for decades without producing an outcome in the
form of a legally binding agreement. It is therefore a very prominent case of a
non-regime. The puzzle of a non-regime despite high-level political action and the
role of scientific uncertainty within this context adds additional explanatory value
to the comparative perspective of this study.
Though deforestation has multiple effects soil erosion, endangered species or in-
digenous peoples, this work exclusively focuses on deforestation in the context of
climate change. Climate change has been the most prominent issue that has so far
been addressed during negotiations on forest protection. The IPCC estimates that
around 17% of global CO2 emissions are caused by deforestation (IPCC, 2007c).
Even though several local effects from deforestation may appear to be more urgent,
climate change is the most prominent transboundary effect and therefore bears the
Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis – International Forest Protection 161
most prominent transnational collective-action-dilemma in the context of defor-
estation. For example, soil erosion in Brazil has no negative effect on Swedish
territory; melting ice-shield and glaciers as a result from global climate change
(to which deforestations contributes through the emission of CO2 (IPCC, 2007c))
however does. Therefore, the rationale for engaging in a multilateral agreement
on forest protection for countries like Sweden is climate change.
Additionally, the case study focuses on the time period between 1950 and 2005,
because most scientific advancement appeared within this period and, secondly,
because the time period covers the political efforts that were directed at negotiat-
ing an agreement on forest protection. This period, however, does not cover recent
political activities under the UN Program ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries’. The program supports
developing countries in their efforts to reduce domestic deforestation through fi-
nancial compensation. Arguably, REDD is the binding multilateral agreement
that derived from the political efforts on deforestation. Not including the process
towards REDD would seriously bias the case study. However, as this case study
must be regarded as a part of a bigger research project, including the political
process leading to REDD would go beyond the scope of this study. For rather
pragmatic reasons, political processes on an international level beyond 2005 are
excluded from this study.
Forests cover approximately 30% of the earth’s surface. The tropical rain forest
and the boreal forest make up for about 90% of global forests. 53% of all global
forests are used for commercial purposes (FAO, 2010). Forests provide multiple
services to humans and wildlife. They are a habitat for a huge and diverse flora
and fauna, they provide recreation facilities to humans, protect land and water
resources, improve air quality and mitigate climate change (FAO, 2005). Addition-
ally, forests are an important resource for raw material across multiple industry
sectors and a resource for energy (FAO, 2005). As “the earth’s lungs”, forests
catalyze CO2 into oxygen and sequestrate carbon.
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Although forest land is reduced through fires, draughts, storms and other natu-
ral phenomena, this work focuses on human activities that directly contribute to
deforestation for two reasons: First of all, according to the FAO (1990) report on
global forests, natural sources for deforestation are negligibly small and secondly,
only human activity can be addressed by political action. The term ‘deforesta-
tion’ hence refers in this work to the anthropogenic conversion of forest land into
non-forest land. This excludes human activities that indirectly decrease woodland
areas, such as the acidification of soil or toxic waste disposal.
This rather narrow definition of deforestation follows the official FAO definition
and reflects the political debates on anthropogenic deforestation (see section ??).
Forests are mainly reduced through commercial logging and the conversion of
forest land to farm-land for agricultural purposes (FAO, 2010). Conversion of
forest areas to farmland appears mainly in the tropical regions as boreal latitudes
are climatically unfitting for agricultural use.
On a global scale, an estimated 2-5% of forest is lost each year (FAO, 2010). As
a global political issue, deforestation is mainly discussed in the context of global
climate change (Gibbard et al., 2005). Two parameters impact on global average
temperatures: on the one hand, the reflectiveness (or albedo) of the earth’s surface
which influences the solar energy-budget. In simplification, high albedo leads to
more reflection of solar radiation and less absorption of solar energy on the surface
and hence – in general – less global warming. The higher surface albedo, the
lower are surface temperatures. On the other hand, ‘green-house gases’ (with CO2
among the most effective ones) determine how much solar energy is radiated back
to space through the atmosphere (see: IPCC (1990) :47). More simply put, a high
concentration of green house gases leads to an acceleration of global warming.
Forests interfere with both of these parameters. On the one hand, forests store
and sequestrate atmospheric carbon from CO2. Deforestation decreases the car-
bon sequestration capacity of forests on a global scale. Secondly, additional CO2
is released into the atmosphere through deforestation28. Forests also interfere
28The amount of CO2 released to the atmosphere, however, highly depends on the purpose of
deforestation. Burning wood to convert forestland into farmland or for heating purposes releases
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with surface albedo (Bala et al., 2007). They are, in general, more reflective than
grassland, deserts and most farmland. However, they are by far less reflective than
snow-fields (Bonan, 2008; Lee et al., 2011). Therefore, the sign and magnitude of
albedo-effect changes from deforestation highly depends on its location. Convert-
ing woodland into farmland might decrease albedo and therefore increase climate
change. Converting woodland into snow-fields has the opposite effect. Hence, de-
forestation does not have a single-lined effect on surface albedo. The albedo effect
of deforestation highly depends on the location.
Additionally, forests also effect the accumulation of vapor and clouds which changes
precipitation patterns. A change in precipitation pattern, in turn, indirectly
changes surface albedo at high latitudes. Less precipitation results in less snowfall
which reduces surface albedo and leads to an increase in temperatures. In tropical
latitudes, changes in precipitation patterns increase surface temperatures, There-
fore, in general, deforestation causes a net warming in low latitudes and a net
cooling in high latitudes (Gibbard et al., 2005). Within this system of interacting
effects, science is highly at odds as to what effect dominates the other.
The protection of global forests has raised political concerns, but these concerns
resulted in little political action. Even though FAO has emphasized the need for
an internationally coordinated forest policy as early as 1958 (FAO, 1958), the loss
of woodland areas has started to raise political concern on a transnational level for
the first time during the 1980s. The issue is marginally addressed by a number of
multilateral agreements such as the International Tropical Timber Trade Agree-
ment (ITTA), the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and the Convention to Combat Desertification
(CCD). However, none of theses agreements explicitly addresses the issue of defor-
estation. ITTA is regionally limited to tropical forests and promotes sustainable
timber trade, therefore addressing deforestation only indirectly. The UNFCCC
and the CBD follow the same direction. They both address the issue of deforesta-
tion, but do not contain legally binding instruments for forest protection nor do
most stored carbon into the atmosphere. Wood products (used for example in construction work
or furniture), on the other hand, often have a longer lifetime than trees in nature, since the wood
is purposely protected against weathering and other degradation processes
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they allocate resources to forest protection. Even though forests are considered
to be a crucial instrument to avoid desertification, the CCD has not included it
into its text. Additionally, implementation plans of the CCD are regional in scope
(Dimitrov, 2006, :101ff). A comprehensive multilateral agreement that explicitly
targets deforestation on a global scale is still missing, despite a long tradition of
negotiation rounds.
It seems puzzling that forest protection has been recognized by decision-makers,
has been repeatedly addressed within a number of international negotiations and
is partially included in a series of multilateral agreements, but a comprehensive
multilateral agreement that considers the issue in the context of climate change is
still missing. The theoretical argument presented in chapter 3 states that regime
formation depends on the interests of states. Furthermore, the argument states
that the formation of states interests highly depends on how states perceive the
issue. On transnational environmental issues, the perception of the issue is influ-
enced by scientific knowledge and some aspects remain – due to the complexity
of environmental issues – uncertain. The argument states that regime formation
depends on what aspect of an environmental issue remains uncertain. In the light
of the theoretical argument, we would expect that (a) the configuration of scien-
tific knowledge was obstructive, meaning that either costs were high while benefits
were uncertain, or costs were uncertain while benefits were considered to be low.
Or (b) that states were highly dissimilar in their perception of the issue. In either
case, we would expect that countries that supported international forests protec-
tion had a rather conducive profile and countries that opposed an international
environmental agreement had a rather obstructive profile.
5.4.1 Defining Costs, Benefits and Uncertainties on Inter-
national Forest Protection
Commercial logging and farmland conversion are the most important causes for
deforestation (FAO, 2010). Hence, an international agreement to protect forests
from deforestation would have to regulate both activities. Costs from regime
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formation were previously defined as direct economic costs from international reg-
ulation. The direct economic costs from regulations on commercial logging and
farmland conversion depends on the economic involvement of a country in these
activities.
Vulnerability from deforestation occurs from the loss of its services, such as wa-
ter and land protection. However, these effects are occur rather locally. They
are caused by local deforestation and can therefore be only an issue of domestic
policy, not an issue of international regulations. Nevertheless, deforestation has a
potential transboundary dimension in the context of climate change as local defor-
estation can contribute to global CO2 concentration which can accelerate climate
change. Hence, vulnerability in the context of a global agreement on deforestation
is regarded as vulnerability from climate change.
Both parameters – economic costs and vulnerability – can be affected by scientific
uncertainty. Concerning costs from an international agreement, states depend
on data on domestic logging and data on farmland conversion. Data on both
activities might not be available or difficult to assess. Especially data on illegal
logging and farmland conversion, which play a significant role in some regions,
might be hard to obtain. With vulnerability from deforestation, the causal link
between deforestation and climate change has been – and still is – heavily debated
as neither magnitude nor direction are perfectly clear.
5.4.2 Outline of the Case-Study
To retrace the scientific process and – at the same time – ensure comparability
across cases, this case study proceeds similarly to the previous case studies in
this work. As a first step, the scientific journals Nature and Science are scanned
for publications on deforestation. Both journals have been scanned for the key-
words deforestation between the years 1920 and 2014. Additionally, the keyword
deforestation has been searched in conjunction with climate change. As a result,
51 articles were identified as highly relevant to the issue. Additionally, as in
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the previous case-studies of this work, an citation analysis using ‘CiteSpace’ has
been performed to identify highly influential contributions to the body of scientific
knowledge across scientific journals. This resulted in additional 7 journal articles.
These publications were scanned for research themes and scientific uncertainty,
using qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2010) and applying the coding-sceme
on scientific uncertainty (see subsection 4.4.1.2). For an overview on the reviewed
scientific contributions, see the appendix.
In addition to the primary sources of scientific literature, the case-study includes
secondary literature and official assessment reports. Dimitrov (2006) published
a case-study on deforestation that reflects to some part the state of scientific
knowledge until the year 2001. Additionally, the UN Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization (FAO) periodically publishes assessment reports on the state of global
forests, which are included in this study.
Dimitrov (2005, 2006)’s publications and Humphreys (2006)’s book also serve as
a source to retrace political action on international forest protection. Apart from
that, international negotiations within several fora that have addressed the issue of
international forests since the 1992 forest principles have been covered in depth by
the Earths Negotiation Bulletin (ENB), a reporting service that summarizes the
process of different international negotiations to a certain topic, in this case forests.
The reports are a result of the observation of individual reporters that physically
participated at the negotiations. They reports reflect individual standpoints of
negotiators, highlights, dead-ends and break-throughs. Additionally, the United
Nations Forest Forum (UNFF) provides documentation on each session from the
three most important arenas in which forest issues were discussed. The following
sections rest on this body of literature.
Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis – International Forest Protection 167
5.4.3 Stages of Scientific Knowledge
5.4.3.1 Sources and Extent of Deforestation
The sources of deforestation as defined in the previous section are linked to clearly
observable human activity and have never been an issue of controversy. Re-
searchers agree that human activities account for the largest part of deforesta-
tion. These include commercial logging, farming, settlement programs and mining
(FAO, 1995). Both rates of deforestation and dominating sources and human ac-
tivities differ across regions. While the main cause for deforestation in Africa is
the conversion of forest areas into farmland, settlement schemes and hydroelectric
projects are the main cause for deforestation in South America. Deforestation in
Asia is caused by a mix of different factors (Dimitrov, 2006; FAO, 1995).
Before rates of deforestation or other changes in wood area could be assessed,
stocks on forestland had to be taken as a baseline measure. This proved to be
more difficult than one might have expected. Remoteness and the absence of
satellites plagued early efforts to estimate global forest land. In an early attempt,
Zon and Sparhawk (1923) developed a first comprehensive estimate on global forest
areas in 1923 which was developed further between 1928 and 1931 (FAO, 1948).
The International Institute of Agriculture in Rome (a predecessor of FAO) col-
lected information on domestic forests provided by national governments. The
data was summarized and published in 1946 by FAO as the first assessment on
global forests (FAO, 1948). The assessments, however, suffered from a lack of
reliable forest inventory information, which existed and continue to exist in many
countries. Additionally, commonly accepted definitions of some of the more im-
portant forestry terms were lacking. Hence, neither qualitative descriptions nor
quantitative estimates were unambiguously clear (FAO, 1948).
FAO continued its work and the first official assessment on global forests and
the extent of deforestation has been performed by FAO as early as 1953 (FAO,
1958). Inventory data was acquired through questionnaires answered by individ-
ual countries. This was the first attempt to globally estimate the true amount
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of forest land, and the inventory was repeated after a five-year period. But once
again, early efforts suffered from unclear definitions that changed over the report-
ing periods. Hence, national data and international assessment reports lacked
comparability and did not allow to account for changes in global forest lands.
The issue of non-uniform definitions continued over the years. It was not until
the FAO global assessment report in 1990 before changes in forest lands could
be assessed sufficiently (FAO, 1990). The report stated a yearly net forest loss
of 9.9 million hectares between 1980 and 1990 (FAO, 1990). An increasing loss
of 11.3 million hectares was reported in 1995, but the numbers declined in 2000
(9.4 million hectares), in 2005 (8.9 million hectares) and dropped to 5.2 million
hectares in 2010 (FAO, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010).
The reliability of FAO figures, however, has raised some concerns. Especially
estimates of changes in tropical rain forests produced large uncertainties since the
estimates of FAO did not correspond with satellite measurements (Achard et al.,
2002). Satellite measurements indicate that FAO figures overestimate global forest
loss. Despite doubts in their accuracy, FAO data is still the most reliable and most
comprehensive data on changes in forest land most accurately. It was frequently
referred to during international meetings on forest protection (Dimitrov, 2006,
:118).
Even though scholars had trouble to define and assess changes in forest areas,
improvements in methods led to a good picture of the actual loss of forest land.
This means that knowledge on the source and extent of deforestation was rather
certain after the FAO assessment in 1990. In the context of this study, this im-
plicates that countries had a good idea of how much forest area was lost annually
by logging and farming. Hence, states could estimate their individual cost from
internationally regulating deforestation.
5.4.3.2 Effects of Deforestation on Global Climate Change
Relevant effects from deforestation appear in the form of a loss of forest services,
such as a loss of resources for raw material or the protection of land and water.
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While most of these effects are local in nature, deforestation has a transbound-
ary dimension in the context of global climate change. In the mid 1970s, shortly
after Keeling (1970) published his ground-breaking findings on increasing CO2
concentrations in the atmosphere (Keeling curve), researches began to investigate
emissions and the fate of CO2. Since modeled CO2 emissions exceeded atmo-
spheric concentrations, scholars were puzzled by the “missing sink” for carbon
and researchers disagreed whether the sink was rather to be found in the ocean or
in terrestrial forests (Fan et al., 1998). Nevertheless, though it remained unclear
how much CO2 was absorbed by terrestrial forests, scholars began to investigate
deforestation as a potential source for atmospheric CO2. In an early attempt, Bolin
(1977) estimates total CO2 emissions from deforestation and suggests a strong in-
fluence form deforestation on the global carbon cycle29. His data indicated that
deforestation might contribute to an increase of atmospheric CO2.
In the 1980s, a small number of publications addressed the contribution of defor-
estation to CO2 concentrations with a focus on decreasing tropical forests. Wood-
well et al. (1983) published model-based results on the amount of carbon released
into the atmosphere due to deforestation of tropical rain forests; they already put
the result in the context of climate change. They found that – in contradiction
to previous publications – the fertilization effect of increasing CO2 concentrations
did not outbalance the CO2 emission effect from deforestation. They, however,
emphasize that their results should be interpreted with caution, as their empirical
data on deforestation was rather fragile.
During the 1990s, studies coupled newly acquired inventory data on forests with
models on carbon storage in wood and confirmed the hypothesis of tropical rainfor-
est as a significant carbon sink (Grace et al., 1995; Phillips et al., 1998; Wisniewski
et al., 1994). However, the estimates were model-based and lacked sufficient data.
For example, Shukla et al. (1990) note that it is “[. . . ]difficult to draw any definite
conclusions about the global effects of Amazon deforestation from this study.”
(Shukla et al., 1990, :1324). Despite the uncertainties, the work was picked up
29The carbon cycle describes the exchange of carbon between oceans, terrestrial land mass
and the atmosphere. For a comprehensive explanation, see for example: (IPCC, 2007c)
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by FAO’s assessment work in 1995 (FAO, 1995). And the IPCC (1996)-report
accounts that 23% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions are caused by deforestation.
The However, nearly every statement on deforestation in the IPCC report from
1996 emphasized how scarce data on deforestation is and how many mechanisms
are still poorly understood (Dimitrov, 2006, :119). During that time period, it
remained unclear whether the tropical rainforest is a sink or a source for atmo-
spheric CO2, as data and measurement instruments remained insufficient (Enting
et al., 1995).
The majority of research focused merely on tropical forests, neglecting the large
areas of boreal forests. Bonan et al. (1992) were among the first scholars to study
the effects of boreal forests on the global climate. Their model did not only
focus on carbon emissions from deforestation, but also included changes in surface
albedo as a result of changing boreal vegetation. They found that the removal
of boreal forest decreases surface temperatures since it increases snow fields with
high albedo. According to their study, this might outbalance the CO2-induced rise
of global mean temperatures.
The net effect from boreal deforestation, however, depends on the method, e.g. on
how forest is removed. While studies indicate that logging will create sustainable
snowfields with a high albedo, other studies indicate how burning boreal forests
can contribute to Arctic haze, which potentially contributes to climate change
(Randerson et al., 2006; Stocks et al., 1998).
Bala et al. (2007) have coupled a global carbon cycle with a climate model their
results have indicated that the albedo effect would overwhelm a CO2-induced
rise of global mean temperatures. Hence, according to their publication, global
deforestation would have a net cooling effect for the global climate. However, their
results are based on computer simulations which assume the highly unlikely case
of total global forest loss and neglect the mentioned differences in consequences
due to the method of deforestation.
During the 2000s, progress was made on estimating carbon stocks in forests. This
also allowed to estimate carbon flows between forests and the atmosphere. Newly
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developed models confirm that global forests are a net sink for carbon, despite de-
forestation. However, terrestrial CO2 uptake and its distribution remains an issue
of scientific debate. For example, (Stephens et al., 2007) show how previous re-
search has overestimated boreal sinks and has underestimated tropical sinks.
Besides estimating carbon stocks in forests, researches addressed the complex re-
lationship between carbon release, evaporative cooling and albedo enhancement in
the context of deforestation. While research so far focused on either tropical forests
or boreal forests, scientists recently have started to take a global perspective on
deforestation to assess the global net effects. Bonan (2008) provided an overview
on research on forests and climate change. He differentiated three different forest
types (tropical, temperate and boreal forests). Secondly, he compared each forest
type with the non-trees-scenario and showed how each type has a different effect
on carbon release, evaporative cooling and albedo. For tropical forests, the non-
tree-scenario shows an increase of atmospheric CO2 and a decrease of evaporative
cooling, while albedo change remains moderate. Similarly, the non-trees-scenario
for temperate forests shows higher CO2 concentration while albedo change is mod-
erate. Additionally, Bonan (2008) has emphasized that evaporative cooling is only
poorly understood for temperate forests. Boreal forest store less carbon, but the
non-trees-scenario shows a sharp increase in albedo values in case non-tree land in
the boreal region is assumed to be covered by snow.
Bonan (2008)’s study is a remarkable attempt to draw conclusions on the complex
role that forests and the removal of forests play. However, it also shows large gaps
in knowledge on deforestation: “The combined carbon cycle and biogeophysical
effect of tropical forests may cool global climate, but their resilience to drought,
their status as carbon sinks, interactions of fires, aerosols, and reactive gases with
climate, and the effects of small-scale deforestation on clouds and precipitation are
key unknowns. The climate forcing of boreal forests is less certain. Low surface
albedo may outweigh carbon sequestration so that boreal forests warm global
climate, but the net forcing from fire must also be considered, as well as effects
of disturbance and stand age on surface fluxes. The climate benefit of temperate
forests is most uncertain. Reforestation and afforestation may sequester carbon,
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but the albedo and evaporative forcing are moderate compared with other forests
and the evaporative influence is unclear. Much of our knowledge of forest influences
on climate, and our ability to inform climate change mitigation policy, comes
from models. Models of climate and the biosphere are abstractions of complex
physical, chemical, and biological processes in the Earth system. Extrapolation
of process-level understanding of ecosystem functioning gained from laboratory
experiments or site-specific field studies to large-scale climate models remains a
daunting challenge.”(Bonan, 2008, :1448-1449).
Deforestation has diverse effects on the global climate, depending on where and
how it occurs. Forests can either mitigate or accelerate climate change. On a
regional level, as well as on a global level, it remains highly unclear what effect
dominates the other. It is therefore impossible to draw unambiguous conclusion
about the effects of deforestation on climate change. Regarding the uncertainty
whether deforestation enhances or impedes global climate change, benefits in terms
of reduced vulnerability were and still are difficult to assess. In the light of the
argument, this means that benefits from regulation were uncertain to all involved
countries.
5.4.3.3 Summary: The Uncertain Consequences of Deforestation
The earliest attempts to estimate global forest lands in the 1950s were plagued by
a lack of sufficient methods and uniform definitions of what a forest actually is.
With repeated assessments by FAO methods improved, and data reported from
countries started to follow a uniform reporting protocol (Dimitrov, 2005). Even
though the questionnaire-based data on deforestation from FAO is not beyond any
doubt, it is still considered to be the most reliable source to determine deforestation
rates (Dimitrov, 2006, :112).
Concerning the effects of deforestation, scientific knowledge has made some progress
over the past decades, but is still highly uncertain on many issues. As disturbances
in the carbon cycle from anthropogenic CO2 emissions were assumed to influence
the global climate in the early 1980s, research mainly focused on the amount of
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carbon that was sequestrated in forests, especially tropical rain forests. It was
believed that deforestation would contribute to climate change through emitting
additional CO2. This view was, however, set in perspective as researchers sug-
gested that other forest-related mechanisms, such as evaporative cooling and sur-
face albedo, might outbalance the effects from CO2 emissions. Whether this is the
case still remains a matter of scientific debate, as mechanisms are complex and
interrelated.
Reviewing the scientific literature on deforestation revealed how knowledge on
the sources and the extent of deforestation became progressively more certain,
while knowledge on the effects of deforestation remained rather uncertain. Lev-
els of, and changes in scientific uncertainty become more obvious through the
application of the coding-scheme from section 4.4.1.2. In simplification, the cod-
ing scheme categorizes the level of scientific uncertainty according to the number
reasonable theoretical models to explain an issue (the higher the number of con-
tradicting explanatory models, the higher the scientific uncertainty) and the con-
gruence between model predictions and empirical testings. The coding is applied
to the previously identified relevant scientific contributions and presented in table
5.16.
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000
Sources and Extent ++ ++ + + - - - -
Negative Effects ++ ++ + + + +
Table 5.16: Level of Scientific Uncertainty concerning Deforestation over Time
and Scientific Theme
Uncertainty levels (see section 4.4.1.2: ++ = very high, + = high, % medium, - = low, - - very
low )
As table 5.16 implicates, states had a clear picture of how much deforestation was
actually proceeding. As this data was acquired through national questionnaires
and collected by FAO, states knew their annual loss in forest area through com-
mercial logging and farmland conversion. Hence, after the annual loss in forest
Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis – International Forest Protection 174
area became determinable in the early 1990s, states could assess their costs from
regulation with a sufficient degree of certainty.
5.4.4 Stages of Political Action Towards Regime Forma-
tion
The first multilateral initiative that addressed the protection of forests was the
regionally limited International Timber Agreement, which was negotiated in 1983.
Calls for a multilateral agreement on forest protection on a broader scope entered
the international agenda in 1990 at the 16th G8-summit in Houston, where par-
ticipating states officially declared that “[. . . ]we are ready to begin negotiations,
in the appropriate fora, as expeditiously as possible on a global forest convention
or agreement, which is needed to curb deforestation, protect biodiversity, stim-
ulate positive forestry actions, and address threats to the world’s forests.” (G8
Information Centre, 1990).
The idea was picked up by FAO, which introduced the issue at the preparatory
meetings to the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Devel-
opment (UNECD). However, even though including forest protection into the Rio
negotiations was supported by the U.S., Canada and some European nations, it
was dismissed due to reluctancy from developing nations like Malaysia and India,
who feared that such a treaty would just be in instrument of trade regulations
on timber and other wood products (Humphreys, 2006). As a compromise, par-
ticipants agreed on a set of legally non-binding forest principles that respect the
rights of sovereign states on the management of forest resources. Malaysia and
India blocked the inclusion of recommendations for a legally binding document in
the future (Dimitrov, 2006, :102-103).
The weak achievements from the Rio conference also frustrated participants from
national governments. As a response, officials from Canada and Malaysia initiated
a further series of meetings to facilitate dialogue and consolidation of approaches to
the management, conservation and sustainable development of the worlds forests
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within the founded Intergovernmental Working Group on Forests (IWGF), which
was founded in 1993 (Humphreys, 2006). The group included 32 key forest coun-
tries, such as Brazil, U.S.A., Indonesia, Finland, Sweden, and the Russian Feder-
ation, as well as IGOs and NGOs. The sessions were held between 1994 and 1995.
Officials mainly discussed appropriate criteria and indicators to assess forest man-
agement, an aspect that was also included into the final document. The Working
Group was explicitly set up as a non-negotiation forum (UN.CSD, 1995). The final
report contained a set of recommendations on how future assessments of national
forest areas should be conducted and stressed the importance of the development
of criteria and indicators. The Working Group agreed that the United Nations
Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) should organize the further
negotiating process and the concluding report was presented to UNCSD in late
1994 (IISD, 1995, :1-4).
The process continued in 1995 when countries established the Intergovernmental
Panel on Forests (IPF) during sessions of the UNCSD to foster an international
dialog on forest and to form the Inter-Agency Task Force on Forests (ITFF).
The task force included FAO, the World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, the International
Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) and the Secretariat of the Convention on
Biodiversity (Grayson, 1997).
Even though the IPF held four meetings between 1995 and 1997 and produced a list
of proposals for potential cooperation areas, participants did not agree on further
steps towards a multilateral agreement on the issue. The main obstacles were
the questions about what kind of agreement should be installed and whether an
agreement was needed at all. The creation of a new, comprehensive agreement on
global forest protection was merely one option among others under consideration
(Dimitrov, 2006, :105).
The negotiation process continued within the International Forum on Forests
(IFF), an additional forum which was established in 1997 at the UN General
Assembly. Mandate, structure and purpose of the IFF were similar to the IPF
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(Humphreys, 2006, :66). In parallel, the issue of creating a multilateral agree-
ment on global forest protection had been discussed during eight official meetings
at the UN General Assembly since 1992. However, national positions on the is-
sue remained unchanged with one group supporting a treaty and another group
opposing the treaty. Among the supporters were Canada, the Scandinavian coun-
tries, France, Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Malaysia, Turkey, South Africa,
Senegal and the Czech Republic. Treaty formation was opposed by the U.S.A.,
Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the U.K., Mexico, India, Indonesia and
China and several developing countries. Both groups contained industrial and de-
veloping countries, forest countries and non-forest countries, and countries with
tropical forests and boreal countries (Dimitrov, 2006, :106).
At the fourth and last session of the IFF in 2000, negotiators felt the pressure
of producing at least some form of outcome (Humphreys, 2006). However, after
long hours of negotiations, consensus could not be reached and the decision on
legal action on forest protection was postponed into the future (UN.ESC, 1999).
The IFF decided to create a permanent United Nations Forest Forum (UNFF) to
continue the dialog (UN, 2001). Furthermore, it was decided that UNFF would
evaluate the precess after five years and “[. . . ]consider with a view to recommend-
ing the parameters of a mandate for developing a legal framework on all types of
forests.”30 (Dimitrov, 2006, :108).
After its establishment, the UNFF met (and still meets) annually with the in-
tensions to consider the possibilities of legal action. However, many observers
consider the forum as “talking shop” or even “circus” that repeatedly produces
resolutions without any substantial outcome. The institution lacked a clear policy-
making or implementation mandate. Despite efforts to strengthen the UNFF as
an international institution by some participants, official statements from meet-
ings are nothing more than declarations of intends and recommendations. The
report from the latest session in 2013 merely summarizes national activities on
non-legally binding instruments on all types of forests.
30NGOs named the paragraph the “Monthy Python paragraph”.
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While progress within the UNFF stagnated, the issue of forest protection popped
up again in 2005 in the context of the UNFCCC. The proposal from Papua-
Neuguinea and Costa Rica aimed at installing incentives for developing countries
to mitigate deforestation through compensational payments.
5.4.5 Summary: Political Action and Lip Service on the
Protection of Global Forests
Political efforts towards transnational forest protection have been described as
“[. . . ]a series of loudly trumpeted non-events” (Westoby, 1989). And, in fact, the
output of a high-level negotiation process that has been proceeding since 1990 is
surprisingly small. So far, protagonists have produced a number of declarations
of intent and some non-binding agreements concerning forest protection. The
UNFF describes the outcomes of deliberations within the IPF and IFF as follows:
“One of the most important legacies of the IPF/IFF process is the wide-ranging
set of approximately 270 proposals for action [. . . ]. These proposals provide gov-
ernments, international organizations, private sector entities and all other major
groups guidance on how to further develop, implement and coordinate national
and international policies on sustainable forest management.” This seems even
more surprising considering that the negotiation process was institutionalized at
an early stage with the involvement and support of several international agen-
cies. The issue was negotiated over two decades and the UN provided several
sub-institutions which provided resources to involve in serious and meaningful de-
liberations on international forest protection. Therefore, the circumstances under
which multilateral forest protection has been discussed were rather favorable. The
issue did not just quietly disappear from the international agenda, nor was it
intentionally liquidated by its opponents. It is continuously discussed in an inter-
national forum that was designed for the sole purpose of elaborating policy options
for international forest protection. Nevertheless, ever since the first attempt to put
international forest protection on the international agenda in 1992, states refused
to produce a legally binding multilateral agreement.
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Early efforts on multilateral cooperation aimed at standardizing research methods
and assessments procedures. This fits the expectations from the theoretical ar-
gument which states that countries call for coordinated research when both costs
and benefits are uncertain. However, the argument furthermore states that regime
formation becomes more likely if costs are low and benefits are uncertain. This
part of the argument is to be tested in the next sections when not only the level
of uncertainty, but the actual level of individual costs and vulnerability are oper-
ationalized and the relevant data is acquired.
5.4.6 Costs, Benefits and Uncertainties of International
Forest Protection
It has been argued that the main rationale for installing international regulation
against deforestation is averting global climate change. National deforestation
can cause a rise in global temperatures since forests contain and sequestrate large
amounts of carbon and filter the greenhouse gas CO2. But despite a variety of
political efforts regarding international forest protection, a legally binding mul-
tilateral agreement on this issue is still absent. Therefore, the hypothesis from
chapter 3 leads to the expectation that the scientific profile was obstructive and
the configuration of costs, benefits and uncertainty turned actors into draggers.
According to the hypothesis, if costs were definitely high whereas benefits are un-
certain, states anticipate to realize in the best case high benefits at high costs or
in the worst case low benefits at high costs. If costs are uncertain while benefits
are definitely low, states can anticipate that they will benefit very little at – in the
worst case – high costs. The purpose of this subsection is to operationalize costs,
benefits and uncertainty for the case of deforestation. This is, in a second step,
tested against empirical data.
Costs are conceptualized as direct costs from international regulation. Two eco-
nomically relevant activities are associated with deforestation: Commercial log-
ging and farmland conversion. Relying exclusively on data on commercial logging
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would neglect the relevant factor of farmland conversion. Data on farmland con-
version, on the other hand, is scarce. A meaningful operationalization, however,
has to capture commercial logging and farmland conversion. As both activities
lead to an increase in CO2 emissions, this study relies on individual country based
data on net CO2 emissions from forest removal. Emission data, however, does not
allow to conclude about the direct economic costs from international regulation,
since emission data does not capture the relevance of deforestation for a countries’
economy. Therefore, emission data is set in relation to GNP per capita. This has
the additional advantage that emission data and GNP is set into relation to the
population size of a country to enhance comparability between countries and over
time.
The proxy has the merit that, on the one hand, it captures the effects from both
deforestation activities and, on the other hand, the proxy is directly related to
the negative effects from deforestation. Emission data is obtained from FAOstat
(www.faostat.fao.org). The institution calculates CO2 emissions that directly re-
sult from the loss of forest land. Data on GNP/capita is obtained from World
Bank statistics. Emissions are measured in gigagrams, GNP is measured in US-
Dollar. In some countries, despite commercial logging and farmland conversion,
the re-growth of forests dominates deforestation. This is represented by “negative
emissions”.
Throughout this work, benefits have been conceptualized as “reduced vulnerabil-
ity”. It has been argued in the previous section that climate change has been
discussed as the most significant negative transboundary externality from defor-
estation within international negotiations on forest. Hence, vulnerability is mea-
sured through the “Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index” (ND-GAIN). The index
combines a range of indicators on exposure, sensitivity and ability to cope with the
effects from global climate change and ranks countries from 0 (low vulnerability)
to 70 (high vulnerability). However, as outlined in previous sections, the causal
chain between deforestation and climate change is rather weak. While it seems
scientifically established that deforestation has an effect on global climate change,
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it remains unclear in which direction the effect yields. The involved scientific un-
certainty, therefore, not only concerns the degree to which deforestation might
lead to enhanced climate change. Scientific uncertainty rather raises the paradox
question whether deforestation could be – at least in some areas – even desirable
to abate global climate change31. In the light of such fundamental uncertainty,
a measure for “vulnerability” rather forms a band that ranges from zero to the
individual vulnerability score, since individual climate change vulnerability might
not be reduced through the international regulation of global deforestation (see
table 5.17). This does not imply that the overall vulnerability of a country can
take the value 0, but that their vulnerability to deforestation might take the value
0.
Data is collected for the year 1994 when multilateral discussions on international
forest protection were initiated – and for the year 2010 when the so far last negoti-
ation round took place at UNFF. Data for individual states’ emissions and climate
change vulnerability is presented for 1994 and 2010 in table 5.17.
At first glance, the vast majority of participating countries shared a conducive
configuration. This counts for both 1994 and 2010. Only a few changes are
observable during the two years. In the light of this data, it seems even more
puzzling that participating countries did not reach an international agreement on
global forest protection. However, a more detailed look at data as provided in table
5.17 reveals that – despite scientific uncertainty – most states could anticipate
that their vulnerability was zero if deforestation did not contribute to climate
change or – even if deforestation contributed to climate change – their individual
vulnerability was still rather low. A comparison between the two years also reveals
that vulnerability decreased over that period of time for most countries (except
for Japan and the U.K.).
A more detailed look at data changes the categorization for 1994 and shows that
most countries were rather in between than definite pushers. Data also shows
31In fact, removing trees from snow-covered surface is repeatedly discussed as an instrument of
artificially manipulating the earth’s solar budget through – so-called solar radiation management
– to employ a “quick fix” for climate change (Shepherd, 2009)
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that seven countries (Brazil, Malaysia, China, Indonesia, South Africa, India and
Senegal) show vulnerability scores that classify them as vulnerable32. Among this
group, Brazil and Indonesia show high emissions and would therefore face high
costs from international regulation, meaning that these two countries have rather
an “in between” configuration of high costs and potentially high vulnerability. This
leaves a relatively small group of pushers (Senegal, India, South Africa, China and
Malaysia).
In 2010, some countries had turned from heavy emitters to mild emitters (Brazil)
or even from positive emissions to negative emissions (The Russian Federation).
The opposite development is also observable: Countries with negative emissions
(China and India) heavily increased their emissions. A comparison between both
years shows that – in general – the vulnerability score decreased, meaning that all
engaged countries (except Japan and the U.K.) became less vulnerable towards
global climate change. This furthermore reduces the group of pushers to South
Africa, India and Senegal.
While some of the predicted pushers were actually among the group of supporters
(Senegal, South Africa, and Malaysia), China and India do not fit the predictions,
as they were categorized as “pushers” according to their emission data and vul-
nerability score, but actually blocked negotiations. Secondly, while Indonesia’s
blockage fits the categorization, a shift in Brazil’s policy position would have been
expected, but is not observable. Countries with an “in between” profile were nearly
split evenly among both groups.
5.4.7 Conclusions
The results from the empirical analysis are not easily and clearly interpretable.
Retracing the scientific process revealed that in the early 1950s, researchers had
trouble to account for the actual amount of forestland and forest loss. This changed
as FAO installed an assessment process with a unified definition of forestland,
32According to the ND-GAIN methodology, a country that shows a vulnerability score above
33 counts as vulnerable.
Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis – International Forest Protection 183
standardized processes on how to account for forest land, and data from national
official agencies. Though the reliability of FAO data is still under debate, countries
were able to compare and assess global forest loss. However, the effects of global
forest loss are still scientifically uncertain. One reason for that is the diverse
geographic focus of research on forests. Since most research focused either on
tropical forests or on boreal forests, it was impossible to draw general conclusions
on the effects of deforestation until the 1990s. The first publications with a broader
perspective found that mechanisms are highly interlinked and that it is hard to
tell which mechanism dominates, especially since mechanisms vary geographically.
Therefore, states still have trouble to assess whether deforestation contributes or
slows down global climate change.
At first glance, the hypotheses33 formulated in chapter 3 offer a straightforward
explanation for the stagnation of negotiations: The majority of participating coun-
tries anticipated that they would draw only little benefits from an international
agreement, even though costs would be low as well. At the same time, a group of
countries that is heavily involved economically in deforestation and faces uncer-
tain can be expected to oppose efforts toward regime formation. Hence, the small
coalition of pushers were not able to turn the “in between” or “obstructive” con-
figuration of other participating states into a more favorable configuration.
Nevertheless, some aspects cannot be fully explained by the hypotheses. Espe-
cially the formation of supporting and opposing coalitions do not match the ex-
pectations. Why did countries like India and China that show a clear “pusher”
configuration not support a treaty? Why did many countries that show an “in
between” configuration shift to either the supporting or the opposing coalition?
Why did policy positions of countries like Brazil or China not change, even though
their emission patterns changed? Alternative ad-hoc explanations might fill this
gap. For example, some supporting states regarded a treaty as an opportunity to
33H 1a: if the profile of scientific uncertainty is conducive, states are more likely to behave
as pushers and a regime formation process is more likely to be completed. H 1b: if the profile
of scientific uncertainty is obstructive, states are more likely to behave as draggers and a regime
formation process is more likely to stall. H 2: A successful regime formation process is more
likely if new scientific knowledge modifies the profile of scientic knowledge towards a pushing
profile.
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resolve some domestic factors. Within the Russian Federation, for example, forest
management lies within the legislation of the regional administration (Dimitrov,
2006, :106). An international treaty could shift this in favor of federal legislation.
Canada, Malaysia and many European countries hoped that a weak international
treaty could fend off domestic pressure for rigid protections or political benefits
on other related issues (Dimitrov, 2006, :106). The maneuver to push domestic
policies to an international level to gain influential leverage on the issue is ob-
servable in other international forums (for example EU politics). Conflicts with
other norms, such as free trade, were stressed by the U.S.A., who retrenched their
general willingness to support international commitments (Dimitrov, 2006).
Apart form domestic policies, asymmetry and distributional conflicts might ex-
plain the stagnation of negotiations. Barrett (2001)’s argument on asymmetry
declares that asymmetric states are unlikely to form and international regime,
unless asymmetry is resolved through incentives or coercion. The economic and
political resources to (using Barrett (2001)’s terms) “buy” cooperation of states
that had the strongest interests for international forest protection (Senegal, South
Africa, and Malaysia) was rather limited. This is also reflected by the observable
discussion on financial compensations. China stated that it would not generally
object an internaitonal treaty on forest protection, as long as financial mechanisms
were included for its implementation (Dimitrov, 2006, :107). At an IFF-meeting
in 2000, a speaker on behalf of developing countries stated that “We do not have
a principle objection to a treaty if the money is provided to implement it”.

Chapter 6
Findings and Conclusions
“The idea is like a pair of glasses on our nose
through which we see whatever we look at. It
never occurs to us to take them off.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical
Investigations
This study was motivated by an interest in how international environmental regimes
form under the condition of scientific uncertainty. More specifically, this research
was motivated by the puzzle why actors form environmental regimes on some
environmental issues while they fail to do so on other issues. Literature on en-
vironmental regimes explains regime formation either through common (or hege-
monic) interests to realize gains from cooperation or through consensually shared
knowledge on the issue at stake. This dissertation challenges both views.
Interest-based approaches assume rational actors that maximize their utility ac-
cording to their pay-off structures. However, on many environmental issues, the
underlying basis of knowledge to assess pay-offs from institutionalized cooperation
is fragile. How, then, can actors be driven by their individual pay-off structure
if they have trouble defining it? Interest-based approaches neglect scientific un-
certainty as a result of inconclusive or conflicting scientific findings. This limits
the applicability of interest-based approaches to a universe of cases without scien-
tific uncertainty, while, at the same time, more and more issues are characterized
187
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by scientific uncertainty. Knowledge-based approaches use a concept of uncer-
tainty that is more appropriate to environmental issues. The approaches theorize
that consensually shared scientific knowledge drives a regime formation process.
They, however, fall short in articulating a consistent theoretical framework. How
does knowledge transform into action? This question remains unanswered within
knowledge-based approaches.
This dissertation makes three key contributions to the study of international
regimes. First, this dissertation offers an innovative theoretical framework which
integrates scientific knowledge, scientific uncertainty and individual state inter-
ests. Previous research on scientific knowledge and regime formation draws a
direct causal link between scientific knowledge and regime formation. This leads
to a rather optimistic view on the influence of science and regime formation: A
better collaboration among international scientists (epistemic communities) leads
to a better scientific understanding of an issue which enhances the chances for suc-
cessful regime formation (Haas, 1992a). This line of argumentation is, however,
problematic in two ways: First, by focussing on the role of epistemic communi-
ties, it attributes explanatory power to agency (in this case scientists) rather than
scientific knowledge (Dimitrov, 2006). Within this theoretical tradition, regime
formation is not explained by scientific knowledge, but by the behavior of scientific
actors. Secondly, this argument presumes that an enhanced scientific understand-
ing automatically facilitates regime formation. There is no reason to believe that.
Advances in scientific knowledge can easily reveal insurmountable obstacles for in-
ternational cooperation that had not been recognized under scientific uncertainty,
or new scientific knowledge can reveal new blank spots in the understanding of an
issue.
In contrast to previous research, this study regards science not as a singular inde-
pendent variable. It is rather argued that the actual content of scientific findings
shapes individual state interests. This goes beyond Dimitrov (2006)’s suggestion
of disaggregating science into different sectors of knowledge. His empirical findings
suggest that, for successful regime formation, some sectors of knowledge have to be
known with certainty while states tolerate uncertainty on other sectors. However,
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he does not provide a compelling argument why states tolerate uncertainty on
some sectors of scientific knowledge, while they are less tolerant towards scientific
upon other sectors. This dissertation contributes to closing this gap by arguing
that different kinds of knowledge shape different aspects of state interests. In the
context of this dissertation, interests have been conceptualized as an aggregate of
costs and benefits. It has been argued that the likeliness of regime formation de-
pends on what aspect is affected by scientific uncertainty and what aspect is known
with certainty. More specifically, the dissertation argues that states are more likely
to tolerate uncertainty about possible benefits from cooperation, as long as costs
from cooperation remain low. Vice versa, the dissertation argues that states do
not form an international regime if costs are uncertain while benefits are low. This
leads to the three main hypotheses of this study:
H 1a: If the profile of scientific uncertainty is conducive, states are more likely
to behave as ‘pushers’ and a regime formation process is more likely to be com-
pleted.
H 1b: If the profile of scientific uncertainty is obstructive, states are more likely to
behave as ‘draggers’ and a regime formation process is more likely to stall.
H 2: A successful regime formation process is more likely if new scientific knowl-
edge modifies the profile of scientific knowledge towards a pushing profile.
The second major contribution of this dissertation is of conceptual nature. An
argument which regards science as a factor that shapes states’ interests provides
the unique opportunity to test more general arguments on the role of science
in politics. Many scholars suggest that scientific ideas influence political action
(Adler, 1992; Dimitrov, 2003; Farrell, 2006; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Haas,
1992a; Holtham and Hughes Hallett, 1987; Lieberman, 2002; Mitchell, 2006; Par-
sons, 2002). Investigating shifts in the scientific understanding of an issue from a
historical perspective allows to observe whether and how there is an influence on
political action. If scientific ideas are causally linked to political action, a chang-
ing scientific understanding should result in changing political action. Testing this
argument through retracing both the scientific process and the political process
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is the second innovative contribution of this study. This, however, requires a de-
tailed understanding of the scientific process. For that reason, this study has relied
on software-aided bibliographic methods to identify the most influential scientific
contributions.
Third, in addition to a historical within-case process tracing, the comparative de-
sign of this study includes the whole spectrum of the dependent variable (success-
ful and unsuccessful regime formations). This allows to draw more generalizable
conclusions on regime formation than previous single-n case studies offer. While
the advantages of including unsuccessful cases have been outlined by Dimitrov
et al. (2007), very few empirical studies have accounted for unsuccessful attempts
of regime formation. Examining conditions that lead to no cooperation allow to
furthermore test previous arguments about conditions that lead to cooperation.
Besides fostering our understanding on the factors that hamper regime formation
processes, this study contributes additional case studies on failed regime forma-
tion and thus enhances our understanding on the hows and whys of failed regime
formation.
6.1 The Cases – A Summary of Empirical Re-
sults
The theoretical argument makes distinct predictions about the conditions under
which an international regime forms and under which conditions such a process
fails. More specifically, the theoretical argument predicts that a specific occur-
rence of the independent variable (configuration of scientific knowledge) leads to
a specific occurrence of the dependent variable (regime formation process). The
analysis of this study aims at testing whether the theoretical predictions can be
observed in real world cases. The results of the analysis are briefly summarized in
this section.
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6.1.1 Case A: International Regulation of Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants (POPs)
The development of scientific knowledge on POPs can be divided into four phases.
The first phase begins with the industrialized production and large- scale use
of POPs (before 1960). The second phase between 1960 and 1985 is marked
by publications on possible negative effects of POPs. During the third phase
(between 1986 and 1995), atmospheric transboundary migration of POPs had
been discovered. Between 1996 and 2005, scientific knowledge on transboundary
migration patterns advanced.
As summarized in table 6.1, the independent variable in the POPs-case (config-
uration of scientific knowledge) has changed from a configuration where states
had no rationale to engage in international regulation, to a configuration that
was conducive in terms of international coordination of research, to a profile that
facilitated international regulation of POPs. The theoretical argument therefore
predicts for the first phase no political action on the international level. The ar-
gument predicts efforts to cooperate at an international level on research during
the second phase, and it predicts an international regime to form for the third and
fourth phase. As the summary shows, the political process followed the theoretical
predictions. No political action on the international level was observable in the
first phase. During the second phase, we can observe how states institutional-
ized the exchange of research efforts internationally. This also fits the theoretical
predictions. However, there is a deviation between theoretical predictions and
observation for the third face: While the configuration of scientific knowledge
had already been conducive during that period, no international regime had been
formed. This, however, simply represents a time-lag between scientific findings
and political reaction.
The case of POPs is of special informative value for the argument. First, it demon-
strates the ambivalent role of new scientific findings. While during the first phase
(before 1960) the scientific basis for POPs seemed to be established knowledge,
new scientific findings scrutinized previous believes on POPs between 1960 and
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Before 1960 1960 – 1985 1986 – 1995 1996 – 2006
Independent
Variable
Strongly ob-
structive
Conducive for
the coordination
of research
Conducive Conducive
Theoretical
Prediction
No regime ‘Research
regime’
Regime Regime
Dependent
Variable
No regime Coordination of
research
No regime Regime
Table 6.1: Summary of Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Observations
on POPs
“Independent Variable” summarizes the occurrence of the independent variable (scientific knowl-
edge) according to empirical observations. This leads to Theoretical Prediction on how the depen-
dent variable is expected to occur if the theoretical argument holds true. “Dependent Variable”
refers to empirical observations on the dependent variable (regime formation).
1985. New scientific knowledge did not reduce scientific uncertainty. On the con-
trary, new scientific findings increased scientific uncertainty. It has been argued
from a theoretical point of view how cognitivist assumptions about new scientific
knowledge are debatable. The empirical findings on the POPs case further fuel
this doubt.
Secondly, the case of POPs regulation is informative, since it confirms the hypothe-
ses of a general link between the configuration of scientific knowledge and regime
formation. No POPs regime had been formed under a configuration that was not
conducive. The case also confirms the hypothesis about the impact of changing
knowledge and regime formation. In particular, the effect of changing knowledge is
observable when new knowledge about transboundary migration patterns of POPs
have put the issue on the international agenda. A change of scientific knowledge
had triggered political action and had caused political decision makers to actively
push for international regulation.
However, the results of this case study have to be taken with some caution. The
theoretical argument predicts that political action results from scientific knowledge
that had changed the cost-benefit-configuration into a more conducive one. Nev-
ertheless, the analysis shows that scientific knowledge was not the only factor that
had an influence on the cost-benefit-configuration of states on the international
level. While scientific knowledge had triggered political action on the domestic
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level, as well as the international level, costs form international regulation had
decreased through political legislation on the domestic level prior to initiatives on
the international level. Additionally, the process-tracing of the scientific process
has shown how some POPs (especially pesticides) became more and more ineffec-
tive and therefore forfeited some of their economic value. Both mechanisms tend
to rival with the hypotheses of the theoretical argument and will be addressed in
greater detail in section 6.3.
6.1.2 Case B: The Regime on the Protection of the Strato-
spheric Ozone Layer
The case of stratospheric ozone depletion can be analytically divided into three
phases. Ozone depletion had been a concern between 1960 and 1972, but it had not
been associated with CFCs. This changed between 1974 and 1984 when researchers
had modeled CFCs induced ozone depletion. This knowledge had become more
and more consolidated in the third phase after 1986.
The summary in table 6.2 shows that states have had only little incentive to
internationally regulate CFCs-emission between 1960 and 1972, since CFCs had
not been considered to be connected with stratospheric ozone. In this case, the
theoretical argument predicts no political action at the international level, since
the main rationale for institutionalized cooperation – a transboundary dimension
of CFCs emissions – had not (yet) been discovered. The scientific understanding
of the issue changed after 1973, when CFCs had been found to be a potential cause
for a so far modeled, but not yet not measured, ozone depletion. It was quickly
realized that replacing aerosol CFCs was rather cost efficient, while replacing non-
aerosol CFCs was not. In the light of the argument, this implies that during said
time period, the configuration of scientific knowledge had changed to a conducive
one for aerosol CFCs, while it remained not conducive for other CFCs. Therefore,
the theoretical argument predicts that states were likely to form an international
regime to regulate aerosol CFCs, while they would hesitate to form an international
regime on other CFCs. After 1986 – the third period – advances in scientific
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knowledge showed ways to substitute non-aerosol CFCs as well. During the same
time period, knowledge on benefits from reducing CFCs emissions advanced and
the configuration changed to a strongly conducive configuration. Therefore, since
the anticipated costs for reducing CFCs emissions had decreased and benefits from
international regulation became more obvious, the theoretical argument predicts
that states form an international regime to reduce CFCs emissions.
Retracing the political process (dependent variable) shows that – as predicted
by theory – states did not take international action before scientific knowledge
suggested a link between CFCs emissions and ozone depletion. The first political
reactions are observable after 1974, the year the hypothesis on CFCs emissions
and ozone depletion was published. Some states began quickly to domestically
regulate the aerosol use of CFCs. Nevertheless, states did not take legal action on
an international level to regulate aerosol CFCs. This seems puzzling, since some
factors facilitated international regulation on aerosol CFCs: First of all, states
that had already implemented domestic regulations can be expected to push for
international regulation to avert comparative disadvantages. And, in fact, several
initiatives for international regulation by countries that had already regulated
aerosol CFCs are observable (Parson, 2003, :41). However, the initiatives failed to
overcome resistance by other countries, even though opposing countries showed a
similiar conducive cost-benefit-configuration. Secondly, cost-efficient substitutes
had already been developed, which decreased potential costs from international
regulation on aerosol CFCs. Therefore, the theoretical argument has trouble to
explain the ‘non regime’ on aerosol CFCs during the phase between 1974 and
1985.1
While emissions of neither aerosol CFCs nor non-aerosol CFCs were regulated
sufficiently at an international level between 1974 and 1985, countries have nego-
tiated and signed the ‘Vienna Convention’, an agreement with little commitments
to emission cuts, but with commitment regarding the continuation of the political
process and with commitments to exchange scientific information on CFCs and
1Parson (2003) offers an explanation by stating that the initiatives lacked institutionalization,
continuity and connections to international agencies (Parson, 2003, :43).
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1960 – 1973 1974 – 1985 After 1986
Independent Vari-
able
– Not conducive for
non-aerosol uses,
conducive for aerosol
uses
Strongly conducive
for all CFCs
Theoretical Pre-
diction
‘Research Regime’ Regime for aerosol
CFCs, no regime for
other CFCs
Regime for all uses
Dependent Vari-
able
Coordination of re-
search
No regime Regime
Table 6.2: Summary of Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Observations
on CFCs
“Independent Variable” summarizes the occurrence of the independent variable (scientific knowl-
edge) according to empirical observations. This leads to Theoretical Predictions on how the
dependent variable is expected to occur if the theoretical argument holds. “Dependent Variable”
refers to empirical observations on the dependent variable (regime formation)
stratospheric ozone. The Vienna Convention can therefore be regarded as a regime
on international research cooperation. This is surprising in the light of the argu-
ment, since the argument predicts international regulations (at least for aerosol
CFCs) with regard to the conducive configuration. However, retracing the actual
negotiation process shows that the level of knowledge differed across actors despite
a publicly accessible, internationalized body of scientific research. The negotia-
tion process towards the Vienna Convention shows how some delegates had a very
poor understanding of the issue. This explains why states opted for cooperation
on research rather then cutting CFCs emissions.
After 1986, political action moved towards the ‘Montreal Protocol’, which regu-
lated all uses of CFCs. This corresponds with theoretical predictions. During that
time period, research on CFCs had shown that (a) substitutes for CFCs were avail-
able for all uses of CFCs and (b) to what extent CFCs had to be cut to sufficiently
avert negative costs from regulation. Hence, at this point, scientific uncertainty
had been reduced and states were able to anticipate how they could realize benefits
through a multilateral agreement on CFCs. This turned the configuration into a
conducive one and – as expected by the theoretical argument – states formed an
international regime to collectively reduce CFCs emissions.
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Even though many empirical observations on the case fit predictions by the the-
oretical argument, the results have, yet again, to be taken with some caution.
Similar to the case of POPs, some states had implemented domestic regulation on
aerosol CFCs before they engaged in international politics. Among those were the
biggest producers of aerosol CFCs and the analysis shows that these states were
the strongest pushers for international regulation. Therefore, a decrease of costs
from international regulation has depended on previous national legislation rather
than changes in the scientific understanding of aerosol CFCs. This furthermore
raises the question of domestic policy making under scientific uncertainty.
Additionally, the case also shows how scientific knowledge “does not speak for it-
self”. Knowledge on substitutes for non-aerosol CFCs had been announced as early
as 1980 by the CFCs industry, but the message has been widely misunderstood.
In 1986, the same information had been presented by industry representatives, but
it was anticipated very differently by political decision makers. At this point, the
message that came across was that all CFCs could be replaced in a cost-efficient
manner (Parson, 2003). Whether business representatives had strategically framed
scientific facts in their favor or whether political decision makers just had too little
general knowledge on CFCs to comprehend the information in 1980 could not be
clarified in this study. However, the story shows that the way scientific knowledge
influences cost-benefit-configurations does not only depend on what information
is available, but how it is perceived by decision makers.
6.1.3 Case C: The Non-Regime on Arctic Haze
The case of Arctic haze has been divided into four different phases. While the
phenomenon of Arctic haze had been known since the early 1950s, it did not at-
tract much attention before 1975. Between 1975 and 1981, research intensified
and focused on a potential link between Arctic haze and soil acidification. Black
carbon, sources and migration patterns dominated the scientific debate between
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1981 and 1990. The thermal effects of black carbon in the Arctic occupied re-
searchers between 1991 and 2001. The debate was integrated into the discussion
on short-lived climate forcers after 2001.
As summarized in table 6.3, scientific knowledge did not indicate the need for
political action regarding the issue during the first phase, since there was no rea-
son to assume anthropogenic sources of Arctic haze. Therefore, the theoretical
argument predicts no political action to reduce Arctic haze. During the second
phase between 1975 and 1981, research showed that Arctic haze was an anthro-
pogenic phenomenon. However, many issues to determine costs and benefits from
collectively reducing Arctic haze were still highly uncertain. Consequently, the
theoretical argument predicts that states would be likely to institutionalize co-
operation on research to benefit from enhancing knowledge. The configuration
remained non-conducive between 1991 and 2000, since costs were regarded to be
high while benefits were highly uncertain. Therefore, the theoretical argument ex-
pects no regime formation. After 2001, scientific knowledge on the effects of Arctic
haze improved. New findings suggested that Arctic haze would, in fact, exhilarate
global climate change. Therefore, the theoretical argument predicts that a regime
formation that contains legally binding commitments on emission cuts of black
carbon is unlikely.
As expected by theoretical predictions, Arctic haze has not been a political issue
during the first phase before 1975. But the theoretical argument predicted that
states would begin to intensify and internationally coordinate their research after
the anthropogenic nature of Arctic haze had been discovered and after several
negative effects had been associated with it. This is, however, not observable
during the second and third phase. In the third phase after 1991, states signed the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and founded the Arctic Council in 1996
as a diplomatic forum to enhance cooperation on the Arctic environment. While
the political output of the Arctic Council is rather small, it has installed a very
productive research institution (AMAP), which has published research results on
Arctic haze. Since the mandate of the Arctic Council is primarily science-oriented,
it can be regarded as a research regime. Though an earlier formation of a research
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Before
1975
1975–1981 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2010 After 2010
Independent
Variable
– Not con-
ducive
Conducive
for the
coordination
of research
Not con-
ducive
Not con-
ducive
Not con-
ducive
Theoretical
Prediction
Research
Regime
Research
Regime
No Regime No Regime No Regime
Dependent
Variable
No Regime No Regime No Regime Research
Regime
No Regime No Regime
Table 6.3: Summary of Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Observations
on Arctic Haze
“Independent Variable” summarizes the occurrence of the independent variable (scientific knowl-
edge) according to empirical observations. This leads to Theoretical Predictions on how the
dependent variable is expected to occur if the theoretical argument holds true. “Dependent
Variable” refers to empirical observations on the dependent variable (regime formation).
regime has been predicted by the theoretical argument, it can be argued that
this is just a time-lag. During the last phase after 2001, no efforts to cuts black
carbon emissions are observable within the Arctic Council. However, changes
in the diplomatic language are observable. With the Nuuk declaration of 2011,
states have acknowledged the issue of Arctic haze and its significance for the global
climate and committed to take further action on the issue.
In the light of theoretical predictions and empirical observations, the case supports
the hypotheses. Furthermore, the case is a perfect example for the very different
policy implications that can be derived from different models. Especially before the
year 2006, two rivaling explanatory models on the effect of Arctic haze concluding
very oppositional effects. To mitigate climate change, one model has called for a
reduction of Arctic haze, while the other model called for the opposite action.
6.1.4 Case D: The Non-Regime on International Forest
Protection
The developments on global deforestation have been divided into three phases.
Before 1990, researchers assumed that forests played a crucial role in the global
carbon cycle, but struggled to exactly clarify its role and struggled to assess the
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extent of global deforestation. During the second period between 1991 and 2000,
estimating the extent of global deforestation was facilitated by technological ad-
vancements. However, the actual effects on climate remained uncertain. While
national inventories of deforestation made assessments on global deforestation even
more precise between 2001 and 2010, two oppositional mechanisms aggravated the
assessment of effects from deforestation.
Table 6.4 shows a configuration under which the theoretical argument predicts that
states coordinate their research efforts in a research regime during the first phase
(before 1990). During the second phase (1991 – 2000) costs have been perceived as
high and benefits were uncertain. Consequently, the theoretical argument predicts
no regime to form during this period of time. Knowledge on the extent of defor-
estation has been enhanced between 2001 and 2010 to a high level of accuracy.
However, the complex relationship between CO2, albedo and vaporization made
it difficult to assess actual benefits from regulating global deforestation. There-
fore, since benefits remained uncertain while costs from regulating deforestation
remained high, the theoretical argument predicts no regime formation.
In contrast to theoretical predictions, states did not form an explicit research
regime on global deforestation during the first phase. However, FAO had been
mandated to collect data and had published assessment reports on both extent
and effects of global deforestation. Even though the issue of regulating global
deforestation had been considered at an international level during the second phase
(between 1991 and 2000), no regime that explicitly regulates global deforestation
has been formed. The issue was debated within different international forums
and agencies to assess the need for international regulation. Even though this
process of scientific assessment and political deliberation continued over years, it
produced only very little substantial political output beyond declarations of intent.
Repeated declarations of intent without substantial political output continued over
the third period, and no regime had been formed.
In the light of the argument, political action generally fits theoretical predictions.
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Before 1990 1991 – 2000 2001 – 2010
Independent Vari-
able
Conducive for the
coordination of re-
search
Not conducive Not conducive
Theoretical Pre-
diction
‘Research Regime’ No Regime No Regime
Dependent Vari-
able
No Regime No Regime No Regime
Table 6.4: Summary of Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Observations
on Deforestation
“Independent Variable” summarizes the occurrence of the independent variable (scientific knowl-
edge) according to empirical observations. This leads to Theoretical Predictions on how the
dependent variable is expected to occur if the theoretical argument holds true. “Dependent
Variable” refers to empirical observations on the dependent variable (regime formation).
Even though states did not form a research regime during the predicted time pe-
riod, it can be argued that FAO served a similar purpose and produced sufficient
coordinated assessment reports. A research regime with an explicit focus on inter-
national forests would have been obsolete. Additionally, the various initiatives at
the international level to protect global forests after 1991 also had a coordinating
function and a mandate to enhance the scientific understanding of the issue (see
for example: UN.CSD (1995)).
Some aspects of the case, however, cannot be sufficiently explained by the the-
oretical argument. Most prominently, it seems puzzling why states continued to
engage in deliberations for an international regime on forest protection when such
discussions frequently failed to produce a political outcome that goes beyond rec-
ommendations and declarations of intent. Secondly, the hypotheses emphasizes
that states are more likely to become pushers if they face a conducive configu-
ration. The empirical process tracing, however, showed some deviations of the
predicted negotiation behavior, meaning that some states that faced a conducive
configuration did not support the formation of an international regime, and vice
versa. Additionally, policy positions of some states did not change even though a
change in the body of scientific knowledge would imply such changes.
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6.2 Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Find-
ings Within and Across Cases
The single case analysis has highlighted the developments on the independent
variable, as well as the developments on the dependent variable from a historical
perspective. One key finding from this perspective is that politics have responded
to science and regime formation has been influenced by scientific knowledge. The
second key finding of the within-case comparison is that different aspects of scien-
tific knowledge have spurred different kinds of political action. It has been argued
in this study that science changes the perception of highly technical issues which
require specialized expertise. It therefore changes the evaluation of policy options.
The single-case analysis shows how shifts in political positions have been induced
by scientific findings and hence supports this notion.
Both conclusions may seem trivial at first glance. However, the possible link
between scientific knowledge and political decision making is still controversial
among scholars of international regimes (Andersen, 2000; Haggard, 1987; Martin
and Simmons, 1998; Parson, 2003). With regard to this dispute within literature,
demonstrating an influence of science on politics and demonstrating how different
aspects of scientific knowledge trigger different political actions are necessary steps
towards the core argument of this study; to argue that a specific configuration
of scientific knowledge leads to a specific cooperative behavior requires credible
evidence that scientific knowledge actually influences political decision making
at all. Similarly, showing that different aspects of scientific knowledge impact
political decision-making differently is a requirement for arguing that a specific
configuration of scientific knowledge has an effect on the outcome.
While all four cases support these conclusions to some degree, the case of success-
ful regime formation on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the case of unsuccessful
regime formation on Arctic haze are especially suitable for demonstrating the
mechanism. Even though both phenomena as such had been known for many
years, the issues have not been considered as issues that require political action.
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With upcoming knowledge about negative effects, policy-makers felt the need to
act. Secondly, both issues have found their way on the international agenda after
scientific findings suggested a transboundary dimension. For example, in the be-
ginning, researchers assumed natural or local sources for Arctic haze. But by the
time scientific findings indicated far-distant anthropogenic sources and knowledge
on long-range transportation accumulated, political decision makers began to ap-
proach the issue at an international level. A similar development is observable for
the case of POPs, which were assumed to be a local issue before they had been
traced in far-off places and their complex transport patterns had been studied.
This indicates how changes in science impact political action which gives further
confidence in the argument that different aspects of knowledge have different im-
plications for political action.
While the single-case studies have confirmed the theorized link between scientific
knowledge and political action, the focus of the comparative perspective lies on
the theorized link between a specific configuration of scientific knowledge and the
outcome of an initiated regime formation process. The findings of the empirical
analysis across cases are summarized in table 6.5. The findings from the cross case
comparison are not as easily and clearly interpretable as the single-case studies.
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn with confidence. The results indicate
that regime formation processes which are marked by a conducive configuration are
more likely to result in a successful international regime. This conclusion is based
on the observation that both successful cases of regime formation have a conducive
configuration in common. However, the successful case of regime formation on
stratospheric ozone depletion is nuanced. The configuration of scientific knowledge
developed from a profile where both dimensions were uncertain to a conducive
profile for the sub-issue of aerosol CFCs and a non-conducive profile for the sub-
issue of non-aerosol CFCs. The configuration turned into a strongly conducive
configuration when scientific uncertainty was (more or less pragmatically) resolved.
Therefore, strictly speaking, with new findings ruling out remaining uncertainties,
the last phase of the CFC case actually drops out of the universe of cases for this
study. Even though the case shows how changes in scientific findings correspond
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with changes in policy positions, an argument about how states behave under the
condition of scientific uncertainty cannot be tested against the case.
Therefore, the case of POPs is more informative for drawing conclusions on suc-
cessful regime formation under the condition of scientific uncertainty. The case
shows how the configuration shifted from a strongly obstructive configuration to a
configuration where both costs and benefits were uncertain. During the last phase,
the configuration was transformed into a conducive configuration and states agreed
on forming an international regime despite substantial uncertainty about benefits.
These shifts are reflected by political action (see section 6.1.1).
The opposite effect – no regime under an obstructive configuration – is harder to
track from the comparative perspective due to a lack of empirical observations.
This study argues that successful regime formation is unlikely when costs are un-
certain and benefits are low. However, within the chosen sample of cases, this
specific configuration has not been observed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded
unambiguously from empirical data that an obstructive configuration as defined
in this study leads to a non-regime. Three arguments, however, give reason to
still have confidence in the hypothesis. First of all, while the ‘uncertain cost-
s/low benefits’ configuration has not been observed, there are observations for all
other configurations that are captured by the theoretical argument. The major-
ity of observations fit theoretical predictions. In the light of the configurations
for which observations are available, it can be concluded that (a) states did not
form a regime under obstructive conditions, (b) states only formed regimes under
conducive conditions, and (c) states coordinated research efforts under conditions
when both dimensions were uncertain. This implicates that, in general, an argu-
ment about a link between the configuration of scientific knowledge and regime
formation is supported. Thus, it seems plausible to argue (with some caution) that
it is unlikely for states to form an international regime under an obstructive costs
/ uncertain benefits configuration. Secondly, hypothesis 1b (regime formation is
unlikely under an obstructive configuration) has not been disconfirmed by empir-
ical findings. The hypothesis would have been disconfirmed by empirical evidence
if an international regime had been formed despite an obstructive configuration.
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As table 6.5 shows, this has not been the case in the cases under investigation.
Third, even under a configuration that was less obstructive than the described
configuration, states did not form an international regime. The high costs/uncer-
tain benefits configuration has been described as slightly more conducive than the
uncertain benefits/high costs configuration (see table 3.4), since there is a chance
for states to realize high benefits (even at high costs). In terms of regime forma-
tion, the configuration is not clearly conducive, nor is it clearly obstructive, but
it is definitely more conducive than the uncertain costs/low benefits configura-
tion. If states did not form an international regime under a high costs/uncertain
benefits configuration, it seems plausible to assume that they would not form an
international regime under a configuration that was even less conducive. Even
though these arguments partially restore confidence in the argument, it is unde-
niable that the lack of empirical observations decreases the causal (or internal)
validity of this study. Technically speaking, while the analysis confirms a link be-
tween “x” (configuration of scientific knowledge) and “y” (likeliness of successful
regime formation), the analysis has not been able to confirm that “non-x” leads to
“non-y”. This does not implicate that the theoretical argument has to be refuted
as a whole, which would only be the case if the empirical analysis had shown that
“x” also leads to “non-y”.
The single case analysis and the comparative perspective have shown what parts
of the argument could be tested against the empirical data of the selected cases
and what parts of the argument have been confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical
evidence. The empirical evidence suggests an influence of scientific knowledge
on political decision-making. Furthermore, the analysis has shown how different
aspects of scientific knowledge have caused different political reactions. However,
while empirical data has shown that states formed international regimes only under
conducive conditions, lacking observations do not allow to conclude the opposite
mechanism of an obstructive configuration leading to a stalling regime formation
process. Therefore, while hypothesis 1a and 2 were positively confirmed by this
study, hypothesis 1b could be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. The empirical
analysis indicates that scientific knowledge played a causal role in the regime
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formation process of the analyzed cases. It also indicates – as postulated by
the theoretical argument – that the actual content of scientific knowledge has an
influence on the likeliness of successful regime formation.
6.3 Alternative Explanations
The cases for this study have been selected to being as similar as possible to con-
trol for alternative explanations (George and Bennett, 2005; King et al., 1994;
Lijphart, 1975). However, even though the formulated selection criteria strength-
ens similarities across cases, perfect similarity is almost impossible to achieve and
rivaling explanations need to be addressed. Even though the empirical analysis
confirms (or at least does not contradict) the drawn hypotheses, the results have
to be interpreted with some caution, since the observed variance on the dependent
variable might be caused by other factors than the theoretical argument suggest.
Especially the influence of pre-existing domestic legislation, vested interests from
decision makers or interest groups on the scientific process, or an exploitation of
scientific uncertainty to pursue individual or national interests could account for
success or failure of a regime formation process.
6.3.1 Science and Interests
Throughout this study, the relationship between science and politics has been
treated as a one-way street where science informs political decision-makers and
scientific findings shape states’ interests. However, this relationship could easily
work the other way around where scientific findings and the way they are presented
are influenced by interests. In this context, at least three mechanisms seem pos-
sible. First of all, ambiguity caused by scientific uncertainty can be exploited in
different ways. Political decision-makers can hide their ‘true’ distributional inter-
ests behind a “veil of uncertainty” (Helm, 1998) to block international cooperation
by referring to uncertain science rather than a state’s own self-interest. Scientific
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uncertainty also allows political decision-makers to pick scientific findings that
speak in their favor to leverage their bargaining position.
Scientific uncertainty may facilitate the exertion of political power. In the ‘post-
structuralist’ tradition, researchers have analyzed how knowledge is shaped by
power and how it reproduces power (Dillon, 2013; Foucault, 2008; Gramsci, 1980).
In this tradition, knowledge is perceived as a socially constructed phenomenon
and is as such prone to being shaped by social factors. Researchers from natural
science would probably deny an influence of social factors on the ‘hard facts’ of
physics, math and chemistry. However, studies have shown that the interpretation
of scientific knowledge can indeed be influenced by power through a ‘prerogative of
interpretation’ (Blaikie, 1995; Oels, 2005; Wiertz, 2011). In the light of scientific
uncertainty, the range of possible interpretations generally becomes wider, which
offers the opportunity for actors to exert their power and to shape interpretations
of scientific findings in their favor. For this study, this means that the configuration
of costs and benefits was not purely science-based, but depended on how (powerful)
actors interpreted scientific findings.
Within a more positivist fashion, researchers have investigated the mechanisms
through which politics controls the production and transmission of scientific knowl-
edge (Clark, 2001; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002). To the largest extent, researchers
depend on politically controlled funding. Evidently, this can be a means to exert
influence on science and to shape scientific findings in one’s favor (Hegde, 2009).
For this study this would mean that political decision makers primarily funded
research projects from which they could expect to produce findings that correlate
with their interests.
The focus in this chapter has been on how political interests may shape science.
However, within the nexus of science and politics, political actors are not the
only stakeholders. Scientists and scientific institutions do not carry out research
in complete independence. As Underdal (2000) puts it, “There is no reason to
believe that the production of knowledge should be the only productive activity
in society that does not generate its own stakes for those involved.” (Underdal,
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2000, :5). As the producers of knowledge, scientists and scientific institutions
depend on funding and have to consider individual career paths. This does not
necessarily imply that researchers or research institutions deliberately bias their
research in favor of a certain outcome. However, actors in the scientific domain
have an interest in what topics make it on the scientific agenda and what topics
stay on the agenda (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1997). In environmental politics, the
most effective way to acquire funding for further research is to portray an issue
as potential threat (thus emphasizing the relevance of the issue) and at the same
time as highly uncertain (thus justifying the need for publicly funded research).
Through this mechanism, scientific institutions may overstate scientific uncertainty
to secure future funding2. This, of course, presumes at least some political control
over mainly publicly funded research institutions. In the light of this research,
this would mean researchers deliberately miss-communicate scientific findings to
political decision-makers in order to keep an issue on the political and scientific
agenda.
These considerations have shown how interests of political decision-makers can bias
scientific findings. While theoretically convincing, this thread of argumentation
neglects the true nature of scientific uncertainty. It has been argued that scientific
uncertainty prohibits the formulation of clear-cut utilities for states. Therefore,
even if decision-makers wanted to influence scientific findings, they would not
know in which direction to bias findings. It therefore seems implausible that
political interests are better suitable to explain the outcome of the dependent
variable. However, the considerations also argue that scientific actors influence
the process of knowledge-production. This presumes that scientific actors have a
bigger interest in retaining funding than in solving a potential environmental policy
dilemma. The analysis of the CFC case has shown that this can especially be the
case in privately funded research where industry-sponsered researchers deliberately
emphasized scientific uncertainty for economic reasons. The same case study has
shown an opposite effect where scientific actors deliberately underscored scientific
2This mechanism has empirically been investigated by Boehmer-Christiansen (1997).
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uncertainty to influence policy decisions. This shows how scientific actors can
exploit their prerogative of knowledge.
6.3.2 Compliance and the Choice of Policy Instruments
This study takes a rather simplistic view on regime formation. It merely focuses
on the formal aspect of regime formation and neglects the actual content of the
negotiation agenda. However, there is an argument that over what policy makers
are bargaining about influences the outcome of whether a regime is formed or not.
Between “business as usual” and “immediate emission reduction to zero”, there is
a whole range of possible policy instruments, such as emission caps, emission re-
duction to a certain threshold, phase-out, stop in production, stop of usage, stop of
trade, and so on. Different policy instruments have different implications in terms
of costs and benefits and may thus have an impact on states’ willingness to form
an international regime (Koremenos et al., 2001). The comparative perspective
of this study can, however, weaken causal claims of this alternative explanation.
If the choice of policy instruments had decisive influence on success or failure of
regime formation, negotiated policy instruments in both successful cases should be
similar. Vice versa, policy instruments in both unsuccessful cases of regime forma-
tion should be similar. However, the analysis of the successful regime formation
processes shows that both regimes installed different policy instruments. While
the Montreal Protocol obligates states to cut production, use and trade of CFCs
(Parson, 2003, :145), the LRTAP Protocol on POPs showed more flexibility in the
form of phase-outs and compromises on time-lines (Selin, 2000). Nevertheless, the
empirical analysis of both cases has also shown that the choice of the appropriate
policy instrument was a matter of discussion during negotiations. Therefore, a
general influence of policy instruments cannot be ruled out and the issue remains
on the research agenda for regime study.
A similar argument can be made about compliance mechanisms that are integrated
in an international regime. Since it has been argued in the theoretical argument
that one motive for forming an international regime is to ensure compliance, it
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can be theorized that the weaker the compliance mechanisms are, the more likely
states will agree to forming a regime. This follows the argument of “cheap talk” or
cheap diplomacy (Ramsay, 2011). However, the case of CFCs gives reason to doubt
this argument. The Montreal Protocol has broad membership, explicit emission
targets and a variety of mechanisms to ensure compliance, reaching from technical
assistance to warnings and even suspension from the treaty (Barratt-Brown, 1991).
Following an argument based on compliance, the Montreal Protocol would seem
implausible.
6.3.3 Domestic Politics
The dissertation follows a rather new and complex theoretical argument, which
was tested against four empirical cases from a historical perspective. The argu-
ments for a comparative case study that employs process tracing (see section 4.1)
instead of employing a more commonly used in regime analysis are convincingly
strong. However, for reasons of feasibility, this type of research design requires a
narrow scope. Therefore, the empirical analysis almost exclusively considers po-
litical action on the international level and neglects the domestic level in great
part. There is, however, a strong argument that regime formation is facilitated by
preexisting domestic legislation. Bottom up norm creation did so far not draw too
much attention within the study of international relations, but became a topic in
the study of international law (Levit, 2005). There are several reasons to attribute
alternative explanatory power to pre-existing domestic regulation.
First of all, pre-existing national legislation indicates that an issues has already
been recognized as an issue that deserves political reaction of some form. If states
have already installed legislation on the domestic level, the question on the in-
ternational level becomes a question of how to regulate it rather than whether
to regulate or not. Even if knowledge on a transboundary dimension was uncer-
tain, states would have an incentive to push for international regime formation
to level possible comparative (dis)advantages of non-regulating states. And in
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fact, the empirical analysis shows that pre-existing domestic legislation which de-
creased costs from international regulation is observable in both successful regime
formation processes while no issue-specific domestic legislation is observable in
the two regime formation processes that failed or stalled. It might therefore be
possible that preexisting national legislation might have more explanatory power
than the configuration of scientific knowledge. This points to the question of do-
mestic law-making under the condition of scientific uncertainty. If pre-existing
domestic legislation has an impact on international regime formation, the more
relevant question to ask would be how scientific uncertainty influences national
norm creation. It can be speculated how scientific uncertainty can more easily be
exploited by interest groups, such as NGOs or industry branches. For example, in
both successful cases of regime formation (POPs and stratospheric ozone) we can
observe strong engagement of civil society through NGOs or the media and in both
cases, a bias towards regulation despite scientific uncertainty is observable on the
domestic level. This mechanism certainly is a field for future policy analysis.
6.3.4 Evaluations
Some of the above mentioned alternative explanations are mitigated through the
methodological architecture of this study. Even though it was observable that
political decision-makers underpinned their policy positions with different scien-
tific findings, there is no evidence that policy makers have concealed their “true”
interests and exploited scientific uncertainty. This ties in with an argument that
has been already made in chapter 3: In the light of scientific uncertainty where
states (initially) not know if they gain or loose from institutionalized cooperation,
how can they determine their own interests? Consequentially, how can they pick
scientific findings that speak in their favor? A similar argument counts for a possi-
ble manipulation or filtering of scientific findings. Even if political decision-makers
intended to exert influence on how science is produced and communicated, how
should they decide what scientific results are favorable for their interests if scien-
tific uncertainty prohibits the articulation of unambiguous pay-offs? For example,
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in the light of conflicting models on the effects of Arctic haze, how should decision-
makers have decided on which model to prefer? In the context of this study, it
seems therefore implausible to assume that the interests of states shaped scientific
findings in the cases under investigation. This is reflected by the case-studies,
which do not imply that such a mechanism was at work.
A similar argument can be made about the exertion of power. If international
regimes were only epiphenomenal, hegemonic states have to have an idea in which
direction they need to exert their hegemonic power. Additionally, the absence of
a clear hegemonic states during the time-span speaks against a power-based ex-
planation for success and failure of regime formation. It can be argued that the
U.S.A. might not have been a hegemonic state, but a state with sufficient means
of power to direct a regime formation process towards a certain direction. How-
ever, empirical evidence collected in this study does not support this notion. For
example, regime formation on deforestation was heavily pushed by the U.S.A., but
was blocked by developing countries (Dimitrov, 2006, :161). Therefore, uncertain
pay-offs and empirical evidence weaken the explanatory leverage of power. While
it is certainly plausible that the content of possible policy options has an influence
on the outcome of regime negotiations, the dissimilarities between policy instru-
ments across cases that show the same outcome speak against this alternative
explanation.
The strongest rivaling alternative explanation remains pre-existing domestic pol-
icy. From a theoretical point of view, it seems intuitive that states are more in-
clined to form an international regime on issues that they have already regulated
themselves. Empirically, this view is partially supported from the comparative
perspective. The majority of involved states has already implemented some form
of domestic policy to regulate POPs and CFCs. This has not been the case with
Arctic haze and global deforestation. The formation of public opinion on issues
that are marked by scientific uncertainty and its effect on national and interna-
tional norm creation are an urgent research agenda that deserves further attention.
While the empirical analysis confirms the hypotheses in general, the possible effect
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from domestic policy needs to be studied to consolidate or scrutinize the results
of this study.
6.4 Implications for Research, Policy and Inter-
national Law
This study has confirmed and strengthened conclusions from previous research
on a causal relationship between science and politics. However, this study has
also shown that this relationship seems to be more sophisticated than it has been
assumed by previous research. This work has focused on the puzzle why states
form environmental regimes on some issue while they fail on other issues. The
theoretical and empirical evidence implies that shortcomings in explaining this
puzzle are partially caused by a too simplified concept of either knowledge or
interests. This means for researchers on international regimes that considerations
on what was known at what point in time and what this knowledge implied for
political action offers explanatory power to this puzzle.
These implications are, however, not exclusively reserved for the formation of
international environmental regimes. The implications can easily be transferred
to other fields of policy-making, either on a national or an international level.
Put simply, scientific uncertainty in international environmental policy has been
pictured as a situation where different plausible scientific models predict different
outcomes from political action. This phenomenon can be found in many other
fields as well. Agricultural politics, central bank decisions and macroeconomic
policy are only some of the many fields that come to mind which are possibly
prone to scientific uncertainty. Introducing scientific uncertainty into the research
on this field offers a more detailed view on factors that influence cooperative
behavior through international institutions.
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This has important implications for policy-making. The ignorance of scientific
uncertainty can lead to suboptimal policy choices. Unfortunatly, there is no suit-
able “rule of thumb” on how to do politics under scientific uncertainty. The often
hailed and praised precautionary principle3, for example, has to be considered with
caution. The principle calls for political action despite scientific uncertainty. How-
ever, the empirical analysis has shown that political action in the light of scientific
uncertainty could lead to the opposite of the intended outcome. This is illustrated
in particular by the case of Arctic haze, where the precautionary principle could
have been referred to in order to increase black carbon emissions at an early stage
of research.
Newly emerging issues of global governance, such as climate engineering, face a
similar dilemma. This emerging technology is designed to avert increasing tem-
peratures from climate change, but it is burdened with high scientific uncertainty
about unintended side-effects. Possible side-effects may comprise unwanted re-
sponses from nature, such as changes in precipitation patterns, as well as unwanted
social responses, such as a further delay of CO2 emission cuts (Shepherd, 2009).
In the light of increasing average temperatures, the precautionary principle tends
to argue in favor of the implementation of climate engineering measures. However,
the technology itself could cause damages comparable to possible damages from
climate change.
These examples show a dilemma which is hard to resolve. On the one hand, delay-
ing political choices could lead to negative environmental effects that might even
be irreversible. On the other hand, insufficiently informed policy choices could
lead to a situation that leaves stakeholders in a similar or even worse situation,
in terms of irreversible environmental effects. It is therefore advisable for policy-
makers to consider scientific findings and their implications more closely before
deciding on issues that are still marked by scientific uncertainty. More specifi-
cally, decision-makers should be aware of the tentativeness of scientific research on
3Principle 15, Rio Declaration of the United Nations: “Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
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complex systems and take into consideration that the current state of knowledge
might be misleading.
6.5 Agenda for Future Research
This research has demonstrated how scientific knowledge can change the perspec-
tive of policymakers on an issue. Moreover, it revealed three areas where future
research seems most promising. The most urgent area has already been mentioned:
A further investigation of additional environmental regimes is certainly fruitful to
see if the argument is confirmed by other cases than the selected ones. Further-
more, additional data on the mechanism on how scientific findings shape state
interests would increase the robustness of the findings. Especially data on the
perception of stakeholders from science and from politics seems fruitful to further
investigate whether the suggested mechanism is at work. This would contribute
to answering the question on how knowledge is transformed into action.
Secondly, this study has built upon the still standing research agenda on failed
attempts of regime formation. Dimitrov et al. (2007) offer convincing arguments
why a focus on failure offers additional insights for regime study in general. This
study offers additional explanations for the failure of regime formation. However,
much work is still to be done in conceptualizing failed regime formation to more
easily identify failed regime formation attempts.
Third, while regime study has progressed over decades now, it would profit from
a shift from single case studies or small-n comparative case studies towards a
more comprehensive comparative perspective. The international regime data base
(Breitmeier et al., 2006) is a good start into the right direction and should be
pursued by the field. This would also allow to test the interplay between some
hypothesized variables more carefully.
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Country Year Source
Austria 1992 Smith and Smith (2009)
Canada 1972 Pham et al. (1996)
Croatia 1973 Gajski et al. (2012)
Cyprus no data available
Czech Republic 1974 Bernek (2005)
Denmark 1984 Schmidt (2001)
Estonia 1964 Roots et al. (2008)
Finland 1977 Wickstro¨m et al. (1983)
France 1973 Lemarchand et al. (2007)
Germany 1974 Frank et al. (2007)
Greece 1972 Goutner et al. (1997)
Hungary 1969 UNEP (1996)
Iceland Never in use
Ireland 1985 UNEP (1996)
Italy 1978 Dommarco et al. (1987)
Latvia 1968 UNEP (1996)
Lichtenstein no data available
Lithuania 1970 Petraitis et al. (2013)
Luxembourg 1988 Pacyna et al. (2003)
Macedonia 1982 Veljanoska-Sarafiloska et al. (2013)
Moldova no data available
Netherlands 1968 Opdam et al. (1987)
Norway 1970 Kveseth et al. (1979)
Poland 1989 Ludwicki and Go´ralczyk (1994)
Portugal no data available
Romania 1987 Covaci et al. (2001)
Slovakia 1974 Petrik et al. (2006)
Spain 1972 Hernandez et al. (1986)
Sweden 1969 Olsson and Reuterg˚ardh (1986)
Switzerland 1972 Bogdal et al. (2008)
Ukraine 1994 Kuznyetsov (2008)
UK 1984 Dryzek et al. (2003)
USA 1972 (Hinck et al., 2009)
Table 7.1: Domestic Regulation of DDT
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Country Year Source
Austria no data available
Bulgaria 1980s Dimitrova et al. (2011)
Canada 1977 Ross (2006)
Croatia no data available
Cyprus 1987 Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance
(2007)
Czech Republic 1979 Pulkrabova´ et al. (2009)
Denmark 1986 UNEP (2013)
Estonia 1999 UNEP (2013)
Finland 1998 UNEP (2013)
France 1987 Brucker-Davis et al. (2008)
Germany 1972 UNEP (2013)
Greece 1970s Konstantinou et al. (2000)
Hungary 1979s Soha´r and Domoki (2001)
Iceland no data available
Ireland no data availlable
Italy 1970s Naso et al. (2005)
Latvia 2002 www.pops.int
Lichtenstein no data available
Lithuania 1999 UNEP (2013)
Luxembourg no data available
Macedonia no data availble
Moldova no data available
Netherlands 1970s Canters and De Snoo (1993)
Norway 1981 Marthinsen et al. (1991)
Poland 1996 UNEP (2013)
Portugal no data available
Romania no data available
Slovakia 1980s Petrik et al. (2006)
Spain 1976 Arrebola et al. (2010)
Sweden 1986 UNEP (2013)
Switzerland 1986 Zennegg et al. (2013)
Ukraine
UK 1981 Law et al. (2010)
USA 1977 Hartmann et al. (2005)
Table 7.2: Domestic Regulation of PCBs
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Country PCBs-
Emissions
in 1970
PCBs-
Emissions
in 1996
∆PCB(t)
1970 – 1996
Year of
Regulation
Armenia n/a n/a n/a n/a
Austria 38010 1368 - 36607 n/a
Bulgaria 186 518 +332 1980s
Canada n/a n/a n/a 1977
Croatia n/a n/a n/a n/a
Cyprus n/a n/a n/a 1987
Czech Repub-
lic
507 762 +259 1979
Denmark 24971 1026 - 23945 1986
Estonia 86 135 +49 1999
(www.pops.int)
Finland 23451 2721 - 20730 1998
France 258091 2037 - 237744 1987
Germany 402160 42462 - 359698 1972
Greece 17936 221 - 17715 1970s
Hungary 180 554 +374 1970s
Iceland n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ireland 6013 77 - 5936 n/a
Italy 270757 6054 - 264703 1970s
Latvia 28 126 +98 2002
Lichtenstein n/a n/a n/ n/a
Lithuania 24 178 +154 1999
Luxembourg 2060 127 - 1933 n/a
Macedonia n/a n/a n/a n/a
Moldova 22 206 +184 n/a
Netherlands 65823 250 - 565573 1970s
Norway 19598 408 - 19190 1981
Poland 637 2374 +1737 1996
Portugal 18171 557 - 17614 n/a
Romania 194 1218 +11024 n/a
Russian Fed-
eration
2094 8072 +5978 1992
Slovakia n/a n/a n/a 1980s
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a
Spain 170541 8721 - 161820 1976
Sweden 41163 2022 - 39141 1986
Switzerland n/a n/a n/a 1986
Ukraine 1181 3043 +1862 1986
UK 282443 3706 - 278737 1981
USA 114000 0 - 114000 1 1977
SUM 2308834 119121 - 2189713
Table 7.3: Change in PCBs Emissions between 1970 and 1996 in Signatory
States and Russia
Emission Data predominantly rests on the following sources: Breivik et al. (2004); Pacyna et al.
(2003); Pacyna (1999).
Title  Author Year Journal Citations
Site of Action of D.D.T. and Cause of Death after Acute D.D.T. Poisoning  D.Dresden 1948 Nature 10
Susceptibility of DDT‐resistant Houseflies to Other Insecticidal Sprays  H. Wilson 1948 Science 17
Persistence of D.D.T. and Benzene Hexachloride in Soil  Smith 1948 Nature 22
Effect of Cooking on the DDT Content of Beef B. CARTER 1948 Science 22
A Theory of Herbicidal Action A. Crafts 1948 Science 32
Development of a Strain of Houseflies Resistant to DDT A. Linquist 1948 Science 38
Reversible Action of D.D.T.  H. Hurst 1949 Nature 13
D.D.T.‐Resistance in Houseflies in Denmark  J. Keiding 1949 Nature 15
Lepidopterous Eggs and Larvæ from the Exterior of Aircraft Fuselages  M. Laird 1950 Nature 2
Stability of the Adenosinetriphosphatase System in Animal Tissues  M. Marquette 1950 Science 4
Determination of DDT by Bioassay C. Pagan 1950 Science 4
Cross Tolerances in Resistant Houseflies J. Pratt 1950 Science 6
Development and Viability of Drosophila melanogaster on a Medium Containing DDT  B. Kalina 1950 Science 9
D.D.T. and ‘Gammexane’ as Residual Insecticides against Anopheles maculatus in Malaya  R. Wharton 1950 Nature 16
Insecticidal Action of DDT E. Skerrett 1950 Nature 32
The Detoxification of DDT by Resistant Houseflies and Inhibition of This Process by Piperonyl Cyclonene  A. Perry 1950 Science 71
Fat Deposits in the Kidney in Chronic Intoxication of the Dog by Hexachlorocyclohexane  M. Dallemagne 1950 Science 114
Houseflies Resistant to Benzene Hexachloride  J. Gahan 1950 Science 204
DDT as a Residual Insecticide against A. letifer and A. maculatus in Malaya  C. Nair 1951 Nature 2
Synergistic Action of DDT and BHC Combined Sprays R.Pal 1951 Nature 2
DDT and BHC as Residual Insecticides in Malaya  R. Wharton 1951 Nature 4
Effects of DDT upon Different Species of Mosquitoes in Malaya  J. Reid 1951 Nature 5
Fly Reactions to Insecticidal Deposits: a New Test Technique  F. Baranyovits 1951 Nature 9
Malaria Eradication Scheme, Mauritius  C. Dowling 1951 Nature 15
The Resistance of DDT‐resistant Drosophila to Other Insecticides  R. Weiner 1951 Science 18
Duration of Action of Residual DDT Deposits on Adobe Surfaces  W. Downs 1951 Science 24
Sorption of Solid Insecticides by Dried Mud  A. Hadaway 1951 Nature 26
Inheritance of Resistance to DDT in the Housefly, Musca domestica L. C. Harrison 1951 Nature 31
Resistance of Houseflies to Ddt F. Winteringham 1951 Nature 43
Mechanism of Resistance to Insecticide in Houseflies  J. Busvine 1951 Nature 197
Scientific Contributions on Perstitent Organic Pollutants
Phosphorus as a Factor Preventing DDT‐Dehydrochlorination  H. Maes 1952 Nature 3
Effects of House Spraying on African Anophelines  P. Wilkinson 1952 Nature 4
Inactivation of DDT by Soils  A. Hadaway 1952 Nature 5
Lipoid Solubility as a Factor in the Toxicity of Contact Insecticides  S Pradhan 1952 Nature 16
Examination of Human Fat for the Presence of DDT  G. Pearce 1952 Science 25
Selection for DDT Resistance in a Beneficial Insect Parasite  D. Pielou 1952 Science 36
DDT Resistance in Korean Body Lice  H. Hurlut 1952 Science 53
Insect Resistance to Insecticides  R. Beard 1952 Science 95
Microanatomical Study of DDT‐moribund Anopheles quadrimaculatus Say J. Jones 1953 Science 2
Effects of DDT and BHC on Soil Arthropods  J. Sheals 1953 Nature 5
Synergistic Actions of Carbon Dioxide with DDT in the Central Nervous System  G. Pollock 1953 Science 12
Amount of Gamma‐Benzene Hexachloride picked up by Resistant Houseflies bred on a Medium containing Benzene Hexachloride  F. Bradbury 1953 Nature 19
DDT Detoxification Product in American Cockroaches  J. Butts 1953 Science 19
Adsorption of DDT on Suspended Solids in River Water and its Role in Black‐fly Control  F. Fredeen 1953 Nature 31
Forms of Insecticide‐Resistance in Houseflies and Body Lice  J. Busvine 1953 Nature 56
Toxic Chemicals in Agriculture and their Effect on Foodstuffs  F. Aylward 1954 Nature 1
Occurrence of Dieldrin‐resistance in Wild Musca domestica L. in England  K. Goodwin 1954 Nature 6
Effect of DDT on the Metabolism of Khapli Wheat Seedlings  F. Forsyth 1954 Nature 8
Metabolism of Gamma‐Benzene Hexachloride in Susceptible and Resistant Houseflies  F. Oppenorth 1954 Nature 17
Houseflies Resistant to a Group of Chlorinated Hydrocarbon Insecticides  J. Busvine 1954 Nature 56
A New Group of DDT Synergists  E. Bergmann 1955 Nature 12
Differences between Rates of Metabolism of Benzene Hexachloride in Resistant and Susceptible Houseflies  F. Oppenorth 1955 Nature 14
Effect of Arasan‐Treated Corn on Laying Hens  P. Waibel 1955 Science 15
Effect of DDT on Enzymatic Oxidation and Phosphorylation J. Sacklin 1955 Science 25
A Case of DDT Poisoning in Fish  E. Burden 1956 Nature 11
Cumulative Effect of Sub‐Lethal Doses of Insecticides on Houseflies  A. Hadaway 1956 Nature 17
Dehydrochlorination of DDT by Resistant Houseflies and Mosquitoes  A. Brown 1956 Nature 20
Effect of DDD and Some of Its Derivatives on Plasma 17‐OH‐Corticosteroids in the Dog  F. Cobey 1956 Science 20
Insecticide Resistance in Anopheles gambiae Giles  G. Davidson 1956 Nature 33
Insecticide Resistance in Anopheles gambiae Giles  R. Elliot 1956 Nature 34
Effect of Changes in Humidity on the Toxicity and Distribution of Insecticides sorbed by some Dried Soils  F. Barlow 1956 Nature 44
Normal Resistance‐level of Anopheles funestus Giles to Insecticides  R. Elliot 1957 Nature 4
Improved Persistence of Dieldrin Deposits on Sorptive Mud Surface  P. Gerolt 1957 Nature 7
Specific DDT‐Resistance in Houseflies  R. Kerr 1957 Nature 15
Effect of DDT on Egg‐laying by Oscinella frit L.  T. Legowski 1958 Nature 1
Laboratory Variations in Mortality of the Mosquito, Culex fatigans Wied., exposed to DDT T. Koshi 1958 Nature 2
Dosage–Mortality Curves for Houseflies Susceptible and Resistant to DDT P. Hewlett 1958 Nature 3
Effects of Simulium Control on Insectivorous Fishes  P. Corbet 1958 Nature 6
A New Type of Insecticide  Z. Ogita 1958 Nature 12
Influence of DDT and Lindane on Chordotonal Organs in the Cockroach  G. Becht 1958 Nature 30
‘Vapour Toxicity’ of Solid Insecticides  P. Gerolt 1959 Nature 6
Varietal Resistance to Spray Damage in Barley  J. Hayes 1959 Nature 33
Metabolism of Benzene 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